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Professor Xuhui Lee 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
This volume is a collection of essays based on a lecture series course taught in the 
School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University in the fall semester of 
2008. The course explored the environmental ramifications of economic growth in 
China and the challenges that growth poses to protecting China’s natural resources 
and preserving its biodiversity. The course discussed the scientific foundation for 
environmental decision­making and strategies for engaging the Chinese government, 
private, and non­government sectors in sustainable development. Eleven prominent 
environmental scholars were invited to Yale to present lectures and join the course 
discussion with Yale faculty and students. Their presentations and the subsequent 
discussions, written up by students in the course and approved by the scholars 
themselves, form the basis for the individual chapters in the book. A short biography 
of each scholar appears at the end of the chapter presenting his or her material, along 
with a short biography of the student author. 
The lecture series was motivated by three broad questions: 1) What are the most 
pressing environmental problems China faces now and in the future? 2) Which 
problems are confined to China’s national boundaries and which have a global 
footprint? 3) How can the international community contribute to China’s 
environmental reform? 
The rationale for the lecture series was simple. China is the fastest growing economy 
in the world. Associated with its rapid growth are environmental pollution, loss of 
biodiversity, and depletion of natural resources. The central government of China, in 
recognition of these environmental challenges, is seeking policies and regulations that 
can promote sustainable development “in harmony with nature.” Some of the 
environmental damages are not confined to China’s national boundaries. In our 
opinion, it is imperative that developed countries play a constructive role in helping 
China meet these challenges. The fusion of western environmental thinking with China’s 
reality will help promote stewardship of natural resources in China and worldwide. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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The course was a 3­hour weekly lecture and discussion. In the first half of the 
meeting, which was open to the whole Yale community, the invited speaker lectured 
on a topic in his or her area of expertise. In the second half, the speaker and I led a 
discussion with participating students. A cheese and wine gathering that followed the 
lecture gave the invited guest an opportunity to interact with the faculty and students 
in an informal setting. 
Professor Jianguo Liu (middle) speaking to students at the reception after his lecture 
Photo credit: Yong Zhao 
Active student participation was an exciting aspect of the course. Prior to each 
class meeting, all the students wrote a detailed critique of the background readings, 
which was very helpful in framing the issues for an in­depth class discussion. The 
students had the opportunity to play host to invited speakers, arranging one­on­one 
meetings as well as social events during their visits, and were each assigned the role of 
moderating one discussion session. The students were also tasked with writing an 
essay on the assigned topic. 
The book chapters represent a joint effort between the students and the speakers. 
The writing was carried out by the student author and was based on the lecture given 
by the speaker and supplemented with ideas raised during the class discussion. For 
the benefit of a non­technical readership, several chapters contain additional 
background information provided by the student authors that was not covered by the 
lecture. 
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Professor Jiming Hao (center, front row) attending dinner hosted by students 
Photo credit: Yong Zhao 
The book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores the developing 
environmental relationship between the U.S. and China. Chapter 3 discusses 
partnerships between non­state actors in EU universities and research institutes and 
their Chinese counterparts. Chapter 4 argues that many seemingly unrelated factors 
of human and natural systems are vital to understanding how best to protect the 
environment. In Chapter 5, lessons of a Beijing­based environmental NGO are 
analyzed to provide insights into how non­governmental actors can effectively 
participate in environmental management. Chapter 6 discusses the role of the 
circular economy, circular industry, and ecocities in meeting the challenges arising 
from industrialization and population growth. The next two chapters (Chapters 7 
and 8) deal with air pollution and global warming issues related to energy use and 
consumption habits. Chapter 9 takes the reader to China’s west where a balancing act 
is played out between human and wildlife needs. Chapter 10 evaluates scenarios of 
environmental impacts associated with livestock farming. Chapters 11 and 12 present 
an analysis of two specific pollution cases, the first on the status of air pollution in the 
Pearl River Delta in southern China and the second on water pollution in Lake Taihu 
in central China. The last chapter (Chapter 13) is a synthesis of the cross­cutting 
themes that have emerged out of the individual chapters. A Chinese version of 
Chapter 13 is appended at the end of the book. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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CHAPTER 2 
Greening the Dragon: The U.S.­China
Environmental Relationship* 
Dr. Gary Waxmonsky 




In the words of Daniel Esty, Professor of Environmental Law and Policy at Yale and
former adviser to President Obama’s transition team, there is good and bad news
regarding China’s environmental trajectory: “The good news is, from a global
environmental perspective, if we get China on the right course, almost nothing else
matters.But the bad news is, if we don’t get China on the right course,almost nothing
else matters.” For this reason, the United States­China environmental relationship is
arguably the most important bilateral effort of the 21st century.
This chapter explores the developing environmental relationship between the
United States and China, drawing upon Dr. Waxmonsky’s extensive experience in
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of International Affairs.** After
providing background information on China’s environmental issues and the history
of U.S.­China environmental policy, the chapter focuses upon new bilateral efforts,
such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), that attempt to tackle both short­
term and long­term environmental issues in Asia’s largest country.
Thanks to bilateral efforts like the SED and China’s internal elevation of its 
environmental agency to ministry status, the outlook for U.S.­China bilateral
relations is bright. Strides have been made in areas such as water pollution, air
particulates, and even complex issues like climate change. However, such 
achievements have come at the behest of particular political actors on both sides,
so maintaining their efforts through political transitions will be key for the next
group of U.S.­China environmental leaders. 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
September 15, 2008 by Dr. 
Waxmonsky as part of a 
graduate course taught by 
Professor Xuhui Lee entitled 
“China’s Environment.” The 
paper was written by 
Benjamin Jacobs, a student in 
the course, and has been 
approved by Dr. Waxmonsky. 
The paper incorporates 
material from the lecture, the 
discussion session after the 
lecture with Dr. Waxmonsky, 
as well as background 
material on the lecture topic 
prepared by the students. For 
short biographies of the 
authors, please go to the end 
of the chapter. 
** The views expressed in this 
chapter are those solely of 
the two authors, Dr. 
Waxmonsky and Mr. Jacobs. 
In particular, the views 
expressed herein do not 
represent those of the EPA or 
any other arm of the U.S. 
government. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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china’s environmental crisis 
“If you care about global environmental quality, no single nation is more 
important than China.” –Gary Waxmonsky 
China’s environmental issues are well documented. The country is riddled with both 
short­term (e.g. water pollution) and long­term (e.g. climate change) environmental 
problems. The short­term problems are often highly localized, while the long­term 
ones are increasingly dispersed. The responses of the multilayered Chinese party­state 
reflect these differences. Short­term, point­source environmental crises are typically 
dealt with swiftly to assuage an anxious public. Long­term, complex issues involving 
multiple sources, on the other hand, tend to fall by the wayside. While every level of 
Chinese government is increasingly focused upon environmental concerns, it is 
difficult to quantify the impacts of issues that span multiple regions or years. In most 
cases, economic incentives continue to trump environmental concerns for leaders at 
the county and provincial levels. 
Figure 1 Population densities in China (number of people per square kilometer) 
Source: China County Population Census (ACMR 2004) 
To a certain extent, the scale of China both geographically and demographically 
explains its unique environmental challenges. China is a large continental region like 
the United States, Canada, Russia, and Brazil, which means that there are stark 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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regional differences across a number of metrics. China’s western regions contain 40 
percent of the landmass but only 10 percent of the population. The country’s 
increasingly developed eastern areas house the remaining 1.2 billion citizens, with 
some urban areas maintaining the highest population densities in the world (see 
Figure 1 above). In addition to this uneven population distribution, China’s provinces 
exhibit extreme differences in GDP per capita, property values, water resource 
availability, vulnerability to climate change impacts, and energy use per capita. Due 
to the structure of China’s government at the city, county, provincial, and central 
levels, these differences can often serve as roadblocks to effective environmental 
policy in interprovince issues.1 
background on u.s.­china relations 
“Getting the U.S. to cooperate with and understand China’s multiple 
challenges—enormous development alongside of its pollution control and 
natural resource management issues—is one of the great issues of our era.” 
–Daniel Esty 
Joint efforts between the United States and Chinese governments on environmental 
issues began shortly after China’s great opening to the world in the late 1970s, 
paralleling economic collaboration at the time. China has maintained a national 
environmental policy center since the late 1970s (although its name and position have 
changed considerably), and the first formal bilateral undertaking with the U.S. was 
achieved in 1980. This was the U.S.­PRC Environmental Protection Protocol (EPP), 
which outlined environmental initiatives and formalized the structure for 
cooperation. It followed shortly after the 1979 U.S.­PRC Science and Technology 
(S&T) Agreement, which established similar guidelines for government­to­
government scientific exchange. It is worth noting that, through the 1980s, U.S.­China 
environmental cooperation was largely limited to joint research on problems such as 
the health effects of indoor air pollution. Collaboration on environmental policy, law, 
and governance would come only much later. Subsequent iterations of both the U.S.­
PRC EPP and U.S.­PRC S&T Agreement remain guiding documents for bilateral 
cooperation today. 
Collaboration on environmental issues in both the public and private spheres 
increased in China for the following two decades, as the country continued its 
socioeconomic opening. But the next significant event in terms of China’s 
international environmental policy did not occur until 1998, when the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) elevated the status of the National Environmental 
Protection Administration (NEPA) to the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA). This shift sent a signal to the international community that 
the CCP would be newly dedicated to environmental issues, and the party’s 
commitment was reflected accordingly with additional resources for SEPA. Direct 
exchange between the PRC’s SEPA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
1 Sources for this section 
include CFR and the World 
Bank. A full citation for each of 
these references is available in 
the Works Cited page at the 
end of the paper. 
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2 For more on this, see the 
annual hearings of the U.S.­
China Economic and Security 
Review Commission in the 
Works Cited section. 
(EPA) then increased during the final years of the Clinton administration and the 
first years of the Bush administration. 
Increased bilateral efforts resulted in a formative international agreement signed 
in December 2003. This instrument, known as the U.S.­China Environmental 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), established the policy and administrative 
rules that have governed bilateral environmental relations to date. Most significantly, 
it established a Joint Committee for Environmental Cooperation (JCEC), which is to 
meet every two years in plenary session. In this forum, the U.S. EPA Administrator, 
China’s Minister of Environmental Protection, and their senior deputies come 
together regularly to review cooperation under the MoU’s various annexes and to 
prioritize efforts for the coming years. The JCEC structure ensures that cooperation 
is fully coordinated across all relevant units of the EPA and the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and accurately reflects the capabilities and interests of 
both agencies. However, cooperation under the JCEC is limited to the domestic 
mandates of both agencies, whereas environmental challenges in large, complex 
economies are often related to factors outside the purview of environmental 
regulators. This problem has become increasingly apparent over time.2 
Table 1 Goals and achievements of the Tenth Five Year Plan (2000­2005) 
Actual 2005 Comparison 
Actual Planned (completed by with Planned 
Indicators 2000 2005 6/17/06) 2005 (+/­ %) 
Air Pollution 
SO2 emissions 19.9 17.9 25.5 42 
Industry 16.1 14.5 21.7 50 
Domestic 3.8 3.5 3.8 9 
Soot Emissions 11.7 10.6 11.8 11 
Industry 9.5 8.5 9.5 12 
Domestic 2.1 2.1 2.3 10 
Industrial Dust Emissions 10.9 8.98 9.1 1 
Water Pollution 
COD discharge 14.5 13.0 14.1 8 
Industry 7.0 6.7 5.5 18 
Domestic 7.4 6.5 8.6 32 
Ammonia Nitrogen 1.8 1.65 1.5 ­9 
Industry 0.8 0.7 0.525 25 
Domestic 1.1 0.9 0.973 8 
Source: Estimations based upon China Environmental Yearbook 2001 and 2006, the 10th Five Year Plan for 
Environmental Protection and status of the China environment report, 2005 (see Yearbook for units of emission 
amounts). 
In November 2005, the JCEC convened in Washington, D.C., during an unexpected 
time of change in Chinese environmental policy. Shortly after the plenary session, the 
Songhua River spill occurred and SEPA Minister Xie Jinhua was removed from his post 
by the CCP. Notwithstanding this major development, cooperation under the MoU 
continued apace. In 2006, China’s Eleventh Five­Year Plan (FYP) began and built upon 
the environmental progress of the Tenth FYP (see Table 1 above). Notable goals of the 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Eleventh FYP include: a 20 percent national reduction in energy intensity (energy used 
per unit of GDP), and a 10 percent reduction in “major contaminants” (including 
sulfur dioxide in the air and Chemical Oxygen Demand, or COD, in the water). These 
significant goals are both slated to be achieved by the end of the FYP in 2010. 
In September 2006, the Bush administration established the U.S.­China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue (SED). This bilateral initiative, which was administered by the office 
of then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, represents an unprecedented effort to energize 
and coordinate meaningful bilateral policy in every arena except security. The SED will 
be discussed in detail here, but there is one more significant change to note before moving 
forward to bilateral goals and achievements. In March 2008, the CCP elevated the SEPA 
to full ministry status, re­naming it the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). 
Some claimed that this elevation was merely environmental window dressing before the 
2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. Regardless of the intent, the change signifies 
China’s increased political commitment to addressing environmental issues, and the 
MEP has received increased symbolic, economic, and political capital.3 
today’s bilateral relations 
While the U.S. EPA’s relationship with China dates to the early 1980s, only fairly recently 
have bilateral efforts shifted from long­term joint research to real­time issues like 
regional air quality management and enforcement of environmental regulations. In 
short, the role of the EPA shifted from scientific liaison to strategic consultant. Through 
the development of both institutional and personal relationships, U.S. governmental 
actors gained the access necessary to provide advice on high­impact environmental 
policy. Over the past decade, the Chinese have been increasingly receptive to such advice 
as motivations for the bilateral relationship have developed on both sides. 
Media reports in the West often cite the transfer of air pollution across the Pacific 
from China to the U.S., which could serve as one motivation for bilateral 
environmental efforts. While hemispheric transfer is certainly a factor, it is worthy of 
note that to date the EPA lacks empirical evidence about the percent or types of air 
pollution in the U.S. that can be directly attributed to China. However, there are 
several other more measurable factors on the U.S. side. The American government is 
interested in Chinese performance in multilateral environmental regimes (MERs). 
Washington remains concerned about the safety of U.S. imports from China and the 
environmental components associated with that issue. Looking at the long term, U.S. 
political actors seek to understand China’s position regarding greenhouse gas 
reductions. The U.S. remains concerned about China’s environmental footprint both 
in the Asia Pacific region and in developing areas like Africa. In terms of economic 
development, the U.S. government seeks to establish political ties as a point of entry 
for private firms that sell green goods and services. And finally, the U.S. has a global 
interest in increased transparency, accountability, and public participation, related to 
both environmental issues and political development more generally. 
Cooperation under the EPA­MEP MoU currently addresses the following 
categories: (1) air pollution (2) water pollution (3) toxic substances (4) hazardous and 
3 For more information, see 
Paulson 2008 and World Bank 
2007. 
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Works cited for this section 
include Paulson 2008 and 
U.S.­China Economic and 
Security Review Commission 
2008. 
solid wastes and (5) environmental law and enforcement. The structure of the current 
MoU mandates the creation of different annexes, each of which addresses one of these 
issue areas and is led by a different part of EPA. The annexes have had different impacts 
depending upon the needs of the Chinese and the abilities of the EPA, as well as each 
party’s willingness to partake in information exchange. Regardless of the differences 
between annexes, the premise behind each of these partnerships is that China can 
benefit from U.S. experience—both positive and negative—and wants to do so.4 
the sed – a revolutionary approach 
The Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) represents the best effort to date between the 
U.S. and PRC on high­level and high­impact environmental efforts. The first 
discussions about the SED occurred in August 2006—only one month after Henry 
Paulson, Jr. became Secretary of the Treasury. The SED is essentially a process 
whereby the Secretary of the Treasury meets with one of the four Chinese Vice 
Premiers every six months to discuss everything in U.S.­China relations that does not 
directly deal with security affairs. On the U.S. side, this dialogue is informed by what 
the administration views as core values: transparency, the rule of law, and responsible 
international engagement. The discussion ranges from issues like currency reform 
and foreign direct investment to clean energy and climate change. The EPA and 
SEPA/MEP have been involved in the policy­making process and the semiannual 
meetings since the program’s inception. 
Figure 2 Agreeing to the ten­year E&E Framework 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson(right) and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan shake hands after sign­
ing the U.S.­China 10­year cooperation agreement on energy and environmental protection during the press 
conference at the U.S. Treasury Department in Washington, June 18, 2008. (Xinhua Photo) 
The significance of the SED meetings cannot be overstated. High­ranking officials 
from both the U.S. and PRC spend approximately two days together at each semiannual 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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session, presenting information from their respective agencies in order to plan policy 
for the future. This type of engagement is unprecedented and unparalleled between a 
Western actor and China, and its continued success is seen by many as crucial to the 
overall bilateral relationship. As we discuss later in greater detail, the SED currently rests 
largely on the shoulders of Secretary Paulson and his personal rapport in China. 
Whether this type of relationship is sustainable depends largely upon the ability of the 
next U.S. administration to leverage Secretary Paulson’s achievements and build upon 
them. In China, personal relations retain the utmost importance, so the staff changes in 
the new administration will present an even larger challenge to actors on the U.S. side. 
For the most part, energy and environmental issues have been addressed in 
tandem under the SED. Both sides have viewed China’s energy consumption and 
environmental issues as inextricably linked, so approaching these issues from a joint 
policy perspective would be more meaningful than examining each in isolation. The 
clearest connection between energy and environment in China is air pollution, since 
it tends to be the direct outcome of increased energy production and consumption 
(i.e., the use of fossil fuels). Finally, another reason for this paired approach to energy 
and environment is that both sides view this aspect of the SED as “low­hanging fruit,” 
where compatible interests are clearer than on such issues as currency reform, capped 
gas prices, and intellectual property rights. 
At the fourth SED session in 2008, both parties finalized a document called the Ten 
Year Framework for Energy and Environmental Cooperation. Secretary Paulson 
developed the idea for the Framework in 2007 in order to insure a long­term legacy of 
the SED—one not tied to any individual political actor. The Framework goes far 
beyond the topics addressed under the EPA­MEP MoU. In addition to clean air and 
clean water, it encompasses clean and efficient electricity generation, clean and efficient 
transportation, and specific topics of nature conservation (e.g., protected areas 
management). Energy efficiency is likely to be added to this menu in 2009. The 
Framework also introduces the concept of “EcoPartnerships,” which seek to pair 
nongovernmental entities on each side. Due to the recent signing of the Framework, it 
is still difficult to determine its effectiveness. This question, like many others, still 
largely depends on resources and political commitment. One larger goal of the 
Framework is a trickle­down impact on other aspects of U.S.­China bilateral relations, 
such as technology transfer in non­green industries and increased economic 
collaboration between state and corporate actors. In short, if the Framework 
establishes formalized channels of coordination on energy and the environment, these 
channels can potentially facilitate similar exchange between nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), local communities, and private corporations in each country.5 
constraints on environmental collaboration 
“The resource limitations are not just financial—a few motivated, bilingual 
employees can accomplish a lot more than dozens of less­motivated employees 
that don’t know the language or the culture. But getting that kind of talent 
into a domestic agency is not that easy, and it’s the China relationship now 
that needs that kind of support.” –Gary Waxmonsky 
5 For more on the SED, see 
Paulson 2008 and U.S.­China 
Economic and Security Review 
Commission 2008. 
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A major obstacle in any cooperative international relationship is limited resources. 
Despite its recent elevation, the MEP still maintains a relatively small staff of about 
500 people in Beijing. The issue of resources is equally significant in terms of the U.S. 
EPA. There is no central appropriation for international environmental cooperation 
within the EPA, whether with China or any other country. Thus, the needs of a 
collaborative program like the SED compete directly with the domestic needs of the 
EPA, particularly in an era of increased environmental concern at home and 
increasingly restrictive budget constraints. 
Once information is exchanged between the EPA and the MEP, an additional 
constraint is implementation within China. This constraint arises for two interrelated 
reasons: (1) limited institutional capacity and (2) the fragmentation of the Chinese 
governmental structure. Despite the elevation of the MEP to ministry status, its 
funding remains miniscule compared to the departments charged with economic and 
infrastructure development in China. Even if the MEP is financially able to push 
through environmental legislation at the central level, enforcing it throughout 
China’s fragmented governmental structure presents another challenge. This 
fragmentation is both vertical and horizontal. Horizontally, the MEP has to work 
with other actors like the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR), the Ministry of 
Urban­Rural Construction (MOC), and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) in order to accomplish meaningful policy changes. Vertically, 
the centralized MEP has to coordinate with various actors at the provincial, county, 
and even township levels, particularly local Environmental Protection Bureaus 
(EPBs). The decentralized fragmentation supports an imbalanced incentive 
structure, one that favors energy­ and pollution­intensive economic development. To 
date, the EPA has seen little evidence of provincial officials disciplined for failing to 
meet an environmental or energy efficiency metric. Thus, there is a real danger that 
talks sparked by the JCEC and SED will remain precisely that—talk. 
other international actors 
While this chapter has focused upon bilateral environmental efforts between the U.S. 
and PRC governments, various other international efforts related to China’s 
environment are under way. The totality of bilateral interaction between the U.S. and 
China is a more complex picture, including the work of governments, corporations, 
and nongovernmental organizations. This chapter has focused mainly on official 
governmental relationships. In China’s highly centralized one­party political system, 
this focus allows insight into the negotiations with the largest and most immediate 
impact. However, additional environmental partnerships with China can be found 
in new multilateral agreements or in activities of established international 
organizations. 
Significant efforts in this regard include: the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) on 
Clean Development and Climate, which is a 2006 effort of the Bush administration 
toward clean development in the region; Methane to Markets (M2M), which is an 
international partnership established in 2004 with the goal of safely harnessing 
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methane from coal plants and mines and recycling it as an energy source; the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which includes most nations of the 
world including the U.S. and China; and the “Major Economies” Process, which is a 
multilateral effort of the largest greenhouse gas emitting countries to incorporate 
clean technologies. China is also both a recipient and provider of funds to the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), which has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 
support of China’s environmentally sound development. 
There are significant international relationships affecting China’s environmental 
policy in which the U.S. holds no influence. The European Union (EU) is the most 
instructive example of this fact. The EU has played a similar role to the U.S. in China 
through the investment of both economic and human capital in green efforts. The EU 
is currently drafting a multilateral agreement with China on environmental 
governance, which when finalized will provide significant resources to support EU­
China partnerships of an environmental nature. It is worthy of note that another 
constraint on effective international environmental cooperation is the lack of 
meaningful coordination between international “donors.” To date, significant actors 
such as the EU, U.S., and Japan have failed to fully coordinate their environmental 
efforts in China. This failure appears to stem from the economic incentive structure, 
as each country attempts to position its government and corporations first in China’s 
expanding green market.6 
looking ahead 
“What will happen to the management of U.S.­China relations [through the 
current U.S. political transition] is very much in play right now.” –Gary 
Waxmonsky 
The largest question regarding the future of U.S.­China bilateral relations, 
environmental or otherwise, remains the next U.S. administration. The Obama 
administration will need to decide whether or not to continue the SED and the 
relationships established within it, and will have the opportunity to refashion 
bilateral environmental relations as China formulates its next (twelfth) Five­Year 
Plan. The new administration will probably not dismantle the SED for fear of being 
seen as downgrading a vital bilateral relationship. But at the same time, it may not 
choose to infuse the relationship with the dynamism and political commitment that 
Secretary Paulson brought to it. Without strong central leadership, centrifugal forces 
are likely to reassert themselves. The strategic nature of the relationship, and the 
important role of energy and environmental cooperation in this relationship, may 
diminish in the months and years ahead. 
There are areas of environmental cooperation with China that hold promise 
regardless of whether the SED continues in its current form. These include 
environmental information management, environmental finance/“green credit,” 
6 For more on the significance 
of additional international 
actors, see Chapter 3 in this 
volume, which was coau­
thored by Dr. Alice Newton. 
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greening supply chains, tariff relief for environmental goods and services, and 
sustainable ports and shipping. Some of these areas will involve a shift away from 
purely government­to­government cooperation, in an effort to infuse Chinese firms 
with increased environmental awareness. An instructive example is “green credit,” 
which entails making environmental performance a criterion in access to bank loans 
for Chinese entrepreneurs. Such financial incentives will be critical in moving China 
toward credible economy­wide or sectoral greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. China’s 
SED commitment to launch national sulfur dioxide emissions trading by the 
beginning of the next FYP in 2010 should also help position the country for eventual 
adoption of GHG emissions trading. Still, the success of this type of market 
mechanism requires a foundation of reliable, publicly accessible information and 
consistent enforcement. 
In China, the CCP is striving to improve coordination between levels of 
government and to strengthen environmental incentives for officials. Some of this 
change has been bottom up, since economic growth has harmed certain segments of 
the population and prompted social action. In such cases, the human impact of 
environmental degradation catalyzed government action. To prevent increased social 
unrest, the CCP seems prepared to accommodate increased transparency and 
accountability. The recent establishment of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection's six regional environmental supervision centers around the country 
(Beijing, Xi’an, Shenyang, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Nanjing) has the potential to 
enhance enforcement of China’s national environmental goals across the various 
provincial and local jurisdictions, just as EPA’s regional offices are designed to do in 
the U.S. The jury is still out, but the U.S.­China environmental relationship seems 
headed in the right direction. 
discussion questions 
1. Best approach? (economic, political, health, cultural) 
Which approach is most effective to address these issues with Chinese leaders today? 
Does the CCP respond to quantitative, economic analysis like the World Bank’s? Are 
bilateral discussions phrased in terms of the health of the environment, or the health 
of the Chinese people? Are culture and ethics used to frame the discussion as well as 
economic costs? 
2. Top­down vs. bottom­up 
To what extent does the U.S. government, American nonprofits, and other non­pri­
vate organizations work with these actors on bottom­up approaches? Furthermore, 
what improvements can be made to their approach? Thus, is it possible that change 
in China is also coming from the grassroots level? Are the public and NGOs acting in 
opposition to, or in step with, the central government? Does the U.S. engage these 
actors on environmental issues as well as senior CCP officials? 
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3. The development of the rule of law and free flow of information in China 
Why do we focus on making China look legally and administratively like the U.S. 
when the U.S. appears to be unable (or unwilling) to mitigate climate change? Does 
mitigation, and therefore environmental stewardship and improvement in general, 
involve something more than an established rule of law, federalism, transparency, 
etc.? And if this is true, how does this change the U.S.­China environmental 
relationship? What concrete strides have been made in terms of the transparency of 
government action and information? 
4. The relationship between environmental policy and economic development 
To what extent does economic development need to be at the forefront of 
environmental discussions? Or can we define a set of environmental priorities as 
separate from development goals? Are economic discussions powerful places to bring 
in the environment or are environmental issues more effectively addressed directly? 
For example, the SED is set up to facilitate top­down economic discussion. How does 
this shape the direction of environmental discussions? What are the pros and cons? 
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CHAPTER 3 
EU Collaboration with China in 
Environmental Capacity Building* 
Dr. Alice Newton 
University of Algarve, Portugal 
Angel Hsu 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
While Chapter 2 in this book discussed the United States’ cooperation with China
on environmental concerns, this chapter explores similar efforts by the European
Union. Bilateral collaboration can take various forms. For example, the dialogue in
Chapter 2 with Gary Waxmonsky focused on government cooperation through the
Strategic Economic Dialogue. This chapter, on the other hand, explores
partnerships between non­state actors in Chinese and EU universities and research
institutes. Alice Newton discusses how capacity building in the Chinese 
environment aligns with the research priorities of the European Union under the
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). Recognizing that many environmental
problems that the EU faces are transboundary in nature and global in scope, the EU
has made working with Chinese counterparts in the area of scientific research a key
element of their strategy to address environmental challenges.
On­the­ground partnerships for knowledge exchange and capacity building are
important for giving the Chinese tools to effectively manage their environment.
Newton brings the perspective of a practitioner who has had years of experience
working hand­in­hand with Chinese partners on various research activities. One
example of capacity building is the Erasmus Mundus education exchange program,
which sponsors students from China to study in European universities and
European students to study in Chinese universities. The program also funds
Chinese scholars to teach in European universities and European scholars to teach
in Chinese universities. While the program clearly represents only one specific 
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example of capacity building, the Erasmus Mundus program can serve as a
potential model for other industrialized nations.
This chapter explores four main points: Why collaboration with China on
environmental issues is important; how the EU research priorities align with
China’s environment, focusing on one particular aspect of China’s environment,
coastal and marine ecosystems; how EU capacity building works through the
Erasmus Mundus program; and how EU­China collaboration in the environment
can be improved. 
“This lecture is really about how science policy and management [go] global. 
We really need to see how we can negotiate between countries to come together 
and to share joint research interests in order to move forward.” –Alice Newton 
introduction: china’s position in the global environment 
Harmony is a key principle in Chinese philosophy, and “harmonious development” a 
core goal of Chinese growth policy. Since Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms 
in 1978, China’s economy has grown tenfold and experienced double­digit average 
GDP growth rates annually. This growth, however, has challenged the idea of 
harmonious development with respect to the country’s environment. The statistics 
are not unfamiliar—China is home to sixteen of the world’s twenty most polluted 
cities; half of the country’s rivers are severely polluted; China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions and energy consumption are among the highest in the world; and high 
sulfur and nitrous dioxide emissions are causing acid rain and acute air pollution. 
China’s ruling “technocrats” are well aware of the environmental consequences of 
the country’s rapid industrialization. In 2004, the State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) and the National Bureau of Statistics launched a “Green GDP” 
initiative to calculate economic losses associated with China’s environmental 
degradation. They estimated that a loss of $64 billion in 2004, or 3.05 percent of 
China’s GDP, could be attributed to environmental degradation. The report also said 
that approximately 1.08 trillion RMB (roughly 135 billion U.S. dollars) would be 
needed to clean up all the industrial pollution and household waste produced, but 
that the Chinese government was only investing a fraction of the actual cost—190 
billion RMB (24 billion U.S. dollars).1 Although the results of the 2006 report were 
never released for political reasons, officials said that the methodologies used to 
calculate the “Green GDP” were low estimates of environmental damage to health 
and did not account for ecological impacts. However, politics aside, the preliminary 
results of the report attempted to place China’s dire environmental situation in a 
common, easily understood vernacular. 
When placed in the global context, China’s environmental problems are becoming 
increasingly transboundary in nature. At the root of many of these transboundary 
pollution problems is China’s reliance on coal. China depends on coal for 60 percent 
of its energy production, which is more coal intensive than the United States, Europe, 
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and Japan combined.2 The country burns over 2.7 billion tons of coal per year and is 
anticipated to burn 25 percent more by 2020. The effects of China’s appetite for coal 
are manifested not only in the country’s growing contribution to global greenhouse 
gas emissions, but also in the sulfur dioxide and particulate matter felt by 
neighboring countries such as South Korea and Japan, as well as the western United 
States. China’s migratory air pollution problems epitomize why China’s environ­
mental challenges are becoming a global concern. 
Reflective of China’s Olympic motto—“One World, One Dream”—China’s 
environmental problems necessitate outside engagement to collectively find 
solutions. Since countries such as those in the European Union have already 
industrialized and “cleaned up” their environments, we argue that this imbalance 
between the European Union and China “colors” the relationship between the two 
with regard to science and policy. Are developed countries simply exporting their 
pollution to developing countries like China and being hypocritical in chastising such 
countries for poor environmental performance? Industrialized countries must take 
leadership roles if they expect China to follow suit. 
Chinese industry represents an area that could benefit from the experience of 
international counterparts. While China in 2006 produced a sizeable portion of 
global steel, cement, aluminum, and other energy­ and greenhouse­gas­intensive 
goods (Figure 1), the Chinese manufacturing processes for these commodities are 
often less energy efficient than those found in other countries. For instance, the 
Chinese steel and cement industries consume 20 and 45 percent more energy, 
respectively, than the international average. Clearly, if Chinese industrialization is to 
follow a sustainable trajectory, international experience and partnerships can help 
China move toward its goal of more sustainable, harmonious development. 
This seemingly bleak overview of China’s environment is the reason why global 
coordination is needed to help China address its complex growth challenges. Many of 
the environmental problems China faces cannot be solved without the experience 
and leadership of other countries who historically have followed very similar 
development paths. However, given China’s 1.3 billion people and increasing 
consumption patterns, the question then arises as to whether China can afford to 
industrialize like its predecessors. 
Figure 1 China’s global share of production in selected sectors 
2 Bradsher, K. and D. Barboza. 
2006. Pollution from Chinese 
coal casts a global shadow. 
New York Times, June 11. 
Source: Rosen and Houser 2007 
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eu research priorities and the chinese environment 
In recognition of China’s importance in the global environment, collaboration with 
China on environmental research has become an important aspect of the EU agenda. 
To support research initiatives, the European Union created Framework Programmes 
for Research and Technological Development, referred to as Framework Programmes 
(FP). The first FP was initiated in 1984 with the idea of fostering transnational joint 
research projects by requiring EU­financed projects to have at least more than one EU 
3member state on a research team. While environmental concerns have been a 
component of the FPs since their inception, the FPs have since taken a more 
multidisciplinary systems approach to environmental research, incorporating 
economic and social dimensions. The ultimate goal of the EU Framework 
Programmes is to build a European Research Area based on education, research, and 
innovation that promotes cooperation across national borders. 
Structured in three­year increments, the EU Framework Programme is now in its 
seventh iteration, otherwise known as FP7. As demonstrated by the near exponential 
growth of the program’s budget (Figure 2), the European Union is investing heavily 
in scientific research to address the challenges of global change. The main 
environmental research objective of FP7 is to promote sustainable management of 
both the environment and natural resources. To accomplish this goal, FP7 seeks to 
further knowledge on complex interactions between the climate, ecosystems, and 
human activity and to develop appropriate technological solutions. 
Figure 2 The budget for the EU Framework Programmes from 1984 to the present day 
Source: European Commission 2008 
Specific points of action focus on: 
● forecasting changes in the global climate, ecology, earth and ocean systems; 
● developing tools and technologies for monitoring, prevention, and mitiga­
tion of environmental risks and pressures, including environmental health; 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
eu collaboration with china in environmental capacity building 
● sustaining both the natural and human­influenced environment. 
Climate change is at the top of the list of research priorities for FP7 (Figure 3). The 
European Union has been cautious in its approach to working with China in the area 
of climate change. As one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China 
is both sensitive to its contribution to global climate change and interested in the 
impacts, particularly in relation to coastal cities and agriculture. Rather than pointing 
blame at the Chinese for their growing greenhouse gas emissions, the dialogue 
regarding cooperation on climate change research should focus on win­win scenarios 
and payoffs for both parties. Thus, as the European Union seeks to mitigate China’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, one of the primary aims of such cooperation should 
concentrate on how China can effectively manage the effects of climate change. 
Figure 3 Research areas of the FP7 
Source: European Commission 2008 
Another critical research area in which there is potential for EU­China 
collaboration is environmental health. China faces a huge challenge with regard to 
environmental health. The World Bank estimates that there are 750,000 premature 
deaths per year due to pollution, while 500 million in China do not have access to safe 
drinking water.4 With these staggering numbers, environmental health represents an 
opportunity for the European Union to engage China in dialogue regarding joint 
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research. However, issues of environmental health remain a controversial and 
politically sensitive topic within the Chinese government. 
Water quality, management, and scarcity issues are also of prime importance for 
China’s environment. Three hundred cities in China are facing acute water shortages, 
and many of China’s rivers and lakes are severely polluted. One recent example of the 
deteriorating condition of China’s lakes is the May 2007 algal bloom of Lake Taihu in 
the Yangtze Delta Plain, bordering Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. High algal blooms 
(HAB) such as the Lake Taihu incident occur primarily due to anthropogenic activity 
and are a threat to the health of humans and organisms living in and around the lake. 
The hypoxia, or oxygen deprivation, that leads to HABs is the result of 
eutrophication, an influx of chemicals into a marine ecosystem that alters the 
nutrient balance of estuaries and coastal zones and reduces dissolved oxygen, on 
which some organisms depend. The following section discusses an example of EU­
China joint research on China’s coastal ecosystems. 
one example of eu­china collaboration: the erasmus mundus 
program 
Collaborative research is one mechanism by which implementation of capacity 
building occurs. In line with this strategy is the European Union’s educational 
exchange initiative called the Erasmus Mundus program. Appropriately named after 
Erasmus, a renowned fifteenth­century Dutch scholar and humanist, and mundus, 
the Latin word for “world,” the Erasmus Mundus program convenes world scholars 
for cooperation in higher learning. The European Commission first introduced the 
program in July 2001 with the goal of promoting intercultural understanding through 
exchanges with third­world countries.5 Students can select from a range of master’s 
courses. 6 Erasmus Mundus supports study in the natural sciences, geography, 
agriculture, forestry, engineering, and technology. 
Figure 4 The hypoxic area in the Yangtze (Changjiang) River estuary 
Source: Xiao et al. 2007 
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An example of an outcome of the Erasmus Mundus program is an academic study 
in which Professor Newton worked with Chinese academics to conduct a survey of 
one of China’s river estuaries—the Yangtze (Changjiang). 
The Yangtze River estuary (Figure 4) faces serious eutrophication and hypoxia: 
between 1959 and 2006, hypoxia increased in the estuary from 1,800 km2 to over 
15,000 km2. Being one of the largest rivers in the world, the Yangtze River estuary is 
also confronting problems of eutrophication and hypoxia in the adjacent area. The 
Chinese partners employed an internationally developed tool called Assessment of 
Estuarine Trophic Status (ASSETS), which determined the amount of eutrophication 
in the estuary using a pressure­state­response model based on three main indices: 
influencing factors, overall eutrophic condition, and future outlook. The study 
concluded that the ASSETS tool was a more useful way of evaluating coastal and 
estuarine systems in China than previous Chinese methods (Xiao et al. 2007). 
the future of eu­china collaboration 
“There’s a tricky balance between policy and politics. You have to be careful 
not to step over that line.” –Alice Newton 
Programs like FP7 and Erasmus Mundus are indicative of the European Union’s 
progression toward more science­based approaches to environmental policy. An 
example of this shift over the last few decades is the Land Ocean Interactions in the 
Coastal Zone (LOICZ) project,7 which aims to build capacity and provide training for 
water and coastal management. A core project under the International Geosphere­
Biosphere Programme (IGBP) and the International Human Dimensions 
Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), LOICZ provides projects and 
internship opportunities for Erasmus Mundus students interested in water and 
coastal management. 
LOICZ connects scientists from around the world who investigate changes in the 
biology, chemistry, and physics of the coastal zone. Although it primarily started as a 
network for research scientists in 1993, LOICZ has since expanded to include social, 
political, and economic sciences to reflect anthropogenic influences as well. 
Grounded in science­based approaches, the LOICZ consortium strives to bridge 
academic knowledge and policy. Newton admits that environmental decision making 
is often based on consultation of environmental managers rather than the scientific 
community. Therefore, if more knowledge­based training can be provided to 
environmental managers, the link between science and policy will also be 
strengthened. LOICZ recently opened a regional office or node in Yantai, China, and 
held a conference on continental margins research in Shanghai in September 2007. 
Chinese scholars have made a valuable contribution to the LOICZ program and are 
increasingly engaged in collaborating on international research. 
A similar capacity­building effort in coastal zones and management is the SPEAR 
(Sustainable options for People, catchment and Aquatic Resources) initiative,8 which 
7 http://www.loicz.org 
8 http://www.biaoqiang.org 
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has been in place since 1983 under FP4 as part of the EU’s International S&T 
Cooperation Programme (INCO). INCO’s research objectives focus on health and 
health systems, sustainable use of natural resources, food security, and cultural 
heritage. The SPEAR program’s goals are to develop and test an integrated framework 
for interpretation of coastal zone structure and dynamics in communities that are 
predominantly dependent on marine resources. In China these systems include 
Sanggou Bay, which is part of a rural watershed, and Huangdun Bay, which is situated 
in an industrial zone south of Shanghai. Both of these systems are characterized by 
community dependence on large­scale cultivation of seaweed, shellfish, and finfish 
for economic livelihood. The SPEAR project’s analytical approach attempts to assess 
optimal management for such areas, accounting for complex interactions between 
ecological processes and human activities. European Union scientists work closely 
with Chinese partners to provide a science­based approach to better management in 
these areas, building the capacity of local officials to sustainably grow and manage the 
natural resources of the area. 
While the European Union aims to expand collaboration with China in 
environmental capacity building, there are several challenges that confront future 
developments. As Waxmonsky of the U.S. EPA also admits,9 language is a barrier that 
plagues relationships between EU and Chinese actors. Two­way Erasmus Mundus 
exchanges, where EU students can study in China and receive intensive language 
training, could facilitate better cooperation in the future. Another challenge lies in 
determining the right partners for capacity­building exercises in China. Newton 
suggests that a “mapping exercise” of scientific laboratories and research institutions 
could ensure ideal matches and best fits between researchers in the European Union 
and China. Lastly, although the tide is slowly changing, more direct linkages between 
academics involved in capacity building in key countries like China and policy 
makers in the European Union would enhance the policy­making process. Perhaps 
the European Union could learn from the Chinese experience on this point. Many of 
China’s leaders, such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, as well as a high 
number of other government officials, have engineering degrees. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government frequently consults Chinese academic institutions for policy 
research and advice. 
Despite these challenges, Erasmus Mundus and other academic research programs 
are a model for on­the­ground collaboration between Chinese and EU counterparts. 
These programs represent practical implementation of capacity building rather than 
high­level, often­abstract dialogues between governments regarding environmental 
issues. Additionally, academic research is often viewed as nonpolitical and 
nonthreatening. As relatively “objective” exercises, scientific collaboration can in 
some ways be a more effective means of capacity building than other efforts, which 
must first navigate bureaucratic or political channels. 
conclusion 
This chapter explored the importance of bilateral cooperation in researching and 
understanding China’s environment, particularly coastal ecosystems, and how 
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capacity building works through academic exchange. While serving as potential 
model for other industrialized countries to engage with China on environmental 
issues, the Erasmus Mundus program and other similar efforts by the European 
Union can be improved, perhaps first through the realization that capacity building 
can be bidirectional. 
This perspective does not touch on the varied channels by which actors in both 
contexts join together to improve the global environment. Some of these actors 
include non­governmental organizations (NGOs), local government institutions, and 
private corporations. Albeit limited in scope, the experience described in this chapter 
is complementary to the Chinese goal of advancing a “scientific outlook on 
development” to achieve a more harmonious society. Building the capacity of 
Chinese academics to apply more quantitative tools and approaches will help China 
move toward a more sustainable growth trajectory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
China’s Environment and 
Globalization: Unexpected
Connections* 
Professor Jianguo Liu 
Michigan State University 
Marissa Matsler 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
Many seemingly unrelated factors of human and natural systems are in fact tightly
connected and vital to understanding how best to tackle the enormous challenge
of environmental protection in China. This is evidenced by multiple recent trends:
an increasing divorce rate leading to increased environmental degradation;
increased GDP from product exports increasing toxic pollution domestically;
increased sprawl and household construction leading to biodiversity loss in nature
reserves; and increased domestic forest cover leading to increased deforestation
internationally.
Governmental programs and goals conceived from separate studies on natural
and human systems often do not take into account underlying issues like those
identified above, although the Chinese government has been trying to promote
harmonious relationships between humans and nature. Suggested is an 
“environmental revolution” in China that takes a holistic approach to 
environmental protection in the context of globalization. 
introduction: setting the stage for a drama 
China is in a unique place in history. The economic standard of living of its citizens 
has increased dramatically over the past three decades, while at the same time its 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
September 29, 2008 by 
Professor Liu as part of a 
graduate course taught by 
Professor Xuhui Lee entitled 
“China’s Environment.” The 
paper was written by Marissa 
Matsler, a graduate student in 
the course, and has been 
approved by Professor Liu. The 
paper incorporates material 
from the lecture, the 
discussion session after the 
lecture with Professor Liu, as 
well as background material 
on the lecture topic prepared 
by the students. For short 
biographies of the authors, 
please go to the end of the 
chapter. 
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environmental quality is among the worst in the world. Amazing growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP) and international trade has made China one of the pivotal 
producers of the world’s goods, while a variety of industrial emissions poison its 
people and environment. Massive forestation policies are allowing China to begin to 
restore ecosystems while at the same time increasing its dependency on foreign wood 
imports and destroying forests elsewhere (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
The gap between an environmentally healthy and an economically prosperous 
China appears to grow larger every day (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu and Diamond 
2008; Liu et al. 2003; Lehrer 2008). As will be explored in the next few sections, there 
are many complex processes behind this gap. The traditional delineation of research 
into increasingly specified fields of social sciences and natural sciences has produced 
some understanding of the issues facing society and the natural world. However, this 
traditional approach to research often ignores the complicated relationship that 
society has with the natural world. This paper will focus on some complex and 
seemingly unrelated relationships by integrating social sciences and natural sciences 
via the Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) approach, in hopes of 
bringing about greater understanding and change for more effective environmental 
protection (Liu et al. 2007; Lehrer 2008). 
China’s environmental woes 
Environmental damages in China span all ecosystem types and have effects that reach 
beyond political boundaries. The most internationally visible pollution issue in 
China is air pollution. The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing raised awareness of this 
quality­of­life concern to a much larger global audience than ever before. 
Unfortunately, water pollution and biodiversity loss are also of serious environmental 
concern (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
Figure 1 Growth of total industrial waste gas emissions in China, 1994­2006 (amounts in 10 billion m3) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
Air pollution in China has been increasing at dangerous levels for quite some time. 
This is due mainly to the steady increase of industrial emissions over the past fifteen 
years, as summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Since 2000, China has been the world 
leader in SO2 emissions (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
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Figure 2 Comparison of particulate matter and gaseous industrial emissions in China, 1994­2006 (in
million metric tons) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
As depicted in Figure 3, this has resulted in severe increases in acid rainfall, which 
now affects about a quarter of China’s land. It is estimated that more than 400 million 
urban residents breathe “bad”, heavily polluted air in China (Pan 2007). 
Figure 3 Distribution of acid rain in China in 2006 
Source: http://showchina.org 
Water is also of extreme concern. Exponential increases in industrialization have 
greatly increased the demand for water and caused more severe water shortages. On 
the other hand, industrial wastewater, combined with agricultural runoff, has 
wreaked havoc on the natural hydrologic cycle of China’s waterways, causing 75 
percent of China’s lakes (Liu and Diamond 2005) as well as 70 percent of its rivers to 
be polluted (Pan 2007). The increase in wastewater output also affects marine systems 
in China. Eutrophication of China’s seas due to industrial and agricultural pollution 
has driven the number of red tides up from only 2­4 per year in the 1960s to nearly 
100 per year at the beginning of the 21st century (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
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A third environmental woe is biodiversity loss. Because China’s territory 
encompasses many different bioregions, there are a great number of unique species 
in China. From coastal monsoon climates to seemingly inhospitable extreme desert 
ecosystems, there is a huge variety of life (Liu et al. 2003). Ten percent of the world’s 
terrestrial vertebrate and higher plant species are found within China’s boundaries 
(Liu and Diamond 2005). That’s more than 2,300 terrestrial vertebrates and over 
30,000 higher plant species, half of which are found only in China (Liu et al. 2003). 
Unfortunately, 15­20 percent of them are endangered or threatened (Liu and 
Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2003) due to environmental pollution, habitat destruction, 
and other human activities. 
Impact on the people 
Of course, the people of China are directly bearing the brunt of the country’s 
environmental problems. It is estimated that environmental degradation accounts for 
a 7­20 percent loss of GDP across China’s provinces. For scale, that was approximately 
$200 billion in 2005 (Liu and Diamond 2008). This high price only takes into account 
effects that can be directly attributed to environmental problems, such as large 
environmental clean­ups related to pollution. For example, just before the 2008 
Olympics sailing competition in Qingdao, military forces were sent to remove macro 
algae by hand that had bloomed uncontrollably and made the race route impassible. 
The labor­intensive and time­consuming cleanup also involved more than 1,000 local 
volunteers. According to the People’s Daily, overall, the government of Qingdao 
planned to spend “over 200 million U.S. dollars every year, nearly 3 percent of the 
city’s annual GDP,” for environmental cleanups from 2003 to 2008. 
There are many other monetary effects of pollution on the Chinese workforce that 
are not included in the estimates of financial losses, due to the difficulty of accurate 
measuring. These unaccounted­for monetary losses include missed days of work and 
medical expenses from hospital visits due to illness caused by poor environmental 
quality. 
China is also paying for its environmental situation more than monetarily. It is 
estimated, astonishingly, that more than 700,000 deaths a year can be attributed to 
the air pollution alone in China (Liu and Diamond 2008). Another disturbing 
statistic shows that half of Chinese urban children have blood lead levels that exceed 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) standard maximum blood lead level, which 
is set at 100 micrograms per liter (Wu 2000). Recent studies have shown that even 
blood lead levels as low as 50 micrograms per liter can result in a variety of 
debilitating brain conditions (Lanphear 2000). This may cause a range of potential 
problems in China’s society as this generation of children grows up dealing with the 
effects of lead poisoning on their mental capacities. 
Social issues extend beyond human health and impede the progress of one of 
China’s most sacred governmental goals: harmonious society. Environmental 
degradation has caused increased numbers of social conflicts in recent years. A total 
of 51,000 severe social clashes were recorded in 2005 alone that were associated with 
environmental complaints. The number of appeals to the government for help 
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dealing with environmental issues is also on the rise, totaling 400,000 from the 
general public in 2005 (Pan 2007). 
globalization: a double­edged sword 
China’s environmental challenges are not just domestic. They have increasingly been 
becoming global challenges as a result of globalization. On the one hand, 
globalization has played a pivotal role in China’s economic miracle and exports of 
cheap products to many other countries. On the other hand, globalization has 
become a major driver of environmental degradation in both China and many other 
countries around the world. 
Imports and exports of goods and products 
China has the third­highest timber consumption in the world (Liu and Diamond 
2005). Timber imports have increased exponentially since 1998, when the logging ban 
in China took effect (Figure 4). In other words, the logging ban has had the 
unintended and unfortunate effect of exporting deforestation to other tropical 
regions of the world, negating many of the positive aspects of the observed Chinese 
reforestation (Figure 5) (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2008). 
Figure 4 Imports of timber to China, 1993­2006 
Source: International Tropical Timber Organization 
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Figure 5 Percent forest cover of total land cover in China, 1962­2006 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
Exports have played an even larger role than imports in environmental degradation. 
In recent decades, China has become a “world factory,” producing an increasingly large 
amount of goods for other countries around the world (Liu and Diamond 2005). As 
shown in Figure 6, this has brought increased monetary wealth to China. However, 
exports are of great concern because of pollution they create (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
Figure 6 Total value of imports and exports in China, 1980­2006 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
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Many of the factories involved in the production of exports use a variety of 
hazardous materials and create a great amount of greenhouse gas emissions. While the 
factories’ products are exported around the world, the hazardous waste used to produce 
them stays within the country. Production for industrial exports accounted for one­
third of 1,700 million tons of CO2 emissions in China in 2005 (Weber et al. 2008). 
Cultural imports 
The importation of the western lifestyle and habits has increased the level of 
consumption, not only in urban areas of China, but also in ecologically sensitive rural 
regions. For example, automobiles have become increasingly popular in China over 
the past few decades as a symbol of status and modernity. With rising standards of 
living, a continually increasing number of Chinese citizens are able to purchase cars 
(Liu and Diamond 2005). It is estimated that there were already 37 million vehicles on 
the road in 2006. The number of vehicles has continued to increase explosively. These 
automobiles have become increasingly important CO2 emitters in China. 
Household proliferation (rapid increase in the total number of households) has 
also spread across China. Traditionally, population growth was singled out as a 
primary driver of the problem. But recent studies suggest that household 
proliferation appears to play a more important role, especially in ecologically 
sensitive regions such as biodiversity hotspots. This is due to the realization that even 
when population growth levels off or declines, households continue to increase in 
number in many places in the world (Liu et al. 2003). 
“Environmental scientists have been paying a lot of attention to population 
size, which is important in terms of environmental impacts. But what we find 
is that in some areas, even with declining population size, not just a declining 
population growth rate, there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
households.” –Jianguo Liu 
Demand from more households sets off a chain reaction of production, such as 
cement and other building materials as well as household goods. Production of all of 
these goods greatly increases the environmental stress on China and the rest of the 
world (Liu, Daily, et al. 2003; Yu 2007). The amount of floor space per capita has 
grown from approximately 7 m2 in 1978 to nearly 30 m2 in 2006. This means that 
larger housing units have been built despite that fact that average household size 
(number of people in a household) has been declining, further decreasing efficiency 
and increasing emissions of pollutants such as CO2 (Liu 2008). 
One of the intriguing findings has been a connection between this growth in the 
number of households and the spillover of divorce as a cultural norm to China 
(Figure 7). Traditionally divorce was rare in China, but the numbers of divorced 
couples had jumped to almost 1.9 million in 2006. Divorce splits one household into 
two, thus increasing the number of households and reducing the number of people 
in each household. A study on the global effects of divorce on household size showed 
that the average numbers of people in divorced households were 27­41 percent 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
36 lectures on china’s environment 
smaller than those of married households in the twelve different countries sampled 
(see Figure 8). To put that into perspective, if the average household size had stayed 
the same as the married household size over the studied time period from 1998­2002, 
7.4 million fewer households would have been created. These 7.4 million households 
represent an enormous amount of embodied energy and natural resource use, all of 
which is due to a purely social and cultural act (Yu 2007). 
Figure 7 Number of new divorces in China 1979­2006 
Source: China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs 






































































































Source: Jianguo Liu 
Globalization has also unintentionally affected China’s nature reserve system (Liu 
et al. 2003; Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu, Ouyang, et al. 2003; Lehrer 2008). The Wolong 
Nature Reserve in southwestern China is an illustrative example of this phenomenon. 
Established in 1975, the Wolong Nature Reserve is approximately 200,000 hectares. Its 
primary goal is to protect giant panda habitat (Lehrer 2008). When the reserve was 
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mapped during its first twenty­five years of existence to track panda habitat, it was 
found that good habitat had actually decreased (see Figure 9) since the establishment 
of the reserve. These were very disturbing results. When probed further, the reason 
for this continued habitat degradation was discovered. 
Like most other nature reserves in China, there are villagers inside Wolong. The 
human population size increased by about 70 percent from 1975 to 1997 and the 
number of households more than doubled. These rapid increases in the numbers of 
villagers and households led to more intensive and extensive human activities, such 
as collection of fuelwood (major energy source) in panda habitat, agriculture, house 
construction, and road construction. After the reserve’s establishment, the reserve 
was transformed from a basically closed economy to an open economy, including 
international tourism. The added domestic and foreign tourists on the land were 
themselves a stress on the environment, and the income gain to the villagers in the 
reserve due to tourism generated more demand for consuming natural resources and 
increased degradation further. 
Figure 9 Degradation of panda habitat before and after Wolong Reserve establishment 
Source: Jianguo Liu 
To mitigate the effect of these villagers on the protected areas, an “eco­hydropower 
plant” was completed in 2002 and villagers are given government subsidies through 
two new conservation programs that began in 2000 and 2001. These subsidies are 
meant to help the villagers afford the use of electricity and minimize the use of 
fuelwood. They are also designed for villagers to return cropland on sleep slopes to 
forestland, and to monitor and protect forests from illegal harvesting. These new 
policies have been quite effective and panda habitat has begun to recover. 
environmental protection efforts: a glimmer of hope 
The Chinese government has responded to the rapid environmental degradation 
within its country by implementing many remediation programs. These programs 
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aim to control air pollution, reduce water pollution, mitigate biodiversity loss, and 
reduce soil erosion and desertification. Many of these programs also provide global 
environmental benefits by increasing vegetative cover, lowering pollution to other 
countries, reducing timber import from and forest degradation in other countries, 
and enhancing carbon sequestration. Below we highlight three of these national 
programs with significant global importance. 
The Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) manifests itself as a strict 
nationwide ban on logging natural forests that started in 1998. Monetary incentives 
are offered as compensation to halt all logging activities in natural forests, which 
began with twelve provinces in the 1998 pilot program and expanded to eighteen 
provinces in 2000 (Liu et al. 2008). ‘Mountain closures’ also ensure that not only 
logging is stopped, but that all human activity including grazing and the gathering of 
fuelwood is prohibited in these areas. This is intended to mitigate the effects of 
erosion as well as to prevent natural disasters caused by deforestation (Liu et al. 2008). 
In fact, NFCP was a direct response to an enormously destructive flooding event that 
occurred in 1998 (Liu and Diamond 2005; Liu et al. 2008). The lack of vegetation in 
many areas greatly exacerbated the flooding effect, and official statistics put the death 
toll at approximately 4,000. Response to this flood illustrates the highly reactive and 
crisis­control­oriented environmental policy in China. 
A second major project started in China, the Grain to Green Program, also 
attempted to mitigate erosion and desertification and increase forest cover. It began 
as a pilot program in only three Chinese provinces in 1999 and grew to a full­fledged 
program in over twenty­five provinces by 2002. Farmers are paid in grain to convert 
their cropland to grasslands and forests. Farmland qualifies for conversion if it has 
over fifteen or twenty­five degrees of slope. Farmers are also supplied with tree 
seedlings and some cash for miscellaneous expenses. These farmers can then afford 
to plant and maintain a tree plantation on cropland that previously would have lost 
a great deal of nutrient­rich soil due to erosion. 
Figure 10 Increase in number and size of China’s nature reserves from 1957­ 2007 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
Nature reserves are a third environmental program undertaken by the Chinese 
government. As displayed in the Figure 10, the number of nature reserves in China 
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has grown exponentially since the initiation of the program in the 1950s. Likewise, the 
area of each nature reserve has also grown impressively. By 1997, the total area of 
nature reserves was 800,000 square kilometers, approximately twice the area of 
California. Amazingly, this number doubled by 2007 with total reserve area at nearly 
1,600,000 square kilometers, an area that could comfortably fit the state of Texas twice 
within its borders with room to spare. 
Aside from these three examples of government efforts, there have been many 
other environmental programs put in place. Environmental awareness among the 
general public has been increasing. A wide range of new and more environmentally 
friendly technologies imported from developed countries have been in operation. 
The efficiency in using energy and many other resources has been improving. These 
are encouraging signs, but much more needs to be done to make fundamental 
changes in China’s environment. 
moving forward: “environmental revolution” 
“In order to fundamentally improve China’s environmental protection, we 
need a revolution—an environmental revolution.” –Jianguo Liu 
As discussed above, there is a variety of complex factors that play into each specific 
manifestation of environmental degradation. Reforming the administrative structure 
and changing the model of economic development are key to making fundamental 
improvements in China’s environment (Liu and Diamond 2008). In addition, changing 
the angle at which the environment is viewed, and researching it from a holistic 
perspective, could greatly strengthen environmental management (Liu et al. 2007). 
Reforming the administrative structure and changing the model of economic
development 
Changing the incentive structure for government leaders in China would be a place 
to start the environmental revolution. Officials have traditionally been selected and 
promoted on the basis of their economic performance. If officials were also evaluated 
on their environmental performance, they would be compelled to devote resources to 
monitoring factory and business cleanliness as opposed to turning a blind eye to cut 
corners that increase gross domestic product but degrade the environment (Liu and 
Diamond 2008). 
Giving environmental governing bodies the authority to properly enforce 
pollution standards would also add strength to China’s environmental programs. At 
present, fines for polluting are ineffectual. It is easier and cheaper for a company to 
pay the fines than to clean up their factories (Liu and Diamond 2008). However, the 
recent elevation of China’s State Environmental Protection Administration to the 
higher level Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is a step in the direction of 
increased authority and enforcement of emission standards. 
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The administrative structure could also be enhanced by high­level cooperation. At 
the moment, many government agencies in China do not work together and consider 
many environmental standard violations outside of their jurisdiction. For example, 
the MEP is not responsible for all environmental sectors. The State Forestry 
Administration, for one, is the body that concerns itself with forest­related policy, 
limiting the reach of the MEP into forestry affairs. Because of this, many violations 
fall through the cracks and are not dealt with by the government. If a national body 
could be formed to coordinate all the disparate environmental agencies of China, 
environmental protection would improve drastically (Liu and Diamond 2008). 
During the past three decades, China’s main goal was to promote rapid growth in 
GDP. The dominant development model must be transformed from inefficient 
resource use and high pollution to high efficiency and low/no pollution for both 
environmental and socioeconomic sustainability. One way to achieve this goal is to 
fully evaluate short­ and long­term socioeconomic costs of environmental 
degradation. Once people realize these costs, it would be easier to treat environmental 
protection as an integral part of sustainable economic development. 
Interdisciplinary approaches 
A few other suggestions for increasing environmental protection efficacy stem from 
interdisciplinary thinking and integration of social and natural sciences. They both 
stray from the traditional regulation path and attempt to treat the root illness as 
opposed to merely mitigating symptoms (Liu et al. 2007). 
The first suggestion is regularly undertaking systematic assessments of the recently 
developed ecological function zones. The assessments would dynamically rank all the 
regions of China by ecosystem fragility, level of ecosystem services, economic 
productivity, socioeconomic and demographic conditions, vulnerability to human 
activities, and so on. This dynamic ranking system could then be incorporated into 
economic decisions in the future. If this is done, human activities that cause high 
environmental stress on an ecosystem can be moved to robust and resilient locations 
and fragile ecological function zones that are providing crucial ecosystem services 
could be left alone. 
Working hand in hand with the protection of ecological function zones is the 
nationwide implementation of “eco­compensation,” or payments for ecosystem 
services. The Chinese government has already started a pilot eco­compensation 
program, but this program needs to be more widespread and effectively enforced. In 
this eco­compensation system, households and institutions would receive payments 
for their effort and outcome in protecting ecosystems. For example, headwater 
communities would receive funds from the government or other sources (e.g., 
beneficiaries in lower reaches) if they kept their environment clean and pollution 
free. If they improved the baseline quality of the area, they would receive even greater 
compensation. This is an incentive scheme that benefits not only the community 
receiving subsidies but also all downstream communities in the entire region (Liu 
and Diamond 2008). 
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Another important way to reduce stress on fragile ecosystems is to provide valid 
relocation options to rural communities in sensitive regions. In many previous cases, 
this eco­migration of communities has proved difficult. Most rural communities 
have lived in the same location for many generations and cannot manage to acclimate 
to their relocation communities. Even past attempts at retraining populations have 
been unsuccessful and many villagers have decided to move back to their rural 
communities. 
However, in an attempt to stop the trend of cultural transfer that brings increased 
numbers of households and inefficient energy use to rural villages in fragile 
ecosystems, an eco­migration of citizens away from such villages is necessary. 
Interviews with rural youth in Wolong Nature Reserve have suggested that 90 percent 
of young people want to move away from their village. The biggest obstacle standing 
in their way is opportunity. This is where education can come into play. If the youth 
of rural villages are given access to quality education, then they are more likely to 
attend universities in urban areas and find jobs in the city as well. At the same time 
that they are moving their career paths in a new direction, they move their 
environmental impact in a direction away from the fragile ecosystem of their village 
to less environmentally sensitive areas. In this new social position, they are better able 
to earn higher wages to send home to the older generation remaining in the village, 
allowing the village to update itself to current environmental standards. This type of 
eco­migration is a win­win situation for the people and environment of China. 
conclusion 
Although China’s environmental problems are complex, it is possible to find creative 
solutions based on the great body of knowledge generated by both social and natural 
scientists. More research using a Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) 
approach is needed to continually connect seemingly unconnected dots and 
fundamentally improve China’s dire environmental situation. 
In this globalizing world, China’s environmental revolution cannot be achieved 
without assistance from other countries, especially developed countries. These 
nations have contributed to and also have suffered from China’s environmental 
degradation. They can provide a range of assistance, from providing environmentally 
friendly technologies, investing in industries with clean and efficient resource use, to 
increasing environmental awareness and pollutant emission standards. The joint 
efforts between China and the rest of the world can lead to a green China and a 
sustainable planet. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Role of Environmental NGOs in 
Shaping a Green China* 
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chapter summary 
This chapter argues that, as a result of the historical development of China’s
environmental management system, environmental non­governmental organi­
zations (ENGOs) are playing an important role as environmental information
disseminators, law facilitators, and communication promoters among four groups
of players: the central government, local governments, manufacturers (polluters),
and civilians (pollution victims). The analysis of a successful Beijing­based ENGO,
the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), provides insights into how
ENGOs can effectively participate in the environmental management system. From
the success and lessons of IPE and the projected demand from civil society for a
better environment, we suggest that localization of ENGOs in China, the 
government’s endorsement, and broad trust from government, manufacturers, and
civilians are essential for the future development of Chinese ENGOs. 
introduction 
Since the 1970s reform and open­door policy, China has experienced great changes in 
many aspects of the society. The environmental crisis resulting from economic 
development has become a serious threat to the sustainable development of China 
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into a harmonious society. Traditional top­down control from the central 
government alone cannot effectively manage the environment. Thus new partners 
and methods are needed to face the challenge. Environmental non­governmental 
organizations (ENGOs) have become an important player in China’s environmental 
management by filling the gap between the top­down control system and the 
requirements of reality on the ground. 
An objective of this chapter is to give a short account of the development of 
China’s ENGOs from the perspective of historical institutional change. In addition, 
the current function of and future outlook for China’s ENGOs will be discussed. An 
illustrative case analysis will be made of the Institute of Public & Environmental 
Affairs (IPE). 
environment ngos in china: origin, role, and development 
On March 31, 1994, the Chinese ENGO Friends of Nature (FON) was founded in Beijing 
by Conjie Liang, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(Figure 1). Since then, the number of ENGOs has grown rapidly. By the end of 2006, 
among 345,000 NGOs in China, there were 2,786 ENGOs, including 1,382 government­
organized NGOs (GONGOs), 202 civilian­organized NGOs, 1,116 student­initiated 
NGOs, and 68 NGOs outside the mainland, either internationally or based in Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Niu and Pan 2007). These ENGOs participated in a broad 
range of activities related to environmental protection, such as environmental 
education, species protection, policymaking, and environmental monitoring. 
Figure 1 On June 5, 1993, more than forty young people participated in an informal meeting about
environmental protection in Linglong Park in the southern suburb of Beijing. It is said that this
meeting was the first non­governmental voluntary environmental protection meeting. In the photo,
the man giving the lecture is Congjie Liang, founder of FON, and the surrounding listeners are the first
members of FON. 
Source: Friends of Nature 1993 
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Origin of ENGOs: A greening government and an awakening civil society 
The emergence and development of ENGOs in China were connected to several 
major societal changes in the early days of implementing the country’s open­door 
policy. The institutional change in government since the reform and open­door 
policy in the late 1970s set the stage for citizens to participate in environmental affairs. 
Before the reform, the government was the sole supervisor, legislator, and regulator 
for environmental management (Figure 2). In this system, there was no direct 
interaction between the manufacturers and the consumers. The manufacturers, being 
mainly state­owned factories, were politically driven rather than revenue driven. The 
power balance was one sided among the three groups of actors in environmental 
affairs. 
The government had strict control of both the polluter and the consumer (see 
curved arrows in Figure 2). The manufacturer and the civilian had little power in 
influencing the government’s policymaking (straight arrows). The civilian was the 
recipient of the impact of pollution produced by the manufacturer, but had no 
oversight power over the latter’s unsound environmental practices. 
Figure 2 The relationship between various actors in environmental management before the reform
and open­door policy of the late 1970s 
The goal of the reform and open­door policy was to adapt market economy 
practices to a socialist system in order to liberate the productivity of the Chinese 
people. This was a major turning point in Chinese history, and all aspects of China’s 
society have changed to facilitate or to adapt to the new national strategy. Realizing 
that the former tight control of its people was no longer effective in managing a 
market­oriented society, the government started to move away from micro­managing 
civil affairs and instead concentrated its efforts on national strategy, policy, and 
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lawmaking. In March 1998 at the Ninth People's Congress, Luo Gan, the Secretary­
General of the State Council, declared that “the government has taken up the 
management of many affairs which it should not have managed, is not in a position 
to manage, or actually cannot manage well” (Saich 2000; Ho 2001). The retreat of the 
government from civil affairs not only successfully stimulated economic productivity 
and efficiency, but also left some fields blank for other social forces to fill in. 
Environmental protection was one of these blank fields. 
In the meantime, the government structure went through a decentralization 
process, a process that actually had a negative impact on environment protection. 
Schwartz (2004) argues that at the central government level, staff reduction left the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) unequipped to provide crucial 
services such as regulation enforcement, environment monitoring, education and 
training. 
Figure 3 illustrates the institutional change in the environmental management 
field owing to the reform and open­door policy. The roles of various actors are 
inseparable. 
Figure 3 The relationship between various actors in environmental management before the reform
and open­door policy without the participation of ENGOs. Open arrows indicate weaker interactions
than filled arrows. 
In this system, the central government not only supervises local government, but 
also relies on the local government to implement environmental policy and law and 
monitor environment performance. However, at the local level, officials are reluctant 
to establish environmental protection goals because the funding and resources for 
achieving these goals have become a local responsibility, and because economic 
development is usually the primary criterion for performance evaluation. From an 
institutional perspective, since the local government has a large responsibility for 
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implementation of environmental laws and regulations (Dasgupta et al. 2001; Wang 
2000), it is susceptible to corruption, given the strong incentive to pursue economic 
development at the cost of pollution. Such an incentive results in an increase in the 
negotiation power of polluters in environmental management. On the other hand, 
local victims of pollution only have weak negotiation power to counter the industrial 
interest groups because they are usually incapable of suing the polluter and the local 
government and because the industrial interest groups and the local government have 
shared interests. In addition, local civilians cannot effectively exert buying power 
because the polluting manufacturers usually do not rely on local markets to make a 
profit. Thus, this institutional change weakens the negotiation power of civilians in 
environmental management. 
While there has been institutional degeneration of environmental management 
capacity, economic development, a major achievement of the government 
institutional change, has also brought great challenges for environmental protection. 
In the 1990s, industrial output increased at a rate of more than 15 percent annually, 
contributing 45 percent of China’s GDP in 2001 (Dasgupta et al. 2001). In 2008, China 
maintained its world dominance in manufacturing many products (Table 1). This 
economic growth comes at the cost of environment degradation. In 2008, more than 
60 percent of China’s fresh water was contaminated and more than half of China's 
major cities failed to meet modest national air quality standards. In response, citizens 
started to complain to different levels of the government. During the period from 
1991 to 1993, the government received over 130,000 complaints annually (Dasgupta 
and Wheeler 1996). Some of these complaints developed into protests. Recognizing 
that environmental degradation could undermine its goal of social stability, the 
government is now willing to go green in order to prevent further social unrest. 




air conditioners and copy machines >60% 
chemical fibers >50% 
color TVs and digital cameras 50% 
cell phones 47% 
crude steel 36% 
computers and refrigerators 33% 
Source: Ma et al. 2008 
The worsening environmental crisis demonstrates the deficiency of the top­down 
environmental management system. The government feels the necessity of having a 
strong civil society to achieve its social agenda. The civil society also senses the 
necessity and possibility for NGOs to contribute to the solution of environment 
problems. The changing relationship between the government and civil society is 
evidenced by the well­publicized story of the establishment of FON and the rapid 
development of ENGOs afterwards. From only nine ENGOs, four of which were 
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student organizations in 1994, the number increased dramatically to 184 student 
environmental organizations and 73 non­student ENGOs in 2001 (Figures 4 and 5). 
Figure 4 Growth in student environmental organizations, 1967–2001 
Source: Yang 2005 
Figure 5 Growth in (non­student) environmental organizations, 1985–2002 
Source: Yang 2005 
ENGOs are diverse in organizational form. According to the classification by Yang 
(2005), there are seven types, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Main types of environmental NGOs in China 
Organizational Type Registration status Examples 
Registered NGOs Registered as social organizations 
( ) or private, nonprofit 
work units ( ) 
Friends of Nature; Green River 
Institute of Public & 
Environmental Affairs; Green 
Earth Volunteers 
Nonprofit enterprises Registered as business enterprises 
but operate as nonprofit 
organizations 
Global Village of Beijing; 
Institute of Environment 
and Development 
Nonprofit work unit Unregistered organizations that 
function as NGOs 
China’s Green Beats 
Web­based groups Unregistered groups that operate 
mainly through the Internet 
Green­Web; Greener Beijing 
Student environmental 
associations 
Registered with campus Youth 
Leagues yet function and are 





centers and institutes 
Affiliated with institutions of higher 
learning but operate as NGOs 
Centre for Legal Assistance to 
Pollution Victims, China University 
of Political Science and Law 
Government­organized 
NGOs (GONGOs) 
Social organizations established by 
government agencies, also known as 
state­owned NGOs (SONGOs) 
China Environmental Science 
Association 
Source: Yang 2005 
The role of ENGOs in environmental management and protection 
In China’s environmental management system, the government plays a much more 
important role than the market and civil society. From the perspective of institutional 
development, the rise of ENGOs in environmental management is closely related to 
the development of the government management system. In some fields, such as 
transportation pollution control, natural resource extraction, and land use change, 
the government relies on command and control policies. For the major pollution 
generation sector—industrial pollution—the situation is much more complicated, 
and the Chinese government deploys two instruments: pollution levies and pollution 
permit trading. 
China has been collecting pollution levies since 1982 (Wang 2000). The 
government wants to use the levy to add external costs to polluters so that they have 
the incentive to change their polluting behavior. In principle, the levy collected will be 
used for the improvement of the environment. However, this mechanism has several 
defects. For one thing, the environment has a limited carrying capacity, and simply 
adding external costs cannot necessarily prevent the environment from being severely 
degraded. According to the analysis of Wu (2005), because the levy is typically priced 
at 10­15 percent of the true cost to control pollution, the polluter may simply consider 
the levy as part of the production cost and add it into the sales price. Furthermore, 80 
percent of the collected levy goes back to the polluter, supposedly to fund efforts to 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
52 lectures on china’s environment 
improve its environmental performance. Therefore the polluter does not really feel 
the pressure to change its behavior. 
The Chinese government has also tried to implement a pollution permit trading 
system, but progress is slow. In 1999, after several years’ discussion between the 
Chinese government and Environmental Defense Fund of the U.S., China initiated 
SO2 emissions trading in two industrial cities, Benxi and Nantong. In March 2002, the 
“4+3+1” project to implement an emissions trading system in four heavily polluted 
provinces, three major cities, and one major energy company (China Huaneng 
Group) was officially carried out by SEPA together with Environmental Defense 
Fund. Finally in December 2008, the first set of permits—in the amount of 50 tons of 
SO2 emission— was bid on by seven buyers in the Tianjin Pollution Permit Trading 
Center, resulting in a transaction of 150,000 RMB. 
Compared to the pollution levy system, the pollution permit trading system has 
several advantages. First, the polluters have more incentive to implement a better 
pollutant control system because extra pollution permits can be traded or stored. 
Because the local government is no longer the permit provider, which requires less 
participation, the likelihood of corruption is lower than in the levy system. Second, 
local people and ENGOs can contribute to pollution reduction by buying the permits 
locally. 
The trading system also has problems of its own. It is difficult to calculate the total 
allowable amount of pollutants and to distribute emission permits in an equitable 
manner, especially in China, whose regions vary greatly in terms of economy, culture, 
and environment. Another difficulty is that the regulatory system is unable to manage 
the trading market with proper instruments such as laws and trading taxes. 
Furthermore, a standardized market did not exist at the inception of the system. 
Although some people believe that emissions trading is more effective than the levy 
system, its implementation is complicated by the fact that the right to issue these 
permits still rests in the hands of local governmental officials. The incentive for them 
to protect the polluter to enhance economic performance may compromise the 
integrity of the system. 
From the analysis above, it is clear that the government’s two instruments are not 
sufficient to control industrial pollution. This is where ENGOs can play an important 
part (Figure 6). As information distributors, justice facilitators, and interaction 
promoters, they can help strengthen environmental laws and market instruments. 
ENGOs can work on the popularization of environmental laws and facilitation of 
public prosecution, making the legal instruments more active in environmental 
management. They can take the responsibility for uniting civilians to interact with 
polluters and local governments. For this reason, ENGOs with professional 
negotiation skills can act as representatives of pollution victims. As a result, they 
strengthen the role of civilians to directly counter the power of polluters. 
Similarly, ENGOs can strengthen market instruments by disseminating pollution 
information. Market forces cannot be functional unless environmental information 
reaches a critical level of transparency so that consumers with concern about 
environment and health can make choices about what to purchase. It is therefore 
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essential that public have adequate access to the information. Using a model to 
compare the implicit price of pollution from community pressure and the explicit 
price in the form of the pollution levy, Wang (2000) demonstrates that the implicit 
price, which measures the attitude of the local community, is at least as high as the 
explicit price charged by the government. Consumers are less likely to purchase the 
products if they know that the firms that produce them are heavy polluters. Investors 
also react significantly to environmental news when deciding how to invest their 
portfolios. Heavy emissions may signal that a firm’s production techniques are 
inefficient (Wang et al. 2004). The behavior of consumers and investors will not 
amount to a positive force unless the information can be easily accessed by the public. 
Figure 6 Same as Figure 3, but with an active participation of ENGOs. Because of the communication
and interaction between ENGOs and other parties (two­sided arrows connecting to the ENGOs box),
market instruments and environmental laws are strengthened. 
In summary, the presence of ENGOs not only improves the function of the market 
and legal systems in environmental management but also provides alternative ways to 
mediate the interactions between the government, manufacturers, and civilians. 
Action: Repertoires, limitations, and opportunities for ENGOs 
ENGOs in China have now expanded into many aspects of environmental protection, 
such as environmental education, species protection, policymaking, and environmen­
tal monitoring. They organize public lectures, workshops, conferences, field trips, 
media campaigns, and Internet publications and communications (Yang 2005). Most 
of them avoid confrontational methods in their actions (Ho 2001; Lee and Ma 2008). 
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ENGOs face several challenges, including funding, registration, data access, mem­
bership recruitment, establishment of local branch offices, and recruitment of capa­
ble staff. Among these limitations, two major constraints are funding and registra­
tion. Fundraising is difficult for ENGOs, and even for GONGOs. The funding situa­
tion is so poor that more than 60 percent of ENGOs do not have office space. Many 
of them have to look outside the country to foreign governments, philanthropists and 
corporations for support (Schwartz 2004). Some of them do not have a strong and 
charismatic leader, which is necessary to engage in successful fundraising during the 
startup phase, and can become a problem that hampers their long­term development 
(Ho 2001). 
The second difficulty is related to ENGO registration. In 1998, to control the power 
of civil organizations, the central government issued a proclamation called 
Regulations for the Administration and Registration of Social Organizations. Under this 
regulation (Ho 2001), registration is a tedious and difficult process. Prior to registra­
tion, the NGO must be approved by a sponsoring institution ( ). 
Therefore it is essential that the leader of the proposed NGO has already estab­
lished a good relationship with the government so that they can find officials willing 
to sponsor them. The total number of staff in an NGO should be more than fifty indi­
viduals or more than thirty non­government units ( ). The NGO must 
have a fixed address, specialized staff, and financial resources of RMB 100,000 for a 
national office or RMB 30,000 for a regional (provincial level and lower) office. 
Within the same administrative area, no more than two social organizations with the 
same or similar scope of business are allowed to apply for registration, eliminating 
the possibility of ENGOs uniting in dealing with the same issue. There is no right of 
appeal if an application is rejected for failing to meet any of the conditions men­
tioned above. To date, a large number of organizations remain unregistered, and oth­
ers operate within a different registered category such as “nonprofit organization.” 
Ironically, the 1998 regulation has resulted in more difficulty for the government in 
controlling the ENGOs (Ho 2001). 
Many Chinese ENGOs act as information distributors, and the funding and 
registration limitations these ENGOs face can be partially overcome by the 
development of Internet sites. The Internet makes it much easier to run web­based 
environmental groups. The rapid increase in Internet use allows them to gain instant 
access to millions of users (Figure 7). These web­based groups can be functional 
without registering with the government. It is also difficult for the local government 
to manipulate the information posted on the Web. Furthermore, they need less staff, 
little or no office space, and a lower budget for maintenance. Because people can 
access the information and share it with their neighbors, these web groups will be a 
major force that determines environmental performance locally. 
ENGOs have also been helped by the Government Information Disclosure Bill, a 
regulation implemented by the State Council in 2007 that strengthens civil society’s 
right to acquire environmental information. For a long time, environment infor­
mation was not accessible to the public because it was considered a state secret. The 
public had to rely on imprecise visual cues such as visibility instead of quantitative 
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pollution data to judge environmental quality. Although in principle the bill grants 
the public the right to access this information, various government agencies have yet 
to determine how to present the raw data in a form meaningful to the public. This 
presents an opportunity for ENGOs to participate in information disclosure. 
Figure 7 Growth in Internet users in China, 2005–2008 
Source: CNNIC 2008 
institute of public & environmental affairs: a case analysis 
The Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE) is a good example of an 
organization that utilizes the new opportunities mentioned above. The NGO, 
established by Ma Jun in 2006, is a Beijing­based nonprofit think tank with a focus 
on environmental policy and governance research. In the following we provide a brief 
overview of its operation. 
Political background 
Facing the challenge of massive environmental degradation, the Chinese government 
has introduced a “scientific outlook” approach to achieving sustainable economic 
growth. The Eleventh Five­Year Plan has laid out clear goals related to environmental 
protection, including reduction of energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 
percent and major pollutants by 10 percent relative to the 2005 levels by the end of 
2010. However, several barriers exist in the process of translating the plan into action. 
At present, polluting enterprises far outnumber the monitoring capacity of local 
governments. Because the cost of regulatory violation is lower than the cost of 
compliance, there is little incentive for the polluters to clean up their acts. To 
overcome these barriers, the government has started to push for greater transparency 
on corporate violations and to improve the public's access to environmental 
information. It is against this political background that the IPE was founded. 
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The IPE can be considered an element of a new form of environmental governance 
whose point of departure is improved access to environmental information. There are 
several policy and legal bases for this. On the government side, the relevant legal or 
regulatory documents include the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (2003­09­
01), the State Council’s Guidelines on the Comprehensive Implementation of 
Administration Bylaw (2004­03­22), the Provisional Measures on Public Participation 
in Environmental Impact Assessment (2006­03­18) and the Environmental Information 
Disclosure Measures (2008­05­01). On the corporate side, the important legal docu­
ments include the Cleaner Production Promotion Law (2003­01­01), the Rules on Major 
Enterprises’ Cleaner Production Auditing Process (2005­12), and the Environmental 
Information Disclosure Measures (2008­05­01). These regulations provide the legal 
basis for open information access. 
IPE’s goal and operational strategy 
The mission of IPE is to improve environmental information openness and public 
awareness by increasing the public accessibility to environmental data. In doing so, it 
exerts pressure on local governments and private companies, especially multinational 
corporations, to improve their environmental performance. Local governments lack 
the incentive to protect the environment because economic growth is more 
important for their performance. With the information IPE provides, local people are 
able to judge environmental quality. It helps focus local government’s attention on 
some of the specific local environmental problems. On the other side, the private 
companies, especially multinational companies, would be concerned about their 
public image if the infraction record were published. In essence, IPE promotes green 
practices by using a bottom­up approach that complements the relatively weak top­
down regulatory system. 
IPE’s operational strategy consists of three parts. First, it collects data from accred­
ited sources only and makes them public in a non­discriminating manner. The 
accredited sources include central and local government branches across the country 
and media reports that cite documents or statements from officials or agencies in 
charge. In doing so, IPE has gained the reputation of being fair and neutral. Although 
the accuracy and completeness of the government­released data are arguable, because 
they come from the government, government officials and private companies would 
have difficulty in challenging the validity of the data, greatly reducing the NGO’s 
institutional costs. 
Second, IPE uses a user­friendly website to house its database. It offers people easy 
access to the information and displays the data in an understandable way. Although 
the website can reach only those people who have the capability to use the Internet, 
it is a better platform than traditional media outlets such as TV and newspapers. 
Users can search for environmental information on water quality, air quality, names 
and locations of polluters, rankings of regional environment quality, remediation 
records, and records of violation. In addition, users can report violators so that IPE 
can track the violators down. 
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Third, IPE uses its database as an instrument to shift the supply chain toward 
greener practices. The database contains the pollution record of the suppliers in var­
ious tiers of a supply chain, such as that of Wal­Mart. If a major retailer commits to 
purchasing products or services only from those suppliers that achieve compliance 
with relevant environmental regulations, databases such as IPE’s make it possible to 
track the environmental behavior of suppliers efficiently. 
The two most powerful products of IPE are China’s water pollution and air pollu­
tion maps (Figure 8). These maps are based on environmental quality data and more 
than 40,000 infraction records released by government agencies. There is a user­
friendly interface between the raw data assembled by the IPE staff and the public. 
Figure 8 Interface of China Air Pollution Map 
Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006a 
By clicking a specific region on the map, the user can find data on water and air 
quality, pollutant discharges by amount and type, and names of violators at the 
national, provincial, or municipal level. The user can also rank provinces and 
municipalities using information on such indices as industrial wastewater discharge, 
industrial waste gas emission, and domestic sewage discharge to find pollution 
hotspots. As a successful case, after Hunan Province was ranked first for cadmium 
and five other heavy metals and toxics in 2006, the provincial government took 
actions to clean it up. IPE has recently added digital geographic information to the 
database so that a user can locate the violator on a digital map and determine the 
distance of the violator from another point of interest on the map (Figure 9). 
The health interface portal explains in simple terms the health consequences of 
pollution to the lay public (Figure 10). For each major pollutant, it provides 
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definitions, source categories, health hazards, treatment methods, environment 
standards, and historical cases of pollution incidents. 
Figure 9 Illustration of the pollution map search engine 
Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006b 
Figure 10 Interface of environment and health 
Source: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2006c 
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The Green Choice Alliance Program 
Based on the thinking that informed consumer choice could affect corporate 
environmental behavior, IPE launched the Green Choice Initiative in 2007 along with 
20 other local NGOs. It has two main components: one is about enabling informed 
consumers to make smarter choices at shops and markets; the other is about 
encouraging major companies to factor environmental standards into their sourcing 
practice. 
Solid progress was made on the responsible supply chain side. A factory’s presence 
on the IPE database list as a violator of environmental compliance poses risks to the 
reputation of its client company. Large companies aware of such risks, especially 
multinational corporations, have begun integrating environmental standards into 
their sourcing criteria. The Green Choice Alliance Program (GCA) is designed to help 
these companies green their supply chains. A company can request that their 
suppliers be removed from the violator list after they have made improvements to 
their environmental performance. The improvement must be verified by a third party 
(consulting firms or research institutes) under the supervision of local NGOs such as 
IPE. 
As a mechanism for responsible supply chain management, GCA uses the steps 
shown in Figure 11 to influence a polluter's behavior. The central goal of GCA is to 
press big retailers and large corporations openly to commit not to sourcing from 
polluters for their supply chain. Since its inception, some major companies have 
started using it to screen their supply chain system. For example, Wal­Mart has made 
a commitment to not sourcing goods from local suppliers with infraction records 
related to pollution. Major companies such as GE, NIKE and Esquel are also using the 
database to monitor the performance of their suppliers. 
Figure 11 Green Choice Alliance program 
As Figure 11 illustrates, after the company has made the commitment, it must draft 
an action plan to fulfill it. The action plan will be disclosed to the public through the 
GCA website. As a GCA member company, it should accomplish a number of steps. 
It should first screen its supplier list using the GCA violator database and report the 
screening results back to GCA. The second step, supplier verification, consists of a 
document review process and an on­site GCA audit. The audit results may indicate 
that further environmental remediation measures are needed. In general, 
remediation measures are expected to be completed within six months after the 
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1 In 2008, there were only five 
full­time staff members at IPE. 
problem supplier has been identified. A follow­up audit may be required for the 
assessment of the remediation measures. The member company is required to cease 
purchasing from the supplier if it is unwilling to achieve or incapable of achieving 
compliance with environmental legal requirements (Ma et al. 2008). 
The GCA audit is performed by a third­party, accredited auditing entity and 
observed by the GCA ENGO members, so as to ensure external validity and to 
enhance transparency. In order to verify compliance status and the capacity to achieve 
compliance, the GCA audit focuses on three aspects: (1) Have the specific violations 
identified by environmental agencies been resolved? (2) Does the supplier have an 
adequate environmental management system? (3) Does the supplier’s treatment 
facility have sufficient capacity to deal with waste discharge? By the end of 2008, the 
GCA audit had already been successfully utilized nineteen times. All but one of the 
audits resulted in removing the violator from the list. 
Lessons from IPE 
IPE owes its success not only to hard work,1 but also to its unique operational strategy. 
Unlike some NGOs that deploy confrontational methods, IPE maintains a cordial 
relationship with the government at different levels. Its agenda is one of non­
activism. Its data come from governmental and accredited media sources, helping it 
maintain its neutrality and non­activist position. In some ways, IPE is an ally of the 
central government to achieve its goal of harmonious and sustainable development. 
The proactive approach of GCA maximizes the utility of the IPE database. The broad 
alliance it has built with other NGOs, companies, and the government provides 
incentives to improve environmental performance at the local and firm levels. 
IPE recognizes several areas in need of improvement. Local government officials 
may have the first­hand data on pollution discharge, but are reluctant to release them. 
Data availability is especially problematic in those provinces with low GDP and heavy 
pollution loading. Unless the information disclosure regulations are strictly enforced 
there, the data availability problem is not going away anytime soon. The GCA 
program is not effective in influencing small polluters such as small mines, chemical 
factories, and paper mills. Often these polluters are invisible to consumers and make 
up too small a portion of companies’ supply chains to feel the pressure from the GCA 
member retailers. Most notably, CGA has virtually no effect on small energy 
producers since energy is not labeled in the supply­chain scheme. That these small 
but heavy polluters are not bound by GCA may drag down the enthusiasm of other 
better­performing companies to participate in the audit program. 
concluding remarks 
China is undergoing rapid economic and social transformation. On the one hand, 
economic growth will bring new challenges for environmental management. 
Pollution sources will spread from industrialized areas to undeveloped areas. 
Emissions from industrial and household pollution will continue, and so will the 
depletion of natural resources. On the other hand, social change will bring 
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improvement to the management system for the environment: new environmental 
laws and regulations will emerge to curb environmental degradation; the 
manufacturing system will become more energy efficient and cleaner; and civil 
society will see increased participation in environmental policy making. A group of 
strong ENGOs is essential to balance these two opposing factors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Toward Sustainability: Circular
Economy and Ecocity Development
in China* 
Professor Rusong Wang 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Baihai Wu 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
This chapter argues that a circular economy approach offers China the best
prospect for meeting its socioeconomic goals during its process of industrialization
and urbanization without disrupting environmental stewardship. It is argued that
the “3r” principle of “reduce, reuse, and recycle” should be replaced by the “3R”
principle of “rethinking, reform, and renovation” as the ecological rationale for a
circular economy. 
Within the realm of circular economy are circular industry and ecological cities, or
“ecocities.” Circular industry is the implementation of circular economy strategies
at the firm level or industrial system level. The foundation of circular industry is
industrial ecology, which means that the waste and by­products of one stage serve
as raw materials for the next stage of the whole product line. Ecocity construction
is the implementation of circular economy principles at the community level. The
concept of an ecocity is based on the belief that cities are the solution to the
challenges arising from urbanization associated with population growth. 
Several cases are examined to illustrate the application of the 3R principle at the
firm and city levels. The last section of this chapter presents a summary of the key
points that were discussed after the lecture between Professor Wang and 
participating students. 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
November 17, 2008, by 
Professor Wang as part of a 
graduate course taught by 
Professor Xuhui Lee entitled 
“China's Environment.” The 
paper was written by Baihai 
Wu, a graduate student in the 
course, and has been approved 
by Professor Wang. The paper 
incorporates material from the 
lecture, the discussion session 
after the lecture with Professor 
Wang, as well as background 
material on the lecture topic 
prepared by the students. For 
short biographies of the 
authors, please go to the end of 
the chapter. 
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Over the past thirty years, China has made great progress in socioeconomic 
development. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a startling rate of 
9.6 percent per year from 1979 to 2004.1 Its income per capita jumped to $1,489 in 
2004 and life expectancy was 72.5 years in 2005.2 The number of Chinese people living 
on one dollar per day decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 15 million in 2008, or in 
other words, more than 235 million people were lifted out of absolute poverty and 
now enjoy living standards above the poverty line.3 
These changes, however, have come at the heavy cost of environmental deteriora­
tion. China is one of the top emitters of carbon dioxide in the world. Ninety percent 
of its rivers through urban areas have been heavily polluted, and 75 percent of its lakes 
are in a state of eutrophication. These examples of environmental degradation weigh 
heavily on China’s economic development. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection estimated that in 2003, the cost of environmental damage was equal to 15 
percent of the nation’s total GDP (Zhenhua 2005). 
In general terms, these environmental problems are caused by weak law 
enforcement, unhealthy levels of consumerism, and environmentally unsound 
technology. They can trace their roots back to industrialization and urbanization. It 
is against this backdrop that the principles of circular economy and ecological cities, 
or “ecocities,” have come to occupy a central position in China’s efforts to reconcile 
economic development with environmental protection. The most attractive aspect of 
these principles is that, while reconciling environmental and economic imperatives, 
they do not require fundamental changes to the basic ownership arrangements and 
the political system. Circular economy and ecocities can work as environmentally 
sound mechanisms to respond to environmental challenges arising from 
industrialization and urbanization. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of and the 
relationships among the notions of circular economy, circular industry, and ecocities 
in China. Several examples are reviewed in the context of the 3R principle. In the final 
section, various questions on circular economy and ecocities are explored. 
circular economy in china 
“Human society is a multi­scale, multi­attribute, and multi­objective eco­
complex bridging man and nature; we call it Social­Economic­Natural 
Complex Ecosystem (SENCE).” –Rusong Wang 
The notion of “circular economy” is subject to different interpretations. In 1999, 
Dr. Tim Cooper first explored the concept of circular economy in his article entitled 
“Creating an Economic Infrastructure for Sustainable Product Design” (Cooper 
1999). In his critique of the existing “linear industry,” he proposed a new form of 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
65 toward sustainability: circular economy and ecocity development in china 
industry, termed circular industry, “in which the ‘throughput’ of energy and raw 
materials is reduced,” and “in such [a circular] economy there would be a shift in 
activity from the manufacturing sector to service sector activities such as reuse, 
repair, upgrading and recycling.” In China, the term circular economy means 
different things to different people. For some, it represents a new form of ecological 
economy, which is most similar to industrial ecology. For others, it denotes an 
integrated ecosystem with a comprehensive range of functionalities related to nature, 
economy, and society (Sun 2007). In the recently issued Law on Accelerating Circular 
Economy of the People’s Republic of China, circular economy refers to waste reduction, 
reuse, and recycling carried out during the processes of production, transportation, 
and consumption. 
Although circular economy is a trendy term in China now, the practice of circular 
economy can actually be traced to ancient China. Thousands of years ago, farmers 
raised fish in ponds, used silt from the bottom as fertilizer for mulberry trees, 
collected mulberry leaves to feed silkworms, and used leaf chips left by the silkworms 
as a food source for the fish. This circle is a perfect example of circular economy at 
the elemental level. A more recent example is the recycling and reuse of metal and 
other materials among different industries in the 1950s, which occurred when China 
began its industrialization under a highly centralized planning economy. In another 
example, in 1958, the Jiangmen Sugar Refinery reused sugarcane bagasse for 
papermaking. At that time, people called this kind of recycling symbiotic use and 
applied it to many industries (Sun 2007). Unfortunately, though, these practices were 
disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Since the late 1970s, China’s industrialization 
and urbanization have been accelerating at a startling rate. This remarkable progress 
is accompanied by the increasing challenge of environmental deterioration. This 
environmental cost is forcing China to shift its strategy from an approach that is only 
focused on the economy to one that is more sustainable. During this period of time, 
the concept of circular economy has been successfully applied in the industrialized 
world, especially in German and Japan. Their achievements have rekindled China’s 
interest in circular economy. 
Circular economy is operated according to the principle of ecological economics, 
whose characteristics are totality, coevolution, recycling, and self­reliance. Circular 
economy also uses resources very efficiently and is in harmony with surrounding life­
supporting ecosystems. The ecological rationale for circular industry is not the “3r” 
micro principle of “reduce, reuse, recycle,” but the “3R” macro principle of 
“rethinking, reform, and renovation” (Figure 1). First, rethinking in this context 
requires that the industry change from reductionism to holism, from environmental 
exploitation to ecological symbiosis, from open­ended material cycles to closed 
ecological cycles, and from external control to self­reliance. The second “R” in the 3R 
principle (reform) means that the industry should change from a chain­link structure 
to one of life­support­oriented vertical and serial coupling, from fragmented and 
isolated to food­web­based horizontal and parallel coupling, from locally 
independent to ecosystem­based regional coupling, and from a rigid and 
nonadaptive structure to a flexible and adaptive production structure. Third, 
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renovation requires that we apply the 3r micro principle of “reduce, reuse, recycle” to 
institutional and technological development. 









A well­functioning circular economy is driven by a number of factors. The first 
one concerns energy resources and the research and technology that explore these 
resources. The second is related to the flow of capital in the banking and market 
sector. The third is power structure, including institutions and governance. The 
fourth and final factor is spirituality, consisting of culture, education, and tradition. 
A key function of circular economy is recycling, which in the broad sense includes 
material recycling, renewable energy use, information feedback, regional symbiosis, 
long­term sustainability and efficient monetary circulation. 
Circular economy in China is constructed at three different levels: the firm, the 
community, and society. At the firm level, entrepreneurs have almost complete 
discretion to use market tools in their day­to­day operations. At the community and 
society levels, government intervention plays a larger role. In fact, local government 
has strict oversight over almost all of China’s industrial parks, in which related 
industries are located together. In China, the governmental role is the most distinct 
feature of circular economy. The government essentially serves as an “enabler,” 
encouraging technological innovation and resource conservation through policies 
and regulations. How this “enabling” role interferes with market mechanisms is a 
subject of debate (Zhu and Liu 2005). 
from linear industry to circular industry 
Within the realm of circular economy is circular industry. The notion of circular 
industry challenges the traditional idea that negative effects on the environment are 
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an inevitable outcome of industrialization and urbanization. Rather, it suggests that 
economic development is not incompatible with environmental protection (Wang 
2005). On one hand, China’s future economic prospects increasingly depend on 
achieving and maintaining high standards of environmental governance, especially 
energy conservation. On the other hand, integrating environmental governance with 
industrialization can create a transformative kind of industry, that is, circular industry. 
One tenet of circular industry is to integrate the 3r principle throughout the entire 
industrial process. In this sense, circular industry has nearly the same meaning as 
industrial ecology, namely “the flows of materials and energy in industrial and 
consumer activities, or the effects of these flows on the environment, and of the 
influences of economic, political, regulatory, and social factors on the flow, use, and 
transformation of resources” (Allenby and Richards 1994). Circular industry, 
sometimes referred to as eco­industry, distinguishes itself from traditional linear 
industry in several ways. Linear industry converts material into product and waste. It 
is inherently unsustainable. In circular industry, production of primary goods, 
manufacturing, distribution, consumption, and reuse are physically integrated into 
one industrial complex. Production processes are linked like a food web in order to 
allow efficient sharing of resources and information and to minimize negative 
environmental impacts. 
On a regional scale, neighboring communities, major enterprises and small 
businesses are integrated into one large industrial ecosystem so that environmental 
costs are internalized and wastes are assimilated within the system itself. Such a 
system also includes social and cultural components, providing local people with 
work opportunities and a chance to participate in the management of the enterprises 
and cultivating a harmonious coexistence between the companies and the 
community’s culture. An important attribute of circular industry, be it at the complex 
scale or regional scale, is that it possesses multiple production functions. In other 
words, circular industry is flexible and adaptive; its products are diversified and can 
be easily changed, rather than rigid and specialized. Related to this flexibility is the 
capacity to switch from product­ and profit­generating—(“hardware”­producing)— 
industry to service­oriented industry, whose outputs are “software,” or services, and 
“mindware,” or cultural enrichment. A healthy circular industry must enhance 
capacity building in the form of R&D (research and development), I&C (incubation 
and consultation), S&T (service and training), and E&E (experience and expertise). 
Finally, a circular industry is not complete without respect for human dignity. In 
circular industry, working is a learning process that fosters innovation, an 
opportunity for social interaction, and something that is enjoyable, rather than a 
process in which workers are enslaved by machines. 
A good example of circular industry is the Guitang Group in Guangxi Province, 
China. The Guitang Group is an eco­industrial park within which the flow of 
materials is circular (Figure 2). The Guitang Group is a pillar industry in Guigang 
City and sustains the livelihoods of 65 percent of the city’s population. Its principal 
business is the manufacturing and sales of sugar, paper, and related by­products, such 
as alcohol (liquor), light calcium carbonate, and water­reducing agents. Since 1995, 
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Guitang has been transforming its traditional industry into circular industry with 
two key product lines. 
In the first product line, Guitang plants sugarcane as a raw material for refined 
sugar, uses the by­product of sugar syrup to produce alcohol, and uses the waste 
alcohol to make composite fertilizer for the sugarcane plantation. In the second 
product line, Guitang creates refined sugar from the sugarcane first, and then uses 
sugarcane bagasse to produce pulp and paper. During this process, the pulp waste is 
used for making alkali, and the by­products of white lime and mud are used to 
produce cement. In both lines, the by­product from one section is recycled as raw 
material for the next section. The transformation to circular industry has increased 
Guitang’s productivity, improved the conservation of energy and water, and greatly 
reduced its wastewater output. 















Source: Modified from http://www.guitang.com 
The successful application of the circular industry principle by the Guitang Group 
depends on a number of factors. As a city­owned corporation, it has broad discretion 
to experiment with new concepts and technology. It has also received strong support 
from the city government for its circular industry strategy in terms of favorable tax 
treatment and financial aid. 
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an eco­city with chinese characteristics 
“[Eco]cities are the solution for humanity’s future, if we can establish an 
eco­polis on the basis of the 3R principle of “rethinking, reform and 
renovation.” –Rusong Wang 
Urbanization is the inevitable outcome of industrialization. In China, rapid 
urbanization is also caused by an exponentially growing population. A fast­growing 
proportion of this expanding population now lives in or near cities. China’s urban 
population tripled from 13.2% of the total in 1979 to 39.1% in 2002 (Wang 2004). With 
the acceleration of urbanization, today the country’s urban population has increased 
to 0.6 billion, almost half of total population of 1.3 billion.4 This urbanizing trend is 
expected to continue, even though the rates of industrialization and population 
growth are projected to slow down. 
The urban explosion in China has a profound and negative impact on the natural 
environment, the economy, and society. China’s interest in the “ecocity” concept was 
motivated by the pressure to reconceptualize the relationship between city and 
nature. Hoping to continue its urbanization without disrupting environmental 
protection or economic development, China wishes to transform its cities to 
ecocities, a sustainable and self­reliant conjunction of nature, society, and culture. 
The emergence of ecocities in China is the application of the circular economy 
notion at the community level. Professor Wang argues that ecocities are the solution 
for humanity’s future if we could establish an eco­polis on the basis of the 3R 
principle of “rethinking, reform and renovation.” Thus, cities that fulfill the 3R 
principle are termed “ecocities.” In the administrative unit of an ecocity, there exists 
an economically productive and ecologically efficient metabolism, a socially 
harmonious culture, and a physically beautiful and functionally vivid landscape. 
A well­functioning ecocity should be a Social­Economic­Natural Complex 
Ecosystem (SENCE) consisting of three subsystems (Wang 1984). The natural 
subsystem of an ecocity is material flow of minerals, biomass, water, energy, and land, 
which can be symbolized by the five traditional Chinese elements: metal, wood, water, 
fire, and soil. Its economic subsystem includes the components of production, 
consumption, reduction, transportation, and regulation. Its social subsystem covers 
technology, institutions, and culture (Wang 2005). 
Guiyang City, the capital of Guizhou Province, is an example of applying the 3R 
principle at the municipal scale.5 Guiyang’s economy used to depend heavily on 
natural resources, namely phosphorus, coal and aluminum ores. Industrial 
exploitation produced a great deal of waste and pollution. From 1996 to 2003, the 
total amount of all pollutants increased from 3.2 million tons to 4.6 million tons. At 
this rate of increase, by 2020 the pollution discharge will be triple today’s amount, 
threatening the very existence of the city. In response, in 2002 the central government 
added the transformation of Guiyang into an ecocity at the top of its agenda. 
4 See 2008 Census on 
Population, National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. 
Available online at: http:// 
news.sina.com.cn/c/2009­
02­16/074415168603s.shtml 
5 This description and analysis 
on Guiyang City as an ecocity 
are based on the data and 
documents in the following 
website: http://www.guiyang. 
cn/zhuanti/jsst/ 
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Guiyang’s shift toward circular economy has resulted in great progress in both 
economic development and environmental protection. The first task Guiyang City 
undertook was to use technology innovation to change its linear industry to circular 
industry. For example, Kaiyang Phosphorus Ore, one of the three phosphorus mining 
operations in China, was once a big polluter with an annual polluted water discharge 
of nearly one million tons, solid waste weighing 1 million tons, and air pollution of 
0.3 billion cubic meters. Thanks to technological innovation, its phosphorus 
production increased from 0.6 million tons in 2002 to 3 million tons in 2008, and its 
revenue increased from 2.4 to 8 billion RMB. The recycling of yellow phosphorus 
contributed greatly to these increases. Now Guiyang has established a new circular 
industry structure covering the agricultural, industrial, tourism, and infrastructure 
sectors. 
The second task the city embarked on was restoring the ecosystems within the city 
and the surrounding environment. The two key eco­projects were the restoration of 
the Nanming River and the reforestation of a greenbelt surrounding the city. Guiyang 
City has also reformed its environmental policy and law to support its ecocity 
building efforts. Guiyang City was the first one in China to create an indicator system 
for ecocities and pass a local law on ecocities: the Statute on Ecocity Construction of 
Guiyang City. 
Guiyang City is one of several ecocity experiments initiated since 2002. Currently 
the experimentation is occurring at different scales. At the megalopolis level, Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai are promoting ecocity construction. Twenty other smaller 
metropolises and thousands of county­level cities have received approval from the 
government to implement ecocity strategies as well. 
Table 1 Advantages and weakness of ecocity development in China 
Challenges Advantages 
1. Low ecological public awareness 1. High priority in decision making 
2. GDP­dominated urban sprawl 2. Efficient land use 
3. Weak bottom­up activities from
saving and reuse 
3. Long tradition of resource
NGOs 
4. Strong initiation and weak con­
service jobs 
4. Fewer slums through diversified
tinuity 
5. Fragile natural ecosystem and
tradition 
5. Decentralized eco­engineering





Professor Wang cautions that China’s ecocity movement has its advantages but 
also faces difficult challenges (Table 1). For example, public awareness of the ecocity 
movement is currently weak. Because local officials are held accountable by their 
superiors, not by private citizens, the public lacks interest in the ecocity initiatives put 
forth by these officials. Yet active public participation is crucial for the success of 
ecocity design and management. 
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concluding remarks 
China is at a crossroad with respect to industrialization, urbanization, and 
environmental reform. As public awareness of environmental deterioration increases, 
large numbers of private enterprises, cities, and provinces are taking steps toward the 
goal of eco­civilization through an ecologically sound development strategy. The 
approaches of circular economy and ecocity development offer the best prospects for 
China to reconcile the goal of environment stewardship with those of 
industrialization and urbanization. 
conversation with professor wang on circular economy and
ecocities 
Circular economy 
What is the precise definition of circular economy? 
Circular economy is defined differently under different circumstances. In Japan, the 
concept focuses on recycling by consumers. In Germany, the concept focuses on 
recycling of wastes. In China, the concept of circular economy is also described in 
various ways, such as a “recycling­based economy” or an economy that fulfills the 3R 
principle as discussed above. 
The law on circular economy in China goes beyond the concept of recycling, 
requiring a network approach and adaptive strategy to deal with situations including 
social, natural, and economic factors. It emphasizes totality, integration, human 
adaptation to the environment, and self­reliance. In other words, the legal definition 
appears to focus on technical side (products) and less so on enforcement. 
Can the green GDP matrix be applied to circular economy? 
In general, green GDP calculations are not compatible with the notion of circular 
economy. In Professor Wang’s view, green GDP is a bad concept. Green GDP is a 
linear, additive approach to integrating environmental costs with economic benefits. 
If all environmental losses are considered, the GDP estimates could be negative. 
Negative GDP is not realizable. To avoid negative numbers, people have to restrict 
damage calculations to a subset of sectors and ignore other sectors. A better approach 
is to define a polygon of indices. You could combine the indices into one measure or 
keep track of how the polygon shape is changing over time. 
Related to the calculation of green GDP is the importance of educating average 
citizens and decision makers on holistic thinking. Since 1840, the single indicator of 
wealth has replaced some traditional values, such as family, and cultural and religious 
traditions as the indicator of success and social status. Since the introduction of 
economic reform in the late 1970s, China has been using GDP as the sole indicator of 
social and economic achievement. More recently, however, increasing concern about 
environmental deterioration has led to the reevaluation of this development pattern. 
Teachers are promoting environmental conscience in young kids. More education is 
needed to influence decision makers. However, this shift from the existing pattern to 
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a new approach is undermined by systemic constraints, in particular the inaction of 
local governments. Ecology is a hollow slogan without real substance at local levels of 
government. To them, the measure of social and economic success is still GDP 
growth. 
Ecocities 
How do people measure ecocity functionality? 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has developed its own indices that 
cover environmental, ecological, economic, and institutional indicators for 
sustainable cities on both large and small scales. The applicability of these indicators 
varies geographically. For example, some of these indicators are more suitable for the 
coastal zone than the interior. Some of the MEP ecological indicators include size of 
wetland area and its change over time, green land area and structure (i.e. percentage 
of native species), and green roofs (in southern China). These indicators are revisited 
every 5­10 years for updating and adjustment. Changes in leadership at the MEP may 
cause the redefinition of these indicators. For example, new leadership has the 
tendency to create the impression of a “new direction” by relabeling things. 
One point of caution is that an overemphasis on greening the landscape can also 
give rise to undesirable outcomes. In some places, in order to “green” the city, big 
parks are dotted with large trees transplanted from elsewhere, and historic houses are 
replaced by eye­pleasing modern buildings. (Aware of the importance of cultural 
heritage, the city of Yanzhou, Jiangsu Province, took good care of its local community 
and historical buildings. Ironically, though, it was not designated as an “ecocity” by 
the MEP because of its relatively low GDP.) In some other cities, rooftops are painted 
green to create the impression of green space. 
Furthermore, ecocity functionality should be realized by institutional change. 
Shanghai is the first city to replace its old fragmented sector­by­sector management 
system with a truly integrated bureau of city management. 
At which spatial scale is an ecocity optimal? 
In China, ecocities vary in size, from towns measuring several kilometers across to 
metropolises like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. However, since ecocity is a 
buzzword, it is misused in almost every sector. For instance, realtors use this concept 
as a marketing tool to make expensive housing more appealing to consumers. 
At the larger end of this scale range, the designated ecocity zone must contain a 
good mixture of ecological towns, each having different functionalities. Within its 
administrative boundary there should be urban land and rural land, each requiring a 
different ecological strategy. By necessity, every ecocity should set its own priority for the 
purpose of planning. For example, the overriding goal of Beijing is water conservation. 
How do ecocities and circular industry relate to one another? 
The principle of circular industry should be integrated into ecocity development. 
One good example is green building with specifications for energy conservation. In 
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Shenzhen, all new buildings must have solar panels in the real estate business. 
Another example is ecological sanitation. In the process of urbanization, use of 
human waste by farmers as a source of fertilizer, an old practice in rural China, is 
discouraged or totally phased out and replaced with a sewage system. This trend is 
being reversed in some local communities. Green microfinancing, which is used as a 
tool to encourage sustainable development in some developing countries, does not 
yet exist in China. 
How important is public participation in the ecocity movement? 
Public participation is crucial to the ecocity movement. At the moment, the public is 
not paying much attention, partly because the government retains tight control over 
Chinese society. However, in recent years, NGOs and semi­NGOs are playing an 
increasing role in public participation. Semi­NGOs such as the Ecological Society of 
China and other professional societies are gaining influence. Members of these 
organizations are critiquing governmental behaviors, raising the public’s 
environmental awareness, monitoring and supervising the business sector. In some 
instances, the government deliberately delegates tasks such as certification, 
environmental assessment, and eco­labeling to these semi­NGOs. 
International cooperation 
How should the international community help China develop its circular economy 
and ecocities? 
International cooperation can provide an infusion of new ideas and knowledge in the 
development of circular economy and ecocities. However, such ideas and knowledge 
must be adapted to local situations in China, or else they are likely to fail. For 
example, some German companies proposed nice ecocity concepts to Shanghai, but 
they were difficult to apply, explaining why the ecocity (district) in Shanghai is slow 
in making progress. Another example is that in Tianjin, planners responsible for 
ecocity construction are all local, with little advanced knowledge. Foreign help is 
needed to inspire them. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Modern Energy Use and Air Pollution
in China: Challenges and
Opportunities* 
Professor Jiming Hao 
Tsinghua University 
Elaine Yu 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
Two main challenges lie at the forefront of energy use in China: (1) diminished
national security due to heightened dependence on foreign oil, and (2) increasing
energy demand and limited supplies. In confronting these challenges, China’s
energy path, which is reliant on heavy industrial processes and fossil fuels, will
increasingly affect air quality on a domestic and global level. Growing vehicle
populations, outdated coal­fired power plants and other heavy industries are the
primary sources of increasing sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), particulate
matter (PM), volatile organic compounds (VOC), mercury (Hg), and carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. These air pollutants emitted from multiple sources over multiple
spatial scales have led to a complexity of interrelated air quality problems—
primarily acid deposition, photochemical smog, ozone, regional haze and reduced
visibility, global mercury dispersion, and climate change. Strategies to maximize
energy production and abate emissions will require targeting industrial processes
for improvements in energy efficiency and strengthening air pollution regulations.
Professor Jiming Hao offers three policy recommendations: (1) develop a national
air pollution control plan based on World Health Organization air pollution targets,
utilizing a multi­pollutant control strategy and regional coordination system; (2)
regulate total coal consumption in heavily polluted areas; and (3) enhance vehicle
pollution control in China’s megacities. 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
October 27, 2008, by Professor 
Hao as part of a graduate 
course taught by Professor 
Xuhui Lee entitled "China's 
Environment." The paper was 
written by Elaine Yu, a graduate 
student in the course, and has 
been approved by Professor 
Hao. The paper incorporates 
material from the lecture, the 
discussion session after the 
lecture with Professor Hao, as 
well as background material on 
the lecture topic prepared by 
the students. For short 
biographies of the authors, 
please go to the end of the 
chapter. 
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introduction 
The country that is home to a quarter of the world’s population has been tied to 
economic and industrial development over the last thirty years in an urgent quest to 
cultivate better living standards. Rushing to center stage as an economic powerhouse, 
China is maintaining the trajectory that modern energy use will fuel the nation’s 
material economy. Energy from coal, oil, natural gas, solar, wind, biomass, 
hydroelectric dams, and nuclear fission is transmuted into modern comforts such as 
heated buildings, improved health facilities, lighting, refrigeration, transportation, 
and electronic communication. Empirical studies from the UN Development 
Program show a positive correlation between the human development index and a 
country’s per capita energy consumption, as well as a positive correlation between 
modern energy use per capita and GNP per capita (UNDP 2005). Pursuing this 
trajectory, China will unquestionably expand its energy infrastructure to lift poorer, 
rural populations in the nation’s western expanse. 
The energy used to fulfill China’s dream, however, has come with the sizeable cost 
of air pollution. Growing vehicle populations, coal­fired power plants, and other 
energy­intensive industries such as cement and steel production produce a spectrum 
of pollutants—namely sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter. These 
are the primary causes of local and regional air pollution problems such as acid rain, 
photochemical smog, ozone, regional haze and diminished visibility. In addition, 
China’s emissions are going global. Greenhouse gases and mercury emitted into the 
atmosphere contribute to climate change and mercury deposition in other countries. 
China’s current air quality control measures have yet to overcome these challenges. 
However, data­driven analysis brings opportunities to strengthen China’s air 
pollution regulations and bolster energy use. In this chapter, we provide a brief 
diagnostic of current and future energy challenges that the nation faces. We will also 
perform a review of China’s current air quality status, which will be followed by a 
discussion of three policy recommendations for air quality improvement. Three case 
studies are also included to bring the reader up to date on the status of mercury 
pollution in China, multiple­control strategies, and air quality during the 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games. 
energy challenges: national security, increasing energy demand,
and limited energy supplies 
In recent years, oil has been a focal point in foreign dependency issues, military 
tensions, price shocks, and long­term resource scarcity. The United States, for 
example, which has a long history of dependence on foreign oil, must rely on military 
and political means to protect access to oil reserves abroad. The connection between 
energy use and national security was a talking point in President Barack Obama’s 
inauguration speech, as he proclaimed, “each day brings further evidence that the 
ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.” The reality 
of transnational terrorism and the violent disruption of oil supplies have led an 
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increasing number of national leaders to look toward domestic and renewable 
sources of energy in order to forge greater energy independence. 
Oil is increasingly fueling China’s economy. Insufficient oil production capacity in 
China has left Chinese companies to pursue oil acquisition overseas. To China’s 
benefit, the country’s crude oil comes from a diverse portfolio of twenty­eight 
countries—as of the end of 2008—to feed petroleum demands and moderate risks 
(People’s Daily 2009). However, China is nevertheless a nation prone to oil market 
instability. Currently about 50 percent of China’s oil imports originate in the Middle 
East, while other oil imports come from transitioning economies in Africa, including 
civil war­afflicted Sudan. The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) has 
further intensified China’s import opportunities in the Middle East by signing a $2.9 
billion contract with Iraq, which will allow CNPC to explore and develop an oil field 
over the next two decades (People’s Daily 2009). China’s oil partnerships may 
improve the economic welfare of petroleum­exporting nations and provide promise 
for China’s energy future, but China may also risk becoming caught in future internal 
conflicts. China must also wrestle with the prospect that oil imports may not meet 
long­term demands for oil consumption, given the nation’s expected rate of vehicle 
population growth. In 2007, for instance, China increased its total foreign oil imports 
by 12.4 percent over the previous year, while its vehicle output increased by 22.6 
percent (Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Table 1 Oil production and vehicle output in China 
Production in 2007 Percent increase over 2006 
Domestic production 187�106 tons 1.87 
Imported petroleum 163�106 tons 12.4 
Output of vehicles 6.33�106 22.6 
Source: Chinese Bureau of Statistics 
Figure 1 Trends of coal, petroleum and gas production and consumption in China 
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Aside from oil in the energy matrix, China’s energy efficiency also deserves 
attention. In 2006, China experienced an 8.4 percent increase in primary energy 
consumption, using about 1.7 billion tons of oil equivalent that year, equating to 15.6 
percent of primary global energy utilization (China Daily 2007). The rural 
population of western China, which has yet to enjoy a lifestyle supported by intensive 
energy use and urban infrastructure, can double China’s current energy usage. One 
straightforward way to improve energy security is to improve energy efficiency. 
Advancing energy efficiency is often less expensive, less ecologically damaging, and 
more feasible than building new energy plants. China has made notable 
improvements in energy efficiency over the past few decades, but the country’s energy 
intensity, which is energy consumption relative to total economic output, still 
remains high compared to the global average. In 2006, China’s energy intensity was 
2.8 times the world average (Figure 2). China’s industry, comprised of heavy sectors 
such as steel, cement, and thermal electricity production, and consuming more than 
50 percent of the nation’s total energy production, is a formidable obstacle for energy 
efficiency improvement. Efficiency efforts can be maximized by examining sector­by­
sector energy savings potential and engaging in international cooperation with 
energy efficiency leaders such as Japan via platforms such as the Japan­China Energy 
Conservation Forum. 
Figure 2 Energy intensity in China and the world. Energy intensity is measured in tons of coal equiva­
lent (tce) per unit GDP. 
Source: Chinese Bureau of Statistics 
current air pollution status in china 
Air pollution refers to a complex variety of airborne substances in the atmosphere 
that originate from multiple sources. Primary pollutants—pollutants that are emitted 
directly from a source, such as exhaust pipes and chimneys—include sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic 
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compounds (VOCs), and carbonaceous and noncarbonaceous particles. Secondary 
pollutants—contaminants formed in the atmosphere through chemical reactions— 
include ozone and secondary particulate matter (PM). Fossil fuel burning and 
industrial processes are the leading culprits of excess emissions in the environment 
that combine to produce an assortment of local, regional and global air quality 
problems (Figure 3). For instance, PM contributes to regional haze and plays an 
important role in climate change, while NOx contributes to climate change, regional 
haze, and regional acid deposition (WHO 2005). 











Regional Photochemical Pollution 
Regional Fine PM Pollution 
Source: Elaine Yu 
SO2, NOx, and PM deserve close attention for their large contribution to a range 
of environmental effects. Although SO2 and NOx can be formed from natural 
processes (e.g., SO2 from volcano eruption and NOx from lighting), in much of China 
they are largely products of combustion of coal and petroleum for power generation. 
PM, on the other hand, comes from a wide variety of sources, comprising a wide 
range of chemical compositions. PM is typically classified by size, from coarse large 
particles such as windblown soil to ultra­fine particles—under 2.5 mm in diameter— 
produced in chemical industries (WHO 2005). 
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Source: Hao 2009 
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In China, SO2 and PM emissions are predicted to decrease and NOx emissions are 
expected to rise. Currently, NOx levels in Chinese cities are comparable to those of 
developed nations, while SO2 and PM10 (particulate matter with diameter less than 10 
µm) concentrations are about 4­6 times the level in developed nations (Hao 2009; 
manuscript in preparation). From 1995 to 2005, nationwide total suspended particles 
(TSP) and SO2 concentrations decreased due to the rapid phasing out of traditional 
coal combustion technology. NOx levels during that time period remained relatively 
constant, except for reported increases in southern China, particularly in the Pearl 
River Delta (Figure 4; Chapter 11). 
Acid rain is largely a product of SO2 and NOx molecules that combine with 
atmospheric water to form sulfuric and nitric acids. Acid deposition damages plants, 
soil, fish, and human health, and causes gradual erosion to buildings and historical 
monuments. The Chinese Meteorological Science Institute estimates that acid rain 
regions (areas with precipitation pH lower than 5.0) accounted for about 30­40 
percent of China’s landmass from 1993 to 2006 (Hao 2009). Generally this percentage 
has remained steady (Figure 5). Some areas with severe emissions even observe pH 
levels declining below 4.5. Although the chemicals primarily responsible for acid 
deposition are SO2, NOx, and NH3 (ammonia), air pollutant control measures in 
China have mainly focused on SO2 abatement (Hao 2009). 
Figure 5 The distribution of precipitation pH values in China for 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2006 
Source: Hao 2009 
Regional haze is a frequent occurrence in China. Dust, smoke, and other particles 
produce a brownish haze that impairs visibility and contributes to respiratory health 
problems (Figure 6). PM2.5 (particulate matter with diameter less than 2.5 µm) 
contributes the most to regional haze and decreased visibility. The average visibility 
diminished at a rate of 0.24 kilometers per year in China from 1957 to 2005—an 
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approximate loss of 10 kilometers over about five decades (Hao 2009). The problem 
is severe in northern Chinese cities: their PM2.5 levels are 0.08­0.10 mg/m3, about 5­6 
times the U.S. ambient air quality standard (0.015 mg/m3). Cities in southern China 
are a little cleaner: their PM2.5 levels are at 0.04 – 0.07 mg/m3, but are still above the 
U.S. air quality standard (Hao 2009). 
Figure 6 Changes in regional haze and visibility. The left panels show visibility and air pollution index
(API) in Beijing. The right panels are satellite images showing the change in haze level in the north­
eastern region. The two crosses mark the locations of Beijing and Tianjin. 
Source: Hao 2009 
Low winds, high temperatures, and an abundance of NOx and hydrocarbons in the 
air are recipes for ground­level ozone (O3) pollution and photochemical smog. The 
effects of high ozone concentrations include harm to the human respiratory system. 
China’s national ozone standard of 93.3 ppb (200 µg/m3) is frequently violated (Hao 
2009). For instance, in Beijing in 2005, about one out of five days was a non­
attainment day (Figure 7). In some cities the maximum hourly average often 
surpasses the European alarm levels. The Pearl River Delta and Beijing are particular 
hotspots for high ozone levels (Hao 2009). 
Global pollutants such as mercury (Hg) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are receiving an 
increasing amount of attention from the international community. Mercury is 
known for its toxic effects on humans and wildlife, and CO2 for its heavy contribution 
to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. China’s contribution to global Hg deposition 
has been substantial, and long­distance transport of mercury may actually hamper 
domestic efforts in the U.S. to bring the pollution problem into regulatory 
compliance (Steding and Flegal 2002; Seigneur et al. 2004). It is estimated that Asia 
exported 21 percent of global mercury to the U.S. in 1998 (Seigneur et al. 2004), and 
China’s coal industry comprised 25 percent of total global Hg emissions in 1995 
(Pacyna et al. 2002). China will also soon surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest 
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greenhouse gas emitter. In fact, in 2006 China emitted about 115 million more metric 
tons of carbon dioxide than the U.S. (EIA 2006). 
Figure 7 Ozone non­attainment days and hours in Beijing 
Source: Hao 2009 
Box 1: Mercury Pollution in China 
Our understanding of mercury emission intensity is improving, but more 
research is necessary. An inventory study estimates that in 1999, 536 (±236) 
metric tons of mercury were released in China from anthropogenic sources 
(Streets et al. 2005). Nonferrous metals smelting, coal combustion, and other 
activities (predominately battery, fluorescent lamp, and cement production) 
contributed 45 percent, 38 percent, and 17 percent of the country’s Hg 
emissions, respectively. Fifty­six percent of 
the emitted mercury was in elemental 
form (Hg), 32 percent as gaseous divalent 
mercury (Hg2+), and 12 percent as 
particulate mercury (Hgp) (Streets et al. 
2005). Southwest regions of China suffer 
the most from mercury contamination in 
local rivers and ecosystems. Areas pro­
ducing the highest mercury emissions 
include small­scale coal burning plants 
lacking pollution control technologies in 
Guizhou and metal smelting industries in 
Liaoning and Guangdong provinces 
(Figure 8) (Streets et al. 2005). 
Figure 8 (a) Gridded total Hg emissions for the year
1999 (all sources together, 30 x 30 km minimum
resolution, unit: t yr­1 per grid cell). (b) Gridded Hg
emissions from coal combustion for the year 1999.
(c) Gridded total Hg emissions from nonferrous
metals smelting for the year 1999 
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making better air quality a reality: policy suggestions,
measures, and targets 
Even though China’s pollution problems seem daunting, improvement of air quality 
is feasible. In this section, we present a set of strategies and recommendations for how 
to move forward. Successful air pollution control management requires a national 
call to action. The first policy suggestion is to develop a national air pollution control 
plan. The plan will require: (1) a study of best methodologies for emissions inventory, 
(2) scientifically­based targets and standards, (3) systemic, real­time air quality 
monitoring, and (4) a regional and urban air quality management system. 
Professor Jiming Hao is a part of an expert group on the State Council of China 
that is focused on climate change, energy savings, and pollution emission control. 
According to Hao, the China’s strategy for air pollution control indicates that by the 
year 2050, most areas in China should meet the WHO guidelines for public health 
and ecological safety. Right now, China is in Phase I of meeting these guidelines. By 
2020, 95 percent of cities in China should be expected to meet China’s national class 
II ambient air quality standard, with some achieving Phase II of the WHO guidelines. 
By 2030, 80 percent of Chinese cities should meet the Phase III targets of the WHO 
guidelines. By 2050, most cities would be expected to meet the WHO guidelines. To 
fully achieve the directive phase targets, SO2 emissions should be reduced by 60 
percent from the 2005 level, NOx by 40 percent, PM10 by 50 percent, and VOCs by 40 
percent (Table 2). 
Table 2 WHO ambient air quality guidelines, µg/m3 
PM10 O3 NO2 SO2 
Annual 24­hour 8­hour Annual Hourly Hourly 10­minute 
average average average average average average average 
Phase I 70 150 125 
Phase II 50 100 160 50 
Phase III 30 75 40 200 
Directive 20 50 100 20 500 
Because China suffers from numerous air quality problems over several spatial 
scales, the cleanup efforts should go beyond minimizing a few airborne pollutants. In 
other words, China will need a multipollutant control strategy and a regional 
framework. In particular, heavily industrialized regions, such as the Beijing 
municipality, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, should be targeted for 
regional coordination (Figure 9). More details on multipollutant regulation 
approaches are provided in Box 2, and a case study for regional harmonization to 
meet air quality goals is supplied in Box 3. 
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Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)
1. Speed up the application of flue gas desulphurization (FGD)
technologies in coal fired power plants.
2. Implement SO2 emissions control in other heavily polluting industries
such as metals manufacturing, cement production, and chemical
fabrication industries.
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)
1. Amend The Air Pollution Control and Prevention Law to add a clause on
NOx emission control.
2. Expand the use of selective catalyst reduction (SCR) systems as soon as
possible.
3. Increase research on NOx emissions inventory and determine long
term measures for NOx abatement.
4. Target thermal power plants for NOx control. In addition to applying
NOx reduction technologies, thermal power units with high NOx emis
sions should be retired.1
Primary Particulate Matter (PM)
1. Increase the use of washed coal. Ash contained in coal can be removed
to reduce PM.
2. Control PM in cement and steel industries.
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Figure 9 A framework for regional coordination 
Science Center 
Monitoring Air Quality Modeling Emission Inventory 
Regional Air Quality Steering Committee 
Work Plan and Air Pollution Control Target Development at Provincial and City Levels 
Implementation 
Air Pollution Control Targets 




1 Thirty­six percent of all NOx 
emissions in China come from 
thermal power plants. 
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● Increasingly retire manufacturing plants that use outdated produc
tion processes.
● Recover waste heat from dry kilns for power generation.
● Utilize continuous environmental monitoring systems (CEMS) to
measure pollutant density within production.
● Install high efficiency dust removal facility.
3. Install high efficiency dust collectors in power plants and industrial
boilers.
● Electrostatic air cleaners (ESP) or fabric filters (FF) can be used in
industrial boilers and power plants. Cleaner fuel for boilers such as
natural gas versus coal can also be utilized.
4. Limit open burning of agricultural biomass such as straw and leaves.
5. Reforest bare land regions to prevent dust storms.
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
1. Develop VOC emissions control laws and regulations. This includes
issuing a list of VOCs to be targeted by ambient air quality standards.
2. Reduce VOC emissions by issuing standards for industrial organic sol
vents.
3. Increase storage and sealing of organic solvents to reduce VOC escape.
4. Prohibit VOC emissions in open air and residential areas particularly
from spraying, sandblasting, and glass and steel production activities.
5. Require that petroleum stations adopt sealing technologies for VOC
control.
Ozone (O3) and Fine Particulate Matter (PM)
1. Strengthen research on regional air pollution control strategies.
Research should be directed to technologies and methods for
monitoring and forecasting air quality, including early warning
systems.
2. Establish scientifically based standards and targets.
3. Focus on regional coordination and management systems for ozone
and fine PM.
Mercury (Hg) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
1. Improve research and understanding of mercury emissions to deter
mine its global impact, with special attention to the monitoring of
atmospheric Hg and wet deposition.
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2 Coal burning units with FDG 
technology not only have the 
ability to capture SO2, but 
also to dissolve Hg2+. 
2.	 Develop technologies to capture and control Hg and CO2. 
2 
3.	 Develop management systems and incentives to reduce Hg and CO2. 
4.	 Increase international collaboration to manage these pollutants and 
share strategies for abatement. 
Box 3 Managing air quality for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were a defining moment for China. The 
world was focused not only on global athletes but also on China’s efforts to 
improve Beijing’s air quality. Most of the public media focused on the short­
term air pollution reduction strategies such as reducing on­road vehicles by 
about 30 percent in Beijing and the closing of some factories during the 
Games. However, Beijing’s air quality improvement strategy was extensively 
planned. 
Professor Jiming Hao notes, “Most people see the short­term [air pollution 
reduction efforts] in July and August . . . but for the Olympic Games, China 
had been preparing for ten years.” In 1999, Hao visited prior Olympic Games 
sites in Los Angeles, California, and Atlanta, Georgia, with Beijing’s 
delegation to learn about their air pollution control strategies. The central 
government has taken on four main actions for long­term Olympics 
preparation: (1) improving energy use—e.g. fueling cooking stoves and small 
heating boilers with natural gas instead of coal; (2) requiring new in­use 
vehicles to meet European IV emission standards; (3) moving heavy 
industries such as steelworks out of Beijing; and (4) implementing ecological 
projects in western China for dust control. Researchers concluded that 
without the air pollution abatement efforts of the last decade, China could 
not have met air quality standards for the Beijing Games. 
Prior to the Games, Hao and his colleagues also predicted that regional scale 
pollution transport posed a threat to Beijing’s air quality, the level of threat 
depending on weather conditions. The community multiscale air quality 
(CMAQ) modeling system predicted that 35­60 percent of ozone during high 
ozone episodes and 34 percent of PM2.5 at the Olympic Stadium originate 
from areas outside Beijing (Streets et al. 2006). Surrounding areas such as 
Tianjin municipality and Hebei and Shandong provinces were predicted to 
contribute significantly to Beijing’s air quality problems. In response, local 
neighboring governments took on special initiatives for the Games as well as 
for long­term environmental improvements. For instance, Hebei’s provincial 
environmental bureau reported fifty­six pollution abatement projects for the 
province’s chemical industries, the installation of thirty­four FGD systems in 
power plants, and the construction of twenty­three central heating facilities 
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to reduce coal consumption—a combined effort projected to cut 550,000 
tons of SO2 in the region (Xinhua 2008). 
The capital’s clean air strategy was a success. Air quality was much improved 
during the Games. Perhaps more importantly, the strategy highlights the role 
of regional coordination in air quality management. 
A second policy suggestion is to control coal consumption in heavily polluted 
areas. Coal is China’s number one source of energy and a significant emitter of air 
pollutants. The number of coal­fired power plants in China grew rapidly from 2000­
2005 (Zhao et al. 2008). As a consequence, the SO2, NOx and PM emissions increased 
by 1.5, 1.7, and 1.2 times, respectively, during this period. Sulfur dioxide emissions 
from coal­fired power plants are expected to decrease by 2010 due to the widespread 
installation of flue gas desulphurization (FGD) devices (Table 2). On the other hand, 
NOx emissions from coal plants are projected to rise by 39 percent from 2005­2010 
because of a lack of rigorous control measures. Overall PM concentrations in the 
Chinese coal industry will decrease in 2010 due to FGD technology, but PM2.5 will 
increase to some extent due to the poor ability of FGD technology to control fine 
particulates. There are numerous coal­fired plants less than 300 megawatts in China. 
These small plants have no FDG units installed and low combustion efficiency, and 
they collectively contribute the most to the total Chinese coal emissions. Future 
regulations will need to focus on these small polluters as well as larger coal­fired 
plants. 
Two steps are recommended to reduce China’s reliance on coal. In the first step, all 
coal­fired units under 25 megawatts should retire by 2010. Under this scenario, it is 
estimated that SO2, NOx, and TSP would decline by 2173, 622, and 540 kt, respectively 
(Zhao et al. 2008). A second step requires that all new coal plants utilize the latest, 
most efficient production technology to maximize energy savings and minimize 
pollution. Examples of clean technologies include FGD, coal washing, and 
gasification. 
Table 2 Total Chinese coal­fired power plant emissions for 2005 and projected emissions for 2010
(kilotons) 
2005 2010 % Change 
SO2 16,097 11,801 ­27 
NOx 6,965 9,680 +39 
TSP 2,774 2,540 ­8 
PM10 1,842 1,824 ­1 
Source: Hao 2009; manuscript in preparation 
A third policy suggestion is to improve vehicle pollution control in megacities. In 
2007, the number of vehicles reached 160 million, which is roughly twice the vehicle 
population in 2002 (Hao 2009). Vehicle emissions can be controlled through a 
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number of options tailored to each city, depending on commuter needs and pollution 
levels. One suggestion would be to expand subway systems and other forms of public 
transit to reduce congestion, reduce emissions, and save fuel. In this regard, valuable 
lessons can be learned from the highly utilized, efficient public transportation 
systems in other populated countries such as Japan. For instance, cutting­edge 
companies such as East Japan Railway, which currently serves large metropolitan 
areas such as Tokyo, have introduced a line of fuel­cell hybrid railcars to reduce the 
impact of on­road transport and capture energy savings (JR East Group 2008). 
China should also improve their fundamental inspection and maintenance 
program to control vehicle emissions. Strict emission standards should be adhered. 
Sulfur content in fuel oil should be reduced. In addition, China can promote “clean 
energy” vehicles using market­based incentives. For instance, fuel taxes on the 
automotive industry or heavy taxes on polluting vehicles can stimulate green choices 
and encourage public transportation use. Finally, China can cap the total number of 
vehicles in heavily congested cities. Cities suffering the most from air pollution may 
want to mimic Shanghai’s vehicle population control policy through a license 
auctioning system. 
summary 
China’s goal of economic development rests on secure energy supplies. Oil is expected 
to play a large role in its energy mix for decades to come, but dependence on foreign 
oil reduces energy security in the midst of increasing energy demand. Energy 
efficiency improvements in the industrial sector are vital to reducing China’s energy 
intensity and can produce immediate energy savings. Sharing technical expertise 
through international coordination will also catalyze China’s energy efficiency 
endeavors. 
In incremental steps, China can begin by codifying its leadership’s commitment to 
update environmental policies and creating the organizational capacity to effectively 
manage air quality. Given the transboundary nature of air pollutants, a national, 
multipollutant control strategy with regional harmonization will be crucial. The joint 
efforts among neighboring provinces during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
demonstrate the feasibility of action to reduce emissions at a regional scale. For 
mercury and greenhouse gases, a global synchronized effort will also be key to tackle 
the effects of climate change and mercury deposition. Additional details on this 
control strategy are provided in Box 2 above. 
Coal will remain an abundant domestic source of energy for years to come. 
Retiring coal­fired power plants with low combustion efficiency and those without 
FDG control units will significantly reduce SOx, NOx and TSP levels. New coal­fired 
power plants should be updated to modern efficiency and stringent emissions 
standards. 
Furthermore, the reduction of vehicle emissions in megacities is vital in the face of 
rapidly growing demand for cars. Improved inspection and maintenance programs 
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for passenger vehicles, use of energy efficient railway systems, and market­based 
incentive policies are among the measures that could be used to achieve a decline in 
on­road emissions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Pinning Down the Factors: Energy
Conservation and Carbon Emission 
Reduction in China* 
Professor Xu Zhao 




Now emitting over 6 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide a year, China is an
industrial powerhouse whose actions affect the entire world. In this chapter, we
examine China’s energy and carbon emission patterns and compare these trends
with the United States and the European Union. We identify increased economic
growth, increased energy intensity, and growth in primary and secondary
industries as the major factors behind increased energy consumption, and change
in energy consumption as the main contributor to increased carbon dioxide
emissions. 
After examining these trends in production and services, we focus especially on
trends in households, a sector that now accounts for over a third of China’s indirect 
energy consumption. We identify urbanization as the main driver behind increased
urban household energy consumption. Technological progress, on the other hand,
corresponds to a drop in both indirect and urban household energy consumption. 
This chapter concludes with the recommendation that China should transition to
market­based policies to induce reductions in energy use, and stresses the 
importance of global collaboration in tackling this energy and emissions problem. 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
October 20, 2008, by Professor 
Zhao as part of a graduate 
course taught by Professor 
Xuhui Lee entitled "China's 
Environment." The paper was 
written by Jiaona Zhang, a 
student in the course, and has 
been approved by Professor 
Zhao. The paper incorporates 
material from the lecture, the 
discussion session after the 
lecture with Professor Zhao, as 
well as background material on 
the lecture topic prepared by 
the students. For short 
biographies of the authors, 
please go to the end of the 
chapter. 
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Energy forms the cornerstone of our economy. Energy commodities provide the fuel 
that drives our transportation system, heats our homes and offices, and powers our 
factories. In essence, these commodities are the critical inputs to a wide variety of 
production processes that drive modern economies. Yet, while energy plays an 
indispensable role in our daily lives and is the force that drives our society’s progress, 
it also has the potential to slowly degrade the world we live in. 
Over the past generation, we have increased our demands for electricity and fuel. 
Instead of working to rein in our own consumption and emissions, we feel compelled 
to compete for global resources. This unchecked and self­centered demand for energy 
has serious consequences for the health of our environment. 
The world market for energy consumption—with current laws and policies 
unchanged—is projected to increase by fifty percent from now to 2030.1 Ninety 
percent of the total projected growth in consumption will come from non­OECD 
countries, and with China ranked only second to the United States in total energy 
consumption, much of this growth will come from China. The combustion of fossil 
fuels is the main contributing factor to the release of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere. Therefore, increased energy consumption will inevitably lead to 
increased greenhouse effects. With China consuming more and more coal—the most 
carbon­intensive of energy sources—growing energy consumption in China will 
negatively impact the health of our planet. 
This chapter examines China’s energy consumption trends over the past thirty 
years and breaks that consumption down by sector. Using decomposition analysis, we 
identify the main factors driving increased energy consumption and carbon dioxide 
emissions. We then shift our focus to households and energy, identifying the main 
drivers of increased indirect household energy consumption and urban household 
energy consumption. Finally, by way of conclusion, we discuss mechanisms to 
address China’s—and the world’s—growing energy needs. 
energy consumption patterns 
“To understand what is happening and where we want to go, we need to look 
at the data and the trends they exhibit.” – Professor Xu Zhao 
Over the past thirty years, energy consumption in China has risen quickly. From 1978 
to 1996, energy consumption increased steadily at an average rate of 42 million TCE 
(tons of coal equivalent) per year. From 1997 to 2000, energy consumption rose at a 
slower average rate of 17 million TCE per year. Then, from 2001 to 2007, energy 
consumption increased dramatically. In 2001, energy consumption was at 1.35 billion 
TCE, and just six years later, in 2007, energy consumption had almost doubled to 2.65 
billion TCE. This translates into an increase of 217 million TCE on average per year, a 
much faster rate than the previous rate of increase between 1978 and 1996. 
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Data source: Statistical Yearbook 2007 of China 
What has caused this trend of increased energy consumption? In analyzing the 
forces producing this change, we examine the following five factors: economic 
growth, energy intensity, industrial structure, sectoral structure, and urbanization. 
While these factors are not exhaustive, together they form a model that reflects the 
concerns that people typically have in mind. Usually when analyzing industrial 
energy consumption, the most common factors that are examined include intensity 
and structural effect. Thus, it makes sense to include energy intensity, industrial 
structure, and sectoral structure in our model as relevant factors. Additionally, we are 
concerned about economic development and population growth and their potential 
impacts on energy consumption, and therefore we include them in our model as well. 
Throughout this chapter, economic growth is measured in GDP per capita, and 
energy intensity is defined as units of energy per unit of GDP. Using 1978 price levels, 
we calculated data for real GDP per capita in thousands of yuan and energy 
consumption per capita in tons of standard coal. In our analysis, “industrial 
structure” refers to the proportions of total output produced by the country’s 
primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. “Sectoral structure” refers to the 
proportions of output produced by each individual sector within the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industry categories. As defined by Chinese statistical 
yearbooks, the country’s primary industries include the following sectors: farming, 
fishing, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing, and water conservancy. China’s 
secondary industries include mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, 
and production and supply of electric power, gas, and water. The country’s tertiary 
industries include all service sectors. Finally, we measured urbanization using the rate 
of population growth in an urban area, which was defined by an increase in the 
density of manmade structures in comparison to the surrounding area. 
Using a co­integrated regression model, we then analyzed these five factors and 
their relationship with energy consumption. Theoretically, when we regress a time 
series variable on another time series variable, we obtain spurious results. Behavior 
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would be time dependent, and thus the results we get would be falsely significant and 
inapplicable in general terms. Co­integration regression, however, allows us to 
analyze these non­stationary time series variables. Through this method, the linear 
combination of these variables is stationary, and we can cancel out their non­
stationary characteristic. 
Using our co­integrated regression model, we determined that increased energy 
consumption was correlated with economic growth, increased energy intensity, and 
growth in primary and secondary industries.2 Out of these three relationships 
between energy consumption and our other factors, we found that the greatest 
correlation existed between increased energy consumption and increased energy 
intensity. Increased economic growth was also highly correlated with energy 
consumption. On the other hand, our regression test revealed that there was little 
correlation between China’s rising energy consumption and changes in its tertiary 
industries or level of urbanization. 
After identifying the general relationships between energy consumption and its 
contributing factors, we sought to determine the extent of each factor’s contribution 
through decomposition analysis, a technique that breaks down the changes in one 
variable into the changes in its determinants. We picked Log Mean Divisia Index 
(LMDI), a method of structural decomposition that uses a logarithmic mean weight 
function and gives perfect decomposition by accommodating zero values in the data set.3 
Figure 2 Results of decomposition analysis of factors contributing to increased energy consumption 
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Figure 2 displays the results of our decomposition analysis. It shows that economic 
growth has the largest positive effect on energy consumption, while declining energy 
intensity has the largest negative effect on energy consumption. This means that 
China’s energy consumption has primarily increased because of its economic 
development, and any decrease in overall consumption was largely caused by a 
decline in energy intensity. The results also show that changes in industrial structure 
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and population contributed to increased energy consumption, although their 
influence on energy consumption is less than that of economic growth. 
Thus, as population has increased, and industrial structure has shifted from 
primary industry to a greater focus on secondary industry, energy consumption has 
gone up. Meanwhile, change in sectoral structure has corresponded to a decrease in 
energy consumption, although its impact on decreasing energy consumption is less 
than that of declining energy intensity. Thus, China’s shift from more energy­
intensive sectors to less intensive ones, combined with the country’s increased 
efficiency in production processes has worked to decrease energy consumption. 
Knowing that industrial and sectoral structures are large contributors to increased 
energy consumption, we move on to examine how energy consumption breaks down 
by sector. This understanding of how consumption in each sector contributes to 
overall energy consumption gives policy makers an idea of which sectors to target 
with regulations and incentive schemes. 
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Figure 3 shows the breakdown of energy consumption. Industry has been the 
dominant consumer of energy over the years, as industrial energy consumption is 
nearly two­thirds of total energy consumption each year from 1987 to 2006. Looking 
specifically at 2006, industry occupied 71 percent of all energy consumption. In 
contrast, household consumption occupied 10 percent of total energy consumption. 
The transportation and telecom sector occupied about 8 percent, and the final 11 
percent was mainly comprised of construction, retail, agriculture, and fishing. 
A more detailed look at trends of energy consumption within specific sectors 
shows that agricultural energy consumption has not changed much over the past 
twenty years, while energy consumption in transportation and telecom has exhibited 
more dramatic changes. The agriculture and fishery sector has experienced an 
average increase of 5 percent per year for the last twenty years. On the other hand, 
energy consumption from transportation and telecom exhibited an average increase 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
98 lectures on china’s environment 
of 20 percent per year over the same period. It is this increase in energy consumption 
from the transportation and telecom sector that contributed greatly to China’s total 
rise in energy consumption. 
carbon emission patterns 
China’s rising energy consumption has been accompanied by increased energy­
related carbon dioxide emissions. As China’s total energy consumption has risen to 
over 2.5 billion TCE, China’s percentage of the world’s total carbon dioxide emissions 
has increased from less than 10 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2005. Thus, by 2005 
China had exceeded all other countries in emissions, with the exception of the United 
States, which represented 21 percent of the global total. 
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Figure 4 shows this marked increase in China’s emissions and compares China’s 
trend with seventeen other countries: the United States, Russia, Japan, India, 
Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, Iran, South Africa, 
France, Saudi Arabia, Austria, Mexico, Spain, and Brazil. From Figure 4, we can see 
that all countries—except for China, the United States, and Russia—have consistently 
produced 5 percent or less of the world’s total carbon emissions since the 1990s. Out 
of the three countries with emissions of over 5 percent of the global amount, China 
is the only country whose percentage of global emissions have risen overall from 1990 
to 2005. Both the United States and Russia exhibited decreases in total emissions. 
The most recent statistics released by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) show that China has overtaken the United States in total carbon emissions. In 
2006, China emitted 6.018 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide, while the United 
States emitted 5.903 billion metric tons. To enhance the comparison, Europe emitted 
4.721 billion metric tons, and Russia emitted 1.704 billion metric tons, making China 
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the clear leader in annual carbon dioxide emissions.4 It is, however, important to keep 
in mind that while China leads in total carbon dioxide emissions, this total emissions 
amount is largely an effect of China’s immense population. China’s per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions are actually less than the European Union as well as the United 
States. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions for China, the EU, and the United States 
were at roughly about 5, 10 and 20 tons of CO2 per capita in 2004.
5 
What has led to this trend of increased carbon dioxide emissions in China? In 
analyzing the causes of increased emissions, we examine the following three factors: 
energy consumption, the fossil energy proportion, and the structure of fossil energy. 
These factors were chosen because they are known to be linked to carbon dioxide 
emissions. Energy consumption results in the release of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere, and energy structure also has an impact on emissions, since carbon 
dioxide is emitted in varying amounts depending on the source. Again, while these 
factors are not exhaustive, they seem the most relevant according to previous 
scientific studies and popular concern. 
Using co­integrated regression, we found that carbon dioxide emissions were 
positively correlated with energy consumption. Thus, as we would expect, with 
increased energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions also increased. As for fossil 
energy proportion and the structure of fossil energy, both were negatively correlated 
with energy consumption. The increase of energy consumption corresponded to a 
decrease in fossil energy proportion and little change in fossil energy structure. 
After identifying the general relationship between increased carbon dioxide 
emissions and its contributing factors, we sought to determine the extent of each 
factor’s contribution using decomposition analysis. Figure 5 displays the results of 
our analysis. Out of the three factors, we can see that increased energy consumption 
was the biggest contributor to increased carbon dioxide emissions from 1984 to 2006. 
On the other hand, change in fossil energy proportion and structure of fossil energy 
had a negative impact effect on emissions. Thus, as the amount of fossil fuels China 
used in proportion to total energy sources decreased, emissions went down. These 
two factors, however, have had a much smaller impact on carbon dioxide emissions 
than energy consumption. 
Our examination of the factors contributing to increased carbon dioxide 
emissions showed us that energy structure plays a role in the amount of carbon 
dioxide we release into the air. Comparing 1978 and 2006, we can see that China’s 
energy structure has remained relatively constant. In 1978, the energy structure was as 
follows: 71 percent coal, 23 percent petroleum/oil, 3 percent natural gas, and 3 percent 
hydro, nuclear, and wind. In 2006, the energy structure was notably similar: coal 
occupied 70 percent, petroleum/oil 20 percent, natural gas 3 percent, and hydro, 
nuclear, and wind 7 percent. From this comparative breakdown, we can see that the 
main difference lies in a shift away from fossil fuels and towards nuclear and 
renewable energy; the percentage of coal and oil in China’s overall energy structure 
has decreased, while hydro, nuclear, and wind have increased. 
China’s energy structure is similar to countries such as the United States and India 
in that it is highly dependent on coal and oil. In general, energy structure depends on 
99 
4 Energy Information Adminis­
tration. Official energy 




5 IPCC. 2007. Summary for poli­
cymakers. In Climate change 
2007: Mitigation. Contribution 
of Working Group III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, eds. B. 
Metz et al. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
100 lectures on china’s environment 
resource endowment and policy. Each country has its unique resource endowment, 
which leads to specific policies and resulting distinctive energy structures across 
countries. For example, the EU depends heavily on nuclear power as its source of 
energy. China’s change in structure now includes more renewable and nuclear energy. 
However, China is still far from adopting energy structures similar to European 
countries. 
Figure 5 Results of decomposition analysis of factors contributing to increased carbon dioxide
emissions 
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household energy consumption 
Trends in production and services are not the only patterns of interest. Households 
—having exhibited an annual growth rate of 10 percent of total consumption since 
1999—now account for over a third of China’s indirect energy consumption. 
Therefore, to tackle China’s growing energy needs, we must understand the trends 
within household energy consumption. 
Household energy consumption (HEC) includes both direct and indirect energy 
consumption. Households consume energy either directly through lighting, heating, 
cooking, electricity use, and petroleum consumption for personal travel, or indirectly 
by consuming goods and services that require energy input in their production. Over 
the years, indirect energy consumption has risen in China. Urban households 
consume most of their energy indirectly, and as the number of urban households has 
increased, total indirect energy consumption has also gone up. 
This growth in indirect energy consumption warrants further examination. Let us 
first discuss the sources of direct versus indirect energy. Rural households consume 
more energy directly than indirectly, while urban households consume more energy 
indirectly than directly. Furthermore, rural households are the main contributors to 
direct energy consumption, while urban households are the main contributors to 
overall indirect energy consumption in China. For example, indirect energy 
consumption of urban households constituted 78–86 percent of total urban HEC, 
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while direct energy consumption of rural households constituted 54–66 percent of 
total rural HEC in 2006. Two factors related to urban households have resulted in 
increased indirect energy consumption. First of all, China has undergone growth in 
its urban centers, and as the number of urban households increases, so does total 
indirect energy consumption. The other factor is that urban residents are consuming 
greater amounts of products and services that constitute indirect energy 
consumption in that they require energy input in their production. Examples of these 
products include personal vehicles, cell phones, and electronic equipment. 
We need, however, a more rigorous analysis of the factors contributing to the trend 
of increased indirect household energy consumption. Again using decomposition 
analysis, we analyzed the factors causing change in indirect HEC during the period 
from 1997 to 2002. Through our analysis, we found that the major contributors to 
change in indirect HEC were technological progress and increased consumption. 
Technological progress corresponded to a 37 percent drop in indirect household 
energy consumption, while increased consumption corresponded to a 42 percent 
increase in indirect household energy consumption. Additionally, indirect household 
energy consumption rose with the increased proportion of urban household 
consumption. 
Digging deeper, we use structural decomposition analysis to identify the forces 
driving the change in urban household energy consumption. Through our analysis, 
we find that urban HEC was largely caused by urbanization and technological 
change. Urbanization acted as a positive driving force, while technological change 
acted as a negative driving force. This analysis is important, because based on 
expected trends in urbanization we can predict the direction of future changes in 
urban household energy consumption. We expect urbanization to continue as the 
income of Chinese residents grows and more people move into the cities. This 
income growth will also increase the size of the urban elite, a group that currently 
makes up about 10 percent of the Chinese population but consumes more than 20 
percent of total indirect HEC. Thus, with this income growth and rapid urbanization, 
we expect urban HEC and total indirect HEC to increase in the years to come. 
There is hope, however, for the expected increase in indirect energy consumption 
to taper off. As people spend their increased income on more products, indirect 
energy consumption is expected to increase. However, if people allocate their money 
to financial markets—abstract entities that consume less direct and indirect energy— 
urban households will consume less energy overall. Thus, if consumption structure 
shifts toward products offered in the tertiary industry, we may see trends in energy 
consumption that ameliorate the expected rise. 
discussion 
Economic growth and carbon emission reductions: Mutually exclusive? 
“So is there a tradeoff between growth and conservation?” –Professor Xu Zhao 
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When we decomposed the factors contributing to increased energy consumption, we 
saw that economic growth was the biggest positive force. Then, when we decomposed 
the factors contributing to carbon dioxide emissions, we saw that increased energy 
consumption was the most important contributor. Thus, all else equal, economic 
growth is positively correlated with carbon emissions. Knowing this relationship, it 
may seem like we face a trade­off between economic growth and energy conservation. 
Thus emerges the resistance that developing countries such as China exhibit toward 
potential emission reduction mandates, for they believe that it will come at the cost 
of hindering their economic growth. However, a trade­off between growth and 
conservation assumes that we cannot do anything to influence the other 
determinants of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. Our analyses 
revealed that increased energy efficiency and sectoral shifts also have an effect on 
energy consumption. Therefore, by creating policy that shapes the other 
determinants of carbon emissions, we do not have to slow down growth in order to 
protect our environment. 
Transforming China’s energy structure: Expected resistance 
“Shifting the energy structure in China will be met with resistance.” 
–Professor Xu Zhao 
A country’s energy structure depends on its energy endowment, and China’s resource 
endowment discourages shifting toward sources other than coal and oil—sources that 
would result in reductions in carbon dioxide emission reductions. Since China has an 
abundance of coal, shifting the energy structure toward more solar, wind, hydro, and 
nuclear power—or any other component that is not coal—will face both resource 
constraints and political resistance. One key to reducing emissions in China is 
changing attitudes. We need to help people understand that there is not always a one­
to­one trade­off between growth and emission reductions, and we also need to think 
of creative ways to overcome energy endowment constraints, and, most importantly, 
the political and social attitudes resistant to changing China’s energy structure. 
Market­based policies 
“We want to use energy price to adjust industry behavior.” —Professor Xu Zhao 
China’s current policies induce action through compulsory, rather than incentive­
based, measures. Yet, these compulsory policies retain inefficiencies that would 
otherwise be eliminated by market forces. For example, the Chinese government sets 
too low a fee for pollution, and only by letting the market determine the fee can we 
internalize these externalities. Thus, the best way for China to reach its goal of lower 
energy intensity may be through market­based measures. Potential strategies include 
price mechanisms, taxes, emission trading, and contracting energy management. 
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Price mechanisms include releasing current price caps on goods, e.g. oil, and 
allowing prices to fluctuate to reflect the accurate market price—the price where there 
is equilibrium between demand and supply. Taxes include carbon taxes and 
environmental taxes, where polluters must pay a fee for emitting carbon or other 
pollutants that damage the environment. Emissions trading entails determining 
standards for emissions, allocating carbon credits, and creating a carbon market. 
Finally, contracting energy management involves hiring foreign companies that 
specialize in overseeing and allocating energy resources to work with Chinese 
companies, or to train the domestic labor force in energy management practices. 
As for the first tool, price mechanisms, there exists the risk of social instability. If 
the central government released its cap on energy prices, the cost of fuel will go up 
and inputs that rely on fuel will become more expensive. As input prices increase, the 
price of most goods will go up. Currently, China has price caps on many goods, from 
electricity to water, medicine, and public transportation. The Chinese central 
government, which prioritizes maintaining a “harmonious society,” is averse to 
releasing these price caps because of the social instability that will ensue in response 
to these increased prices. Further research needs to be done on this topic to determine 
the effects of letting energy prices fluctuate with the market. The hope is that the 
release of energy price will adjust industry behavior, thus contributing to lower 
energy consumption and a reduction in carbon emissions. 
Taxes can also be an effective tool. In administering a carbon tax, one 
recommendation is to tax carbon in the coal, oil, and gas extraction and mining 
sectors. By levying the carbon tax upstream of the industrial production chain, we 
reduce the administrative cost of imposing such a tax. The cost will automatically 
carry through in the products of downstream industries, such as chemical and 
manufacturing industries that use coal or oil. Furthermore, this type of carbon tax 
would have the added benefit of increasing environmental consciousness in these 
downstream industries. These industries will learn to factor the carbon content of 
different fuels into their decisions, and they may shift toward cleaner substitutes.6 
Finally, as for emissions trading, there have already been some efforts in China to 
employ this tool. In 1999, China’s State Environmental Protection Administration 
collaborated with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and started pilot 
programs to reduce SO2 emissions. Two cities were chosen as the first stage: Nantong in 
Jiangsu Province, and Benxi in Liaoning. Later on, Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Henan, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and more cities also joined the program. The results so far have been 
mixed. One barrier this program faces is that there is not a national standard in place, 
even though there are provincial or municipal level legislations and regulations. A 
second barrier is a lack of enforcement of these regional caps on emissions. Finally, 
there has been a conflict of interest between the goal of economic growth at the 
provincial level and the emission reduction target. Under this program, emission 
reduction is only a “nice” thing to have, whereas “economic growth” is the primary 
criterion for evaluating provincial governments. As a result, environmental goals are 
often sacrificed for the sake of economic growth. The shortcomings of these efforts 
contain important lessons for future emissions trading systems. These pilot programs 
6 Wang, Qiong (Juliana). 
Personal communication. 
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have demonstrated the importance of setting a national standard, having good 
enforcement mechanisms, and internalizing environmentalism in incentive schemes. 
Moving forward, we face the question of whether a tradable carbon emission 
permit would be effective, and if so, how to properly design this mechanism. From 
our examination of the mechanism, we see that the key to effectively designing any 
market­based mechanism is to have an accurate estimate of the marginal social cost 
and marginal social benefit. If the price of energy is artificially low, then the cost of 
using one more unit of energy is going to be lower than the true cost, and people will 
over­consume energy. Thus, it is imperative to the success of any market­based tool 
that the price is set such that marginal cost equals marginal benefit. 
The global effort 
“This is a global problem, and collaboration is key.” –Professor Xu Zhao 
China’s energy consumption has reached 19 percent of the world’s energy 
consumption. Environmental issues in China are now more than just a domestic 
issue—they have become a global problem. 
Domestic efforts and goals can be summarized by the Five­Year Plan, which aims 
to reduce emissions by 20 percent in 2010. Last year, China did not reach its goal to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 4 percent, and it seems that these plans are more 
of an aspiration than a manageable reality. The transfer of manufacturing from 
foreign countries to China may be aggravating this problem, as multinationals pursue 
cheaper labor costs in the great China region. While we do not know the exact impact 
of this shift—and it is another topic for further research—it is likely that it has a 
negative impact on the decline of energy intensity, as it brings high­energy operations 
to the mainland. Thus, with international actors on and influencing the scene, 
emissions reduction in China requires a globally coordinated effort. 
conclusion 
In this chapter, we examined China’s energy and carbon emission patterns. We saw 
that increased economic growth, increased energy intensity, and growth in primary 
and secondary industries have been major contributors to increased energy 
consumption, and change in energy consumption has been the biggest driving force 
behind increased carbon dioxide emissions. 
We especially looked at energy consumption trends in households, as this sector 
now accounts for over a third of China’s indirect energy consumption. Similar to 
trends in the industrial sector, we found that increased indirect household energy 
consumption (HEC) has been mainly caused by increased consumption. However, 
households also diverge from industrial sector trends in a couple of ways. For 
example, urbanization was a key driver behind increased urban HEC, as well as 
technological progress, which corresponded to a drop in both indirect and urban 
household energy consumption. 
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This chapter concludes with the recommendation that China transition to market­
based policies to induce reductions, and we wish to stress the importance of global 
collaboration in tackling this energy and emissions problem that is without borders. 
Identifying the key factors that have an impact on energy consumption and carbon 
dioxide emissions in China has pointed out the direction of future efforts to reduce 
energy consumption and emissions. The best path to fix these problem areas is still 
an uncertain road ahead, but it is one that we now know must be navigated hand in 
hand through more research, program trials, and most importantly, with open minds 
and a greater concern for the well­being of our future world. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Wildlife Conservation inWestern China* 
Professor Richard Harris 




Eastern and western China have very different climates, population densities, and
livelihoods. As a result, distinct conservation models are appropriate in these two
regions. Pastoralism (herding and grazing animals) is the primary livelihood in
China’s west. This extensive land use allows humans and wildlife to coexist. This 
chapter explores current Chinese views toward wildlife as a basis for 
understanding Chinese conservation, and then addresses the current state of
wildlife management in western China. Finally, it makes recommendations for the
future of wildlife conservation. 
overview of western china 
Geography, culture, and wildlife vary dramatically from eastern to western China. 
The two regions are separated by their climates, population densities and livelihoods. 
To the east, high rainfall and a moist climate make agriculture possible. To the west, 
arid highlands make agriculture difficult even with intensive irrigation. As a result, 
pastoralism is the dominant livelihood in the west. 
It is appropriate to design and implement distinct conservation models in eastern 
and western China to reflect the different land usage in the two areas. China’s 
population is densely concentrated in eastern China’s agricultural regions. High 
population densities mean that the only way to protect eastern wildlife, such as 
pandas, is to set aside clearly delineated reserves. Western China, on the other hand, 
is characterized by relatively sparse pastoralist populations. Unlike eastern China’s 
intensive agriculture and dense population centers, this form of human land use does 
not necessarily preclude having wildlife on the land as well. Many wild species are 
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capable of dealing with some level of human involvement. Their survival is not 
limited to clearly delineated reserves. This has a profound impact on the types of 
wildlife conservation that are possible in western China. 
Figure 1 Map of mainland China, showing precipitation isopleths (shading) and highly concentrated
areas of human population. Areas north and west of the solid line cannot support agriculture in the
absence of irrigation, and therefore meet Harris’s definition of western China. 
China is home to a diverse range of biomes and an enormous number of species. 
It is considered a “mega­diversity” country, ranking second worldwide in its number 
of mammal species and fourth in its number of reptile species (Harris 2008). China 
boasts much greater species diversity than North America. Arid western China has 
less biodiversity than the east, but is still home to an impressive array of terrestrial 
vertebrates. It has a wealth of bird species, from hawks, falcons, and eagles to upland 
birds such as the white­eared pheasant and the Himalayan snowcock. Western China 
has an especially unique wealth of large mammals (Figure 2). Four species of gazelle 
roam the alpine meadows (Figure 3). 
Figure 2 Tibetan wild asses (for Latin names of species in this chapter, refer to Harris 2008) 
Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska 
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Figure 3 A young male Przewalski’s gazelle Figure 4 A wild yak bull 
Photo credit: Richard Harris	 Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of 
Cordova, Alaska 
Wild yak (Figure 4) and argali, or wild sheep, are impressive grassland species. The 
chiru, an antelope­like goat, stands as the emblem of the Tibetan Plateau. Blue sheep, 
Himalayan tahr, and Asiatic ibex are comfortable along the rocky cliffs. Snow 
leopards are still present in many mountain chains. Today, this diverse fauna suffers 
from increasing population and development pressures. 
“There is, put simply, quite a lot to conserve, and put more darkly, quite a lot 
at risk.” –Richard Harris 
Much like the geography of the two regions, the people of western China are 
different from the people of eastern China. Han Chinese are a minority in western 
China, and there are many Tibetans, Mongolians, Kazakhs, and people of other ethnic 
groups. While Chinese is still the dominant language, many other languages are also 
spoken. The political system in the area operates just like the rest of China. 
The predominance of pastoralism in western China has implications for grassland 
preservation and species conservation. Traditional practices form a foundation for 
sustainable use. However, due to increasing market pressures, rangeland degradation 
has become a growing problem (Figures 5 and 6). Although overgrazing is clearly 
recognized as the primary cause of rangeland degradation, the drivers of overgrazing 
behavior are not fully understood. Traditionally, subsistence pastoralists faced with a 
market economy have been susceptible to overgrazing pressures. While they receive 
increasingly higher prices for the products they trade, they have no feedback 
mechanism built into their society to deal with overgrazing. As a result, overgrazing 
has caused changes to grassland species composition in many areas, and most species 
whose habitat needs overlap with human needs are generally doing poorly. In contrast, 
some species whose habitat needs have little overlap with humans continue to thrive. 
The “Great Opening of the West,” a national strategy to prioritize the development 
of China’s poor rural western regions, also has significant implications for wildlife. 
This development has focused on building infrastructure such as bridges and 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
110 lectures on china’s environment 
highways, although mining has also been encouraged in the area. While some believe 
this plan was conceived strictly for poverty alleviation, others see it as a government 
strategy to exert more control on these far­flung regions. This view is based on the 
concept that those who are currently enjoying a standard of living closer to what is 
available in eastern China are less likely to rebel or complain about their lifestyles. 
Whatever the motivation for the development, the impacts on wildlife are clear. A 
more crowded, motorized, and industrialized society makes life for wildlife much 
more difficult. Regions that were previously protected by their remoteness are losing 
that sense of security. As a result, future wildlife management will need to more 
actively balance the increasingly overlapping needs of humans and wildlife. 
Ecological values are emphasized in the Great Opening of the West and highlight the 
region’s pristine waters and open grasslands. However, the development strategy is 
worrisome for wildlife. Propaganda often addresses wildlife as something to be done 
away with, promoting an idealized picture of the west that resembles eastern China. 
However, in order to preserve the unique wildlife of China’s west as an asset for the 
future, alternative models of development will need to be considered. 
Figure 5 Jianshe Township in Aksai County, Gansu, shows the effects of excessive livestock use on arid
rangelands 
Photo credit: Richard Harris 
chinese perceptions of wildlife 
“Now is the time for more purposeful management.” –Richard Harris 
To best understand the future of wildlife conservation in China, it is important to 
understand the dominant views of wildlife in Chinese society. Conservation does not 
exist in a cultural background in China. The dominant view toward wildlife among 
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Chinese is a utilitarian one. Wildlife has historically been used for food and compo­
nents of wildlife for traditional Chinese medicine. As Chinese culture continues to 
change, fewer people are interested in these practices. However, this shift is a gradual 
one, as evidenced by the Chinese government’s supportive policies toward consump­
tion of wildlife products. Demand for wildlife products continues. However, it is ille­
gal to kill or otherwise exploit these animals in the wild. As a result, there has been a 
shift toward captive breeding to produce animal products. Rather than reducing 
demand for wildlife products, many originally wild species are now being farmed to 
meet demand for wildlife products. Wild counterparts can then be left untouched in 
protected nature reserves. 
The utilitarian perspective on wildlife often evokes a negative reaction among 
North Americans, who have historically prided themselves on eliminating demand 
for wildlife products. However, use of wildlife products in China is deeply rooted in 
the culture. Unlike in North America, medicinal uses of wildlife have a strong 
historical and cultural presence in China. While many North Americans disapprove 
of the utilitarian approach to wildlife, the utilitarian perspective in itself does not 
mean that Chinese people view wildlife in a negative light. Rather, it is simply a 
reflection of the attitude that wildlife products can be put to many human uses. Quite 
the opposite of a negative view toward wildlife, this utilitarian attitude offers a strong 
basis for conservation. 
There is a subordinate mode of appreciating wildlife among many Chinese which 
is classified as dominionistic or aesthetic (Harris 2008).1 This is a positive, but 
paternalistic attitude toward wildlife. For example, many Chinese view wildlife as 
something soft and cuddly. This attitude is apparent in propaganda encouraging 
people to love, learn about, and care for wildlife. One such poster shows a girl holding 
a tiger cub, an image which resonates among many Chinese. While the idea it 
represents is unrelated to conservation of wildlife in the wild, it has influenced 
Chinese wildlife conservation policy. Current policy focuses a large percentage of 
funds on captive breeding programs to protect wildlife species for future generations 
within breeding centers (Harris 2008). 
“There is a tendency to view wildlife as something we want to cuddle and 
take care of as opposed to something we appreciate for its ability to take care 
of itself in its own natural environment.” –Richard Harris 
Confucian Optimism and Unity are two concepts prevalent in Chinese society. 
According to these beliefs, educated citizens can communicate and will eventually 
come to agreement. Harris views Chinese governance as a reflection of these beliefs. 
He feels that part of the reason the autocratic system has remained in China is 
because citizens feel that wise leaders will know what is best for everyone. 
These concepts of Confucian Optimism and Unity are also apparent in Chinese 
wildlife conservation. “Protecting wildlife is really just protecting mankind itself ” is a 
common mantra among wildlife conservationists in China. This reflects the Chinese 
view that wildlife is beneficial to humans. While this sounds good, it is not necessarily 
1 Utilitarian, Dominionistic, and 
Aesthetic views are part of a 
typology created by Stephen 
Kellert, a leading scholar of 
attitudes toward nature. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
112 lectures on china’s environment 
true, except for over very long timescales and very broad geographic areas. Wildlife 
conservation is fundamentally about compromise between wildlife’s needs and 
humans’ demands. In western China, these tensions play out as pastoralists’ herds graze 
on limited grassland resources shared with wildlife and as pastoralists protect their 
herds from attack by wolves. Wildlife conservation is a balancing act between these two 
groups. Often their conception of Unity makes Chinese unwilling to admit that wildlife 
conservation involves allocation of resources to one group at a cost to another. 
Pastoralist minority cultures have very different views of nature than Han 
Chinese. These pastoralist cultures depend on their livestock and the meadows they 
graze. This direct dependence on natural resources for survival provides a historical 
and cultural basis for sustainability. Many Americans and Europeans view Tibetan 
Buddhists as the pristine protectors of nature. While their lifestyle does rely on 
ecological wisdom, few Tibetan pastoralists are the idealized vegetarians and 
conservationists that westerners imagine. Quite to the contrary, hunting wildlife, 
killing of their own herd for food, and use of other natural resources are fundamental 
aspects of the pastoral livelihood (Huber 1991). There is also a basis for sustainable 
use among Kazakh and Muslim pastoralists, as the Koran instructs them to use 
resources wisely and not to overuse. 
Figure 6 Grasslands in Gouli, Dulan County, Qinghai 
Photo credit: Richard Harris 
chinese wildlife management today 
The Chinese government has taken many important steps to manage wildlife and its 
habitat through the implementation of various laws and programs. For instance, the 
National Wildlife Law of 1988 is the primary law that regulates and provides legal 
protection to wildlife, and it is popularly quoted in all books on the subject. An 
extensive network of nature reserves has also been created to protect wildlife habitat, 
while captive breeding centers have allowed rare species to reproduce in a protected 
environment. However, these many efforts lack the cohesion and structure which 
would allow them to function as a unified wildlife management system. 
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The National Wildlife Law provides two lists of critical species, and killing of these 
species is strictly prohibited. Scientific use is one exception. However, even in this case 
it is difficult to obtain a permit. Many have drawn parallels between the two lists of 
species included in China’s National Wildlife Law and those of the U.S. Endangered 
Species Act. However, Harris sees many differences between the two documents, and 
believes that any similarities, such as the two lists, are accidental (Harris 2008). 
The fact that the law prohibits the killing of any listed species seems to have the 
best interest of wildlife at heart. However, this uniform ban across all species may in 
fact have detrimental effects on wildlife. Harris argues that while total prohibition is 
necessary for species such as a tiger or panda, some species on the lists are abundant 
enough to tolerate some level of sustainable use. While bans on hunting sound good, 
they may be a mixed blessing for conservation. By prohibiting use of these relatively 
abundant species, local people are completely shut off from their traditional use of 
wildlife and lose their stake in wildlife conservation. The result is a law that tends to 
disenfranchise local people rather than involve them. 
“This blanket national ban simply alienates people who have a tradition of 
using those species.” —Richard Harris 
Figure 7 Yeniugou, an important area for Tibetan Plateau wildlife in the Kunlun Mountains 
Photo credit: Richard Harris 
The National Wildlife Law thus provides some strict regulations. However, it is not 
accompanied by the resources necessary to create a system of enforcement. For 
example, the law has no mechanisms to reduce poaching. There is no funding in place 
for general enforcement, or for a corps of wardens to patrol. Most importantly, the 
law focuses on protection in the narrow sense and does not have mechanisms for 
habitat protection. 
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China’s extensive network of nature reserves is another central component of the 
country’s current wildlife management. Currently, an impressive 1.4 million square 
kilometers of nature reserves account for 15 percent of China’s total land area (Harris 
2008). However, like the National Wildlife Law of 1988, they lack the structure 
necessary for management and enforcement of regulations. They have few staff and 
are severely underfunded. For example, in Qinghai Province, which is twice the size 
of Montana, there is only a single wildlife biologist (Figures 7 and 8). Others are 
supposed to address wildlife at the local level, but no funding exists for this work. 
While funding is a serious issue for nature reserves today, it is not necessarily the 
largest impediment to creating a successful management system. 
“Most people simply view it as a situation that is underfunded or under 
enforced. I disagree with that. I think there are some fundamental issues that 
need to be thought about before wildlife conservation, particularly in China’s 
west, will succeed more than it does now.” –Richard Harris 
Nature reserves do not form a sufficient foundation for habitat conservation in 
China’s west. This is not because the rules are not sufficiently protective. 
Paradoxically, it is because they are too protective. This problem stems from the fact 
that regulations governing nature reserves often fail to take into account on­the­
ground realities. 
China’s nature reserves are structured in a three­tier system. The innermost 
sanctuaries, called “core zones,” do not allow human visitors. While humans are 
allowed to visit other areas, tourism is only allowed in the outermost “experimental 
zone.” Economic activity that requires extraction of natural resources is forbidden in 
all nature reserve zones. This restriction effectively forbids people from living within 
the confines of nature reserves, as the pastoral livelihood is dependent on the land. 
This mandate becomes a serious problem when taking into account the fact that 
nature reserves were established only after people had been living in these regions for 
years. Today, the nature reserve system lacks an effective mechanism for dealing with 
this clash between strict preservation and existing human inhabitants. To this day, 
millions of people continue to live within these supposedly strictly protected areas. 
Draconian preservation restrictions form a system that is very difficult to enforce. 
Such extreme regulations confuse managers responsible for enforcement. It is 
impossible for them to obey regulations without sacrificing the livelihoods of the 
millions living inside the protected areas. These managers do not have a set of 
management guidelines to follow that are relevant to their reserves’ situations in 
reality. Harris has observed, “As a result, they ignore the regulations and manage them 
on an ad hoc basis instead.” This leads to complex negotiations between nature 
reserve authorities and other prevailing systems. On the ground, there is no clear 
agreement that land inside nature reserves will be managed according to some 
alternative land management system. Regulations become a continuous compromise. 
Harris says, “There are two systems. And yet one does not supplant the other, they 
simply live on top of each other. These two competing mandates, on the one hand 
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limiting human use in favor of nature conservation and on the other economic 
development, just sit there uncomfortably, one on top of the other.” As a result, nature 
conservation is only a bit better within the reserves than outside of them (Liu et al. 
2001). Because the county ultimately has to agree every time a rule is to be enforced, 
the nature reserve system is fairly weak, despite its enormous size and breadth. 
While China’s nature reserves protect vast tracts of land, China lacks a 
comprehensive wildlife protection and management program. Though there are 
enormous areas that are currently under nature reserve titles, they do not form a true 
system because there is no common framework among them. This is partly a result 
of the fact that there is not a comprehensive national nature reserve agency in China, 
nor is there any other potential analog to the U.S. National Park Service. Thus, there 
is no national backbone of support for individual reserves. While China’s State 
Environmental Protection Agency plays a nominal role, there is a lack of policy and 
guidance at the national level. Within individual reserves, there is also no system for 
drafting a management plan. As a result, most reserves do not have one. Most are the 
reserves that are in place are underfunded and understaffed with employees who are 
improperly trained. In many cases, these underpaid staff exploit the resources of the 
reserves they are supposed to be protecting. 
Figure 8 Yeniugou, an important area for Tibetan Plateau wildlife in the Kunlan Mountains, Qinghai.
Note Harris’ campsite 
Photo credit: Richard Harris 
the future of wildlife management in china 
In order to create a successful system of wildlife management in the future, China 
must recognize and balance the needs of both humans and wildlife. It will need to 
acknowledge conservation as a way to limit human behavior, which may entail 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
116 lectures on china’s environment 
sacrifices for people. Currently, western China views conservation as a biological and 
technical endeavor, however, much of wildlife conservation is actually about 
managing humans. To create a successful system of wildlife management, China must 
increasingly involve local people. There are many ways to do this. For example, 
allowing subsistence hunts and more local control of trophy hunting would benefit 
local communities. To take advantage of the potential of China’s nature reserve 
system, regulations should be reformed to allow humans to live within them. 
Additionally, universities should be encouraged to conduct applied wildlife research. 
Population studies would allow more knowledgeable management of the reserves. 
Finally, principles of conservation should be expanded to outside the reserves as well, 
building a strong foundation for a comprehensive wildlife management system. 
“While there are biological and technical aspects, I think of wildlife 
conservation as primarily a human endeavor.” –Richard Harris 
Allowing subsistence hunting in China would give local pastoralists a stake in the 
natural resources of China’s west, laying the groundwork for a dialogue about 
conservation. This would allow local people to continue their traditional lifestyles 
(Figure 9). It would also lay a foundation for discussing aspects of pastoralist 
behavior that are hurting certain species, such as argali and wild yaks. At the moment 
there is no system for sustainable harvests and no hunting is allowed. As a result, there 
is no one working with wildlife, and local people are not receiving a share in the 
resources they are being asked to protect. The current system creates unnecessary 
antagonism, as it is difficult for local people to understand why they should limit 
themselves in deference to wildlife if they are not receiving anything in return. 
Figure 9 Tibetan woman milking a yak 
Photo credit: Richard Harris 
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Figure 10 A small group of blue sheep. An adult female is followed by a lamb, a yearling, and a
subadult male 
Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska 
Limited subsistence hunts would allow people to make use of certain species. Blue 
sheep (Figure 10), for example, are abundant enough to sustain a limited subsistence 
hunt. Currently there is a fear in China that allowing any hunting at all will lead to 
complete decimation of all wildlife. Pastoralists would be able to successfully limit 
themselves if they had a vested interest in wildlife populations. Subsistence hunts 
would only be allowed for specific species and would be managed within relatively 
small areas. Within these areas, a biologist could collect information on population 
sizes and communities would be in communication about how many animals had 
been taken each year. This would only be possible by a common agreement, under 
which some communities would have to make sacrifices each year. Harris believes this 
could be successful because most local people would be happy to have some and to 
limit themselves. 
“Of late, the problem is not so much under­regulation as overregulation. 
Many wildlife species have been put off limits to people for consumptive use to 
the point where people are alienated. People are seen as the enemy, and they 
see government as the enemy. There is very little opportunity for community 
management under the current system.” –Richard Harris 
Many factors influence a species’ ability to be hunted sustainably. Population 
density, renewal rate, strength of the indigenous conservation system of limiting 
resource use, and degree of integration with the market economy all factor into the 
probability of the hunt leading to sustainability or overharvesting. It is important to 
consider the multiple dimensions of the problem. For example, chiru now number in 
the thousands. Some people believe that if poaching were controlled, Tibetans could 
take some for sustainable use. However, chiru is a migratory species. This means that 
their range is so large that no single population area can take responsibility for their 
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habitat. Thus, their migratory nature disqualifies them from sustainable use. Musk 
deer, on the other hand, are a sedentary species. They could be harvested sustainably 
if a community would take responsibility for their habitat in return for the rights to 
harvest a few individuals each season. 
Figure 11 A group of adult male argali in Yeniugou 
Photograph courtesy of Milo Burcham of Cordova, Alaska 
Trophy hunting, in which wealthy foreigners come in to kill a large male and take 
its head home, is another scheme that has the potential to increase local involvement 
with wildlife. The revenue generated from hunting would be an incentive for 
communities to protect populations of that single species. In order to save these 
populations, communities would need to protect wildlife habitat. This would have 
cascading benefits for other species. In this way, trophy hunting provides indirect 
incentives for wildlife habitat conservation. 
Currently some trophy hunting is allowed in western China, and an international 
hunter may pay $21,500 for a single argali (Figure 11). However, little of this money 
makes it to local communities, and as a result the incentive structure is not operating 
as hoped (Harris and Pletscher 2002). Money is paid to foreign outfitters, 
import/export taxes, and forestry bureaucracy at the national, provincial, prefecture, 
and county levels. The only money left for the local hunting authority covers the cost 
of outfitting the hunt, and very little money is left to compensate people for limiting 
their behavior. 
In the future, trophy hunting systems should be restructured to provide stronger 
incentives for local people. However, even in its current state, trophy hunting offers 
the benefit of providing employment that is actively involved with wildlife. People 
managing hunts tend to love their jobs and become interested in animal preservation. 
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Harris believes, “At this stage, it is a huge asset to have anyone on the ground whose 
job is something related to wildlife.” 
China should be proud of its extensive nature reserves. These areas offer extremely 
high potential for habitat protection. However, in their current state, the nature 
reserves do not offer the comprehensive wildlife protection that they might. 
Currently regulations are unrealistically strict. As a result, enforcement is impossible. 
If regulations were actually implemented, a large portion of western China would be 
dispossessed. Thus, reform of nature reserve policies is necessary to make them more 
reasonable and to provide provisions for humans to live within them. Two different 
reform scenarios might be effective. One possibility is to adapt regulations to be more 
realistic and not completely limit humans from living in the areas in which they are 
already present. The other possibility is to retract boundaries in order to focus on the 
natural areas where humans are not currently present. 
There are several smaller changes that would significantly benefit nature reserves 
as well. First, it is important to get more people involved with wildlife, both through 
hunting programs and by working as reserve staff. More people working with wildlife 
will increase knowledge of and concern for wildlife. Second, greater value should be 
placed on keeping wildlife wild. A smaller percentage of conservation budgets should 
be spent on captive breeding centers, and increased emphasis should be placed on 
protecting habitat and monitoring wild populations. Third, universities should be 
asked to help with this monitoring task. Currently there is a focus on theoretical 
research in China. When people begin to ask questions about wildlife populations, 
applied wildlife research in China will grow. 
“These changes would build a foundation for consideration of wildlife outside 
of the nature reserves as well, which ultimately is where we need to go.” 
–Richard Harris 
In the long run, China’s west should aim to make conservation a priority even 
outside nature reserves. In eastern China, population pressure demands a sharp 
delineation between what is inside and outside of nature reserves. However, in 
western China land use is much more extensive, allowing both wildlife and 
pastoralism to coexist. The ideal wildlife conservation system in western China would 
place value on wildlife both inside and outside of nature reserves. It would also have 
strong mechanisms for habitat preservation. This would be possible with a network 
of core protected areas linked by a matrix of secondary zones, where management 
plans could be designed to balance human and wildlife needs. With a few key 
changes, western China has the potential for a highly effective conservation system in 
which compromises from both humans and wildlife allow them to coexist. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Impact of Increasing Feed and Meat
Demand on China’s Agriculture and
Environment* 
Professor Laixiang Sun 
University of London 
Yi Luo 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
Chinese agriculture produces a significant amount of food. To address the future
challenges that the Chinese agriculture sector may face, a state­of­the­art decision
support tool, the Chinagro simulation model, was developed by two EU­funded
projects. This chapter applies this model to simulate the supply and demand
dynamics of agriculture products and their impacts under several scenarios of
farmland and population change, non­agricultural growth, and world food prices.
The results of the baseline scenario indicate that China will be able to feed itself 
with grain, but will need to import meat and livestock feed from the world market
to satisfy its new demand for protein. Under this scenario, income disparity
between rural and urban people will continue to grow, raising the possibility of
social instability. Under an alternative scenario in which China becomes more self­
sufficient in meat, China will need to import a higher amount of livestock feed, and
farmers will get paid for raising more livestock. The concern for both scenarios is
the increasing environmental risks from excessive fertilizer use and possible
mishandling of manure. A third scenario shows a choice between economic 
efficiency and environmental concerns: moving the livestock production from
highly populated areas to relatively remote areas will reduce environmental risk
but increase the cost of production. 
* This paper is based on a 
lecture presented at the Yale 
School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies on 
November 10, 2008 by 
Professor Sun as part of a 
graduate course taught by 
Professor Xuhui Lee entitled 
“China’s Environment.”The 
paper was written by Yi Luo, a 
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and has been approved by 
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lecture, the discussion session 
after the lecture with Professor 
Sun, as well as background 
material on the lecture topic 
prepared by the students. For 
short biographies of the 
authors, please go to the end of 
the chapter. 
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background 
About ten years ago, when the Chinese population broke the 1 billion mark, the world 
started to worry about how to feed the Chinese people. It was a reasonable concern, 
since such a huge population could have created unbearable pressure on the country’s 
agriculture sector, as well as a mammoth amount of demand in the international food 
market. Fortunately, with good planning and improved technology, starvation did 
not become an issue. 
However, while the rest of the world starts to feel less concerned about food 
security in China, the Chinese are still worrying. This is because the population is no 
longer satisfied with being fed by carbohydrates alone. They want protein, or in other 
words, meat. This creates a new concern: Who will feed Chinese livestock, and how? 
In this chapter, we will first provide an overview of the status of the Chinese 
agricultural sector. Next, we will evaluate scenarios in which China would be able to 
provide sufficient meat, either domestically or by import, to meet the demand. The 
tradeoff between producing livestock domestically and importing meat or livestock 
feed from the international market will be discussed. An objective of this exercise is 
to quantify the environmental impact of different meat production scenarios. The 
agricultural sector is labor intensive. Its future changes will have far­reaching impacts 
on farmers’ living standards, and its massive fertilizer use and manure waste 
production are major environmental concerns. 
The assessment provided in this chapter is based on the results of two research 
projects. The first one is Chinagro, which aimed to provide policy decision support 
for sustainable adaptation of China’s agricultural to globalization. Chinagro was an 
EU Fifth Framework Program International Scientific Cooperation (INCO) project 
and ran from October 2001 to January 2005. Team members came from six 
institutions in China and Europe. 
The second project is Catsei (Chinese Agricultural Transition: Trade, Social and 
Environmental Impacts). This project is supported by the EU Sixth Framework 
Special Targeted Research Project (STRP) program. It began in January 2007 and will 
continue through December 2009 (Fischer et al. 2007). Professor Laixiang Sun has 
served as a leading scientist on both projects. The fact that the same team received 
back­to­back support from the EU highlights the importance of China’s agricultural 
sector to the global community. 
chinese agriculture then and now 
Chinese agriculture follows a high input, high output pattern. While its 
production per hectare is among the highest in the world, its fertilizer and 
human power input are also among the highest. Therefore, it raises concerns 
about farmer’s income, sustainability of food supply when food prices 
fluctuate, and the environmental impacts of food production—mainly 
fertilizer use and manure disposal. –Professor Laixiang Sun 
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In China, more than twenty kinds of food crops are cultivated on large scales. The 
dominant species are rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, soybean, millet, and potato. Of 
these, rice, wheat, and corn are the three most widely cultivated crops, yielding 86 
percent of the whole country’s grain production. In 2007, China’s grain production 
was 501.5 million metric tons, equaling about 25 percent of the world’s total 
production (China Statistical Yearbook 2008; Wei 2008). 
Except for a few purely pastoral areas, almost all counties in China cultivate cereal 
crops. However, the different food production portfolios are variable, since soil and 
climate conditions vary from county to county. The area to the south of the Qinghai­
Tibet Plateau ( ), Wulate ( ), and Wushen 
( ) produces 96 percent of China’s grain. Each grain species also has 
its major production regions. In the area to the south of the Qinghai­Tibet Plateau, 
Qinling Mountain ( ), and the Huaihe River ( ), rice is the major crop. 
Wheat, rapeseed, soybeans, and peas are also cultivated as winter rotation crops. The 
multi­cropping index (MCI, a measure of number of crops grown in one year) can 
reach two or three on a yearly average base in this area. North of the line between the 
Qinghai­Tibet Plateau, Qinling Mountain, and the Huaihe River, and south of 
Liaoning Province, winter wheat is the major crop. Corn, millet, potato, peas, and 
beans are cultivated as secondary crops during the summer. The MCI is 1.0 or 1.5 in 
this region. In Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning ( ) 
provinces, corn, soybean, sorghum, millet and wheat are cultivated in rotation. The 
MCI is 1.0 in these areas. On the Qinghai­Tibet Plateau itself, the major crops are 
barley, peas, and spring wheat. The MCI is less than one on the plateau.1 
Livestock production is another element of the agricultural sector. Historically, 
both industrialized intensive livestock production and small­scale household 
backyard livestock production exist in China. In recent years, more and more large­
scale production sites have emerged. In 2005, China’s official statistics put the total 
meat production at 69 million metric tons, equal to 25 percent of the world total 
(China Statistical Yearbook 2008). 
Figure 1 Agricultural output per capita, 1955­2005 
1 http://www.hudong.com/ 
wiki/ 
2 Note: Meat production is 
measured by carcass weight 
and represents total production 
of pork, mutton, and beef. 
Official meat production data 
are adjusted downward in 
accordance with the procedure 
in Ma et al. (2004). 
Source: Naughton 20072 
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Figure 1 shows the time trends of agricultural production per capita. Food 
production, which includes grain and meat, has greatly increased over the past fifty 
years. Although the increase of China’s per capita grain production was not 
significant and often fluctuated between 300kg/year to 400kg/year, the total amount 
of grain produced tripled over this period due to the near tripling of the Chinese 
population from 500 million to 1.3 billion. 
Unlike the grain figures, per capita meat production and consumption climbed 
rapidly during this period. The production was around 6 kg/year in 1955 and rose 
steadily to 38 kg/year in 2005. Considering the significant population growth from 
500 million to 1.3 billion people, the growth of total production and consumption is 
remarkable. The production of edible oil also shows an impressive growth trend: per 
capita production grew more than four times, and the total amount produced in 2005 
was six times that of 1978 (China Statistical Yearbook 2008). 
The growth in China’s agricultural productivity was supported by increased use of 
resources (Figure 2). China’s fertilizer use increased rapidly from 1952 to 2004. The 
national total fertilizer use climbed from virtually zero in the 1950s to 46 million tons 
in 2004. The amount of irrigated area followed this trend, growing from about 20 
million hectares in 1952 to 54.5 million hectares in 2004. Growth in both of these areas 
led to a significant increase in yield. Additionally, Chinese scientists succeeded in 
creating high­yield crop varieties by cross­breeding, further enhancing the land’s 
productivity. 
Figure 2 Fertilizer use, irrigation, and mechanical power 
Source: Naughton 2007 
Power input in the Chinese agriculture sector also increased rapidly over the years. 
Machine power use grew from almost zero in 1949 to 640 million kilowatts of 
machinery in 2004. Farmers traditionally use machines mainly for irrigation and 
transportation. However, recently some have started to use them for cultivation, 
contributing to the improvement in productivity. Use of draft animals grew at a 
modest rate, from 50 million heads in 1949 to 150 million heads in 2004. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the agricultural input and output among China, the 
United States, and global averages. China’s per hectare crop yield is disproportional 
to its fertilizer and manpower input, even though it is above the world average. For 
example, China’s rice yield averages 6.2 metric tons per hectare, higher than the world 
average of 3.9 metric tons per hectare. China’s wheat and corn yields are also higher 
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than the world averages. However, these high yields are largely a result of China’s huge 
fertilizer and manpower inputs to farmland. Chinese farmers lead the world in 
fertilizer application, using 271 kg chemical fertilizers per hectare—three times the 
amount of the world average, and 2.5 times the U.S. amount. Similarly, China’s labor 
input, as measured in the number of farm workers per 100 hectare, is also very high, 
at more than 150 times the U.S. level and 4 times the world average. This number is 
only matched by India, which is also a highly labor­intensive country. China’s 
percentage of irrigation area, a measure of water consumption, is also higher than the 
world average and the U.S. level. With these numbers, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the total factor productivity (TFP) of Chinese agriculture is low, that farmers’ profit 
margin is small, and that the pressure on the environment is inevitably greater than 
in other countries. 
Table 1 Comparison of yields and inputs, 1997 
Unit China World US 
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Source: Gale 2002 
the chinagro model 
Overview 
Chinagro is a spatially explicit general equilibrium model that comprehensively 
depicts China’s farm sector in 2,433 counties, while connecting them through trade 
and transportation flows. The model was first developed in 2002­2005 as a part of an 
EU­funded Fifth Framework Program project. It was then refined in 2006­2007 
under a bridging project funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management, and Food Quality, and further developed in 2007­09 under a follow­up 
project funded by the EU in its Sixth Framework Program. Eight institutes have 
contributed to the development of the model: the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; the Centre for World Food Studies, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; the Center for Chinese Agricultural 
Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; the Institute for Geographical Sciences 
and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing; the China 
Agricultural University, Beijing; the School of Oriental and African Studies of the 
University of London, UK; the International Food Policy Research Institute, 
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Washington D.C., USA; and the Agricultural Economics Research Institute, The 
Hague (Fischer et al. 2007). 
The model simulates the interactions between farmers and consumers of 
agricultural products based on the most plausible assumptions of current and future 
social, economic, and political situations. It seeks to answer the questions of how 
farmers allocate labor and other inputs according to changes in food price and how 
consumers behave in response to a given market situation. On the supply side of the 
model, parameters for 2,433 counties, or all counties with agricultural production in 
China, are defined, including land use type, cereal crop cultivated, and livestock 
production system. On the demand side, consumers are grouped by whether they are 
from urban or rural areas, as well as by income levels (Van Veen et al. 2005). The 
model structure is discussed in Keyzer and van Veen (2005). The year 1997, for which 
a complete data collection is available, is used as the baseline year. The year 2003 is 
used for validation of the model performance. Scenario simulations are conducted 
for three selected years (2010, 2020, 2030). 
Baseline scenario 
In the baseline scenario, the following assumptions are made: First, there will be 
sustained high economic growth in the non­agricultural sector—in other words, the 
industry and service sectors—over the next twenty years. The growth is assumed at 
6­7.5 percent per year. Second, there will be moderate population growth to a total of 
1,460 million in year 2030. Third, urbanization will continue so that 60 percent of the 
population will live in urban areas in 2030, which will create further land use 
demands, cause environmental pressures in areas of high population density, and 
most importantly, move a huge number of people from rural to urban areas. Fourth, 
there will be a 7 million ha loss of cropland, primarily in regions of rain­fed 
agriculture, in response to the “Grain to Green” policy. Fifth, technical progress will 
continue and contribute to a yield increase of 0.5­1.0 percent per year. An increasing 
number of large livestock farms are anticipated, since the capacity of backyard 
feeding is anticipated to decline as a large proportion of the rural population moves 
into cities. Sixth, trade liberalization will continue, including a reduction over time of 
tariffs and non­tariff barriers, farm taxes will be abolished, and an average subsidy 
rate of 5 percent to support grain production will be introduced. Finally, the model 
assumes that world agricultural prices will follow the FAO­OECD projections. 
According to the baseline simulation, China will be able to feed itself with grain, 
vegetables, and fruit, and even export part of its grain production. However, China 
will have to import feed for its fast­growing livestock production, and eventually 
import meat. This is because the demand for meat will rise rapidly when people’s 
incomes rise. Furthermore, this increase in income will result in an increase in the 
cost of labor, which will raise the cost of domestic meat production. 
The simulation indicates that in 2030 China will be able to export 3.5 million tons 
of rice (2.6 percent of its production), 3.9 million tons of wheat (4.5 percent), 12.7 
million tons of vegetables (4.6 percent), and 3.0 million tons of fruit (3.9 percent). At 
the same time, it will need to import 7.3 million tons of pork (12 percent of its 
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demand) and 3.6 million tons of poultry meat (20 percent). It will also need to import 
5.8 million tons of maize feed (5 percent), 15.7 million tons of other carbohydrate feed 
(16 percent), and 30.2 million tons of protein feed (29 percent). 
The baseline simulation also calculates an increase in farmers’ earnings at 4.0 
percent per year for cropping, 5.5 percent per year for livestock, or a combined 4.6 
percent per year for all farming activities. These numbers look impressive by the 
world standard. However, Chinese farmers’ incomes will still be below non­
agricultural income, which is projected to increase at 6–7 percent per year. Therefore, 
agricultural income will lag significantly behind non­agricultural income, leading to 
extended income disparity between farming and non­farming activities. As a result, 
concerns about the urban­rural income distribution will continue. 
Table 2 provides detailed information on projected income changes by land use 
type. The most noticeable feature is that the value added per person is higher for the 
livestock sector than for the cropping sector, especially for intensive livestock 
production. 
Table 2 Value added per farm worker (in 1997 prices in RMB) by land use type 
1997 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Cropping Sector 3820 4127 6552 8632 10584 
Irrigated cropping 4135 3863 6893 9157 11237 
Rainfed cropping 3244 4231 5997 8041 10040 
Tree cropping 5148 6173 7545 8197 9013 
Livestock Sector 4028 8578 12841 20968 29800 
Draught animal system ­6605 ­4939 ­5778 ­6323 ­5813 
Grazing ruminant farm 8715 12415 14585 18319 25969 
Trad. ruminant farm 544 5462 6104 8621 13924 
Intens. dairy farm 24800 25730 24509 25183 26821 
Trad. nonruminant farm 5438 8898 12512 18950 24829 
Intens. nonruminant farm 14315 21344 28946 42830 56000 
Average 3852 4908 7736 11288 15153 
Source: Fischer et al. 2007 
Another important issue concerns the environmental pressures of the agriculture 
sector, especially related to intensive fertilizer use and the disposal of manure from 
livestock production. Since 1981, China has been the largest consumer of fertilizer in 
the world and has accounted for more than 90 percent of the growth in global 
fertilizer use (Liu and Diamond 2005). Although it is possible to increase the 
efficiency of fertilizer use, the demand for fertilizer will be significant in the coming 
years (Figure 3). In 2003, fertilizer application was already quite high, at an average of 
330 kg chemicals and 70 kg organic nutrients per ha. In 2030, it is estimated that 
China will use 376 kg chemicals and 74 kg organic nutrients per ha. The manure 
generated from livestock production amounted to approximately 114 kg nutrients per 
ha of cultivated land in 2003 and will increase to 136 kg in 2030. Figure 3 indicates that 
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areas with high fertilizer use density are usually those with high population density. 
Similar spatial patterns exist for manure production. The disposal of unused manure 
and unabsorbed fertilizer will be serious environmental concerns, as they add 
nutrient pressure in water bodies and increase health risks. In 2003, for example, only 
47 percent of the manure was applied to cropland. 
Figure 3 Fertilizer use in kg/ha, 2003 and 2030 
Alternative scenario 
In an alternative scenario, more livestock would be produced domestically than in the 
baseline scenario. This scenario seeks to address the following question: Would it be 
better to produce more meat inside China than to import it? In order to answer this 
question, it is assumed that from 2020 onward, pork and poultry production from 
large­scale intensive farms will be 30 percent higher than the baseline, specialized 
dairy production will be 20 percent higher than baseline, and meat ruminant (beef 
and mutton) sector production will be 10 percent higher than the baseline due to 
further intensification. 
Table 3 summarizes meat and feed imports projected for 2030. According to this 
alternative scenario, to reduce meat imports, China would need to increase feed 
imports by a large amount. For example, maize feed imports would rise to 24.6 
million tons, or four times the baseline prediction. Other carbohydrate and protein 
feed imports would be 60 percent higher than the baseline predictions. In order to 
transport such huge amounts of feed at a reasonable cost, China would need to locate 
livestock production near the harbor. 
As a result of the enhanced domestic production capacity, meat prices in 2030 
would go down somewhat in comparison to the baseline projection and consumers 
would gain 5 kg more meat per year. However, the average farm value added would 
stay virtually the same. Income discrepancy between urban and rural areas would still 
be a critical social problem. 
In this alternative scenario, the national average of manure generated per ha would 
be 3 kg lower than the baseline prediction. This is because the most intensive livestock 
production would be concentrated in areas close to harbors, and the production 
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would be more efficient due to economies of scale. However, since harbor areas are 
also highly populated, mishandling of manure can lead to disease and pollution, 
imposing risks to human health on a larger population. In Figure 4, the red and dark 
red areas show where manure discharge is more than 10 kg pure nutrition per ha of 
agricultural land. 





















Figure 4 Manure discharge in kg/ha, 2030 
China faces a tough choice. Importing meat that meets China’s demand for protein 
appears to be more environmentally friendly than importing feed because it leaves 
the environmental pressures associated with production outside the country. 
However, it may be risky to rely heavily on the world market when demand would be 
so high. If China imports feed to raise more livestock domestically, it will improve its 
self­sufficiency with respect to meat but will increase its dependence upon the world 
feed market. It will also create livestock “hotspots” near the harbor areas, which 
would cause health concerns. 
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spatial livestock production planning under risks and
uncertainties 
The tradeoff between the two scenarios prompts us to look more closely at how 
livestock production should be spatially planned. One important question is whether 
there are alternatives for locating the livestock production away from harbors. In 
order to address this issue, new scenarios have been developed to estimate the 
probabilities. Specifically, we are interested in two scenarios. The first represents a 
“business as usual” approach of intensification driven by easy access to consumers, 
and the second is a plausible alternative that may give attention to both economic 
efficiency and environmental sustainability (Fischer et al. 2009). 
S1. Demand­Driving Scenario: The “business as usual” practice is to allocate 
intensive livestock production in areas with convenient access to consumers, high 
demand, and high population density. 
S2. Sustainable Scenario: In this scenario, a trade­off is made between pure 
economic efficiency and environmental risk aversion. The goal is to find a balancing 
point. To achieve this, socioeconomic, demographic, sustainability, and 
environmental risk indicators are specified. Location­specific conditions and 
limitations, such as water and land scarcity, livestock density, and urbanization level 
are specified as constraints on livestock production. The amount of livestock 
production in a region is allocated based on the individual “weight” of each indicator 
of the area. Allocation of livestock beyond the specified constraints may lead to 
disastrous consequences related to water and air pollution, increasing the chance of 
either livestock disease outbreak or threats to human health, both of which would 
incur high costs. 
The degree of urbanization and population density are considered critical 
constraints in this model. For example, it is considered excessively risky to build up 
intensive livestock sites if more than 80 percent of the county’s population is urban, 
but safe if less then 10 percent of the population is urban. Similarly, if more than 50 
percent of the area is built up, meaning that more than half of the land area is already 
occupied by buildings and roads, it would be excessively risky to practice intensive 
livestock farming there. However, it would be safe to do so if only 25 percent of the 
area was already built up. If an area is in between what would typically be considered 
“safe” and “unsafe,” the area’s suitability of livestock operation is measured by 
compromise curves as shown in Figure 5. 
Nutrient level is another critical constraint. Similar to urbanization level, if 
nutrient supply—mainly fertilizer use—is more than 150 percent of the crop’s 
nutrient uptake, it is considered highly risky. However, if only 90 percent of the 
needed amount is supplied, it is considered perfectly safe. If 110 percent of the 
nutrient uptake is applied, the risk is considered moderate, since the soil can also 
digest some nutrients. Between those numbers, there is a compromise curve as shown 
in the left panel of Figure 6. 
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Figure 5 Constraints on intensive livestock production (urbanization). Here R1 and R2 indicate the level
of risks for counties with different degrees of urbanization. 
The compromise curve for livestock biomass, the fourth constraint, is shown in 
the right panel of Figure 6. If more than 1.1 tons of animal biomass is produced per 
hectare of cultivated land, the model considers the production to be risky. However, 
0.3 tons of livestock biomass to per hectare land is considered safe. 
Figure 6 Constraints on intensive livestock production (nutrients) 
Using the constraint functions defined above, the model generates a comparison 
between the two scenarios (S1 and S2) with regard to the number of people exposed 
to different categories of environmental risk. The results are summarized in Figure 7. 
On the left side is S1, the business as usual scenario. On the right side is S2, the more 
sustainable scenario, where livestock production plants are moved away from highly 
populated areas. In the figure, the color scheme is such that the degree of risk 
increases in the order from grey, dark green, bright green, white, yellow, pink, to red. 
As demonstrated by Figure 7, in most regions it is not surprising that moving 
intensive livestock production to remote areas helps reduce the environmental risk. 
However, in the south, where farmland parcels are populated with nearly equal 
density, there are fewer choices for livestock production locations. Therefore, moving 
livestock production sites would not help relieve environmental pressures in all 
regions. 
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Figure 7 Relative distribution of population according to classes of severity of environmental pressure
from livestock production in 2030. In color scheme, degree of risk increases in order from grey, dark
green, bright green, white, yellow, pink to red. 
3 Cow and horse manure have 
been in use by farmers in 
northern China as a heating 
source in the winter for many 
years, but not on a large scale. 
concluding remarks 
Intensified livestock systems will play a critical role in meeting China’s increasing 
demand for meat in the future. Pig, broiler, and layer stock in intensified systems are 
expected to increase by at least 2.5 times between 2000 and 2030. The “business as 
usual” scenario suggests a high correlation between the geographic distribution of 
animals and population density. Unused animal manure and leaching of chemical 
fertilizers will imply serious environmental and health hazards. To reduce these 
hazards, this chapter reports a method for spatially explicit planning of production 
levels in given locations. The method is based on a rebalancing algorithm and takes 
into account “weighted” combinations of criteria for sustainable livestock production 
and intensification. 
This research highlights an urgent need for a technological breakthrough in 
manure management. It calls for a new third generation of biofuel technology. The 
first generation of biofuel technology relied on maize, beans, and sugar. The second 
generation uses non­food crops. We hope that the third generation will start to use 
manure. If manure can be directly converted into biofuel on a large scale, it would be 
a blessing for China.3 
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CHAPTER 11 
Air Pollution Status and Challenges
Ahead in the Greater Pearl River 
Delta Region* 
Professor John Chuen­yu Chan 
Sun Yat­Sen University 
Xin Zhang 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
This chapter describes current air pollution conditions in the Greater Pearl River
Delta (GPRD) region and illustrates how urbanization and industrialization have led
to dramatic air quality degradation. In addition, it shows how the long­distance
transportation of ozone precursors along the East Asian coast and from the
Southeast Asian subcontinent contributes to ozone enhancement in the GPRD. 
Limited air quality data in the GPRD has become the main obstacle for scientists
addressing air pollution problems there. Also, the unclear interpretation of the Air
Pollution Index in the Chinese mainland conceals the urgency of these problems
from the public. 
introduction 
The Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD) is located on the southeast coast of China and 
includes nine cities in Guangdong province (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, 
Jiangmen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing), Hong Kong, and Macau.1 
The GPRD is one of the most developed regions in China. These nine cities in 
Guangdong have been recognized as the Pearl River Delta (PRD) economic zone 
since 1978, and it is now one of the most important manufacturing centers in the 
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world. From 1980 to 2004, the annual GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate in 
the PRD was 16.24 percent, which was about 70 percent more than the growth rate of 
the rest of China.2 Since the 1970s,3 Hong Kong has surpassed Shanghai as an inter­
national financial center. It now has the second­largest stock market in Asia and ranks 
eleventh among the world’s trading economies.4 Relying on tourism, Macau’s GDP 
per capita reached $28,436 in 2006, ranking first in the GPRD.5 
Along with the growth of GDP, the GPRD has seen substantial increases in 
population, energy consumption, and the number of vehicles on the road. Within 
only 42,648 km2, four major cities—Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and 
Macau—coexist with more than 54 million permanent residents and a huge influx of 
migrants. With the dramatic industrialization and urbanization of the past thirty 
years, environment degradation in the region is significant. Air pollution, as the most 
observable and crucial environmental problem in the GPRD region, is a concern for 
local people, government officials, entrepreneurs, and even the global community. 
High pollutant concentration and low visibility have been affecting local people’s 
living conditions and health. 
These challenges are even more difficult to address because three different 
governments with separate institutions coexist in the GPRD region: the People’s 
Government of Guangdong Province; the Government of the Macau Special 
Administrative Region; and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR). This unique situation makes the allocation of responsibilities and 
cooperative policy­making more complex. In addition, increasing emissions in the 
GPRD are possibly affecting downwind areas over the Pacific Ocean, including the 
West Coast of the United States, so the GPRD’s emissions are a concern for countries 
far beyond China’s borders. 
This paper will address the current air pollution status in the GPRD and explore 
its affiliation with regional and global pollutant emissions. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive scientific background for policymakers to address air quality 
degradation in the GPRD. 
air pollution status in gprd region 
The air pollution status in the GPRD region is quite complex and very different from 
most U.S. and European cities. Because the GPRD region has had a relatively short 
but intensive developmental history, London­type smog problems, mainly caused by 
coal combustion, and photochemical smog problems, mainly caused by vehicle 
emissions, coexist in this region (Wang et al. 2005). In addition, industrial emissions, 
biomass burning, and biogenic emissions in rural areas add more complexity to air 
pollution control. These conditions make it necessary to research the many reactions 
among different pollutants while exploring emissions of each pollutant individually. 
Particulate matter 
Particulate matter is considered to be the most crucial air pollution problem in the 
GPRD region because of its high concentration and great impact on human health. 
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Particulate matter has very broad health effects for all populations, but the 
respiratory and cardiovascular systems are predominantly affected. Finer particles 
tend to have a stronger impact on health. Particles with diameters less than 10 µm 
(PM10) can enter the respiratory tract and increase respiratory symptoms and disease, 
while particles with diameters less than 2.5 µm (PM2.5) can more easily penetrate the 
lungs, decrease lung function, alter lung tissue and structure, and even lead to 
premature death (Zheng et al. 2000). In the GPRD, PM2.5 accounts for a very high 
percentage of particulate matter, up to 70.4 percent of PM10 (Cao et al. 2003). 
Guangzhou has the one of the highest annual average PM10 concentrations in this 
region, ranging from 73 to 99 µg m­3. Even though this range is below the Chinese 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard of 100 µg m­3 for urban and residential areas, 
it is still much higher than the standard of 20 µg m­3 that is suggested by the World 
Health Organization’s air quality guidelines (AQGs) (WHO 2006). Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong have lower annual average PM10 concentrations—around 50 µg m­3— 
which are still more than double the concentration suggested by AQGs. 
Some components of particulate matter, such as toxic metals, can have great health 
impacts on humans, but this data is generally not available for the GPRD beyond Hong 
Kong. While Hong Kong’s annual average of toxic metals in PM10 was under the safety 
limits (Lee et al. 1999), more research should be done for the rest of the GPRD region. 
Ozone 
Since 1990, ozone concentration in Hong Kong has continued to increase (Figure 1), 
while little data is available for the rest of the GPRD region. In October 1995, daily 
average ozone concentration exceeded 80 ppbv (parts per billion by volume) for at 
least five days (Zhang et al. 2008b). The highest hourly ozone average in the GPRD 
increased from 142 ppbv between October and December 2001 to 179 ppbv between 
October and November 2004 (Zhang et al. 2008a). In the downwind southern PRD, 
the 8­hour mean ozone concentration reached 116±16 ppbv in 2004, which is higher 
than 100 ppvb suggested by the WHO AQGs (WHO 2006). 
Figure 1 Trends in major air pollutant concentrations in urban Hong Kong (central/western, 1990­2007) 
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The year­to­year change in ozone concentration also depends on weather patterns. 
For example, when rainfall was very low in 2004, ozone concentration soared 
dramatically. Ozone concentration also has obvious seasonal patterns: fall and spring 
always have higher ozone concentrations (Wang et al. 1998). Anthropogenic VOCs 
(volatile organic compounds) and NOx are also important control factors (Huang et 
al. 2005), and on­road vehicles and power plants are reported to be the main sources 
(Chan et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2002). 
VOCs 
As the precursors of ozone on the ground level, VOCs are critical air pollutants, 
especially in urban areas (Liu et al. 2008). From 2001 to 2006, the composition of 
VOCs in the GPRD region changed dramatically: propane concentration increased to 
nearly 50 percent in both urban (Guangzhou) and rural (Dinghu) areas; isoprene and 
ethyne decreased by 47 percent and 78 percent, respectively; and benzene 
concentrations in cities (Guangzhou) reached 20 ppb due to industrial emissions, 
compared to 16.25 µg m­3 (about 5 ppb) by the UK Air Quality Objectives.6 
The change in VOC composition at different sites provides vital insight into the 
sources of pollutants. For example, the similar changes in VOC spectrum for urban 
and roadside atmospheres indicate that VOC emissions in the city are mainly due to 
fuel combustion in vehicles. VOC composition can further indicate the fuel structure 
of vehicles: ethylene, acetylene, and other light alkenes are attributed to local 
emissions from gasoline­powered vehicles, while propane is mainly contributed by 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) fuel (Box 1). 
SO2 and acid rain 
Since 1999, few trends could be observed for acid rain in most of the GPRD region. 
Guangzhou, which is located at the center of the second largest acid rain region of 
China, has been suffering from frequent and intense acid rain for several decades. 
From 1999 to 2005, acid rain accounted for 63 to 91 percent of rain days every year, 
with the annual average pH values ranging from 4.4 to 4.8. The occurrence of acid 
rain in Hong Kong remains steady, with the annual average pH around 4.6. Acid rain 
occurrences in Shenzhen have increased from 33 percent in 1999 to 81 percent in 2005, 
while the annual average pH values have decreased from 5.1 to 4.6 (Chan and Yao 
2008). These acid rain events are mainly caused by the oxidation of SO2, though the 
ratio of another acidic species, NO3­, has been increasing. 
To deal with the acid rain problem, the government of Guangdong province has 
taken efforts to reduce SO2 emissions, especially emissions from power plants, which 
account for 32.9 percent of SO2 emissions (Wang et al. 2005). An execution plan for 
de­sulfurizing power plants in Guangdong Province was promoted in 2003, and a 
slight decrease of SO2 concentration in Guangdong and Shenzhen was observed in 
2005 (Chan and Yao 2008). However, the SO2 concentration in Guangzhou, 77 µg m­3 , 
was still higher than the Chinese National Ambient Air Quality Standards for urban 
and residential areas. SO2 concentration in Shenzhen and Hong Kong are around 27 
µg m­3, much lower than the standard. 
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Box 1: A Lesson from LPG Fuel 
In 2003, in order to reduce dust emissions from vehicles and improve urban
 
air quality, the Guangdong government started to encourage replacing diesel
 
light buses and taxis with LPG versions by offering incentives.a
 
With 2 billion RMB invested by the government, LPG was quickly adopted
 
by switching the engines of existing vehicles. By the end of 2007, about 6,400
 
buses and 16,000 taxis had been changed to use LPG, which accounted for
 
80% of buses and 100% of taxis in Guangzhou.b However, the many prob­

lems that came to light during this dramatic change have revealed that LPG
 




LPG in Guangzhou faces the dual challenge of high economic costs and
 
limited fuel resources. Even though the government has spent a lot on the
 
transition to LPG vehicles and subsidized the LPG fuel price, most of the bus
 
corporations have been suffering from debts since they adopted LPG. In
 
addition, LPG fuel in Guangdong is highly dependent on imports. With the
 
drastic increase of LPG in the vehicle fuel structure from nearly zero percent
 
to 14.2 percent within only five years,d pressure will increase on the limited
 
LPG resources, as well as the price.
 
In addition, without careful design, new engines are not efficient enough to
 
burn all of the LPG. Sometimes the fuel can be seen leaking out of the
 
vehicles. As a result, even though on­street dust has been reduced, propane—
 
one of the reactive VOC species—has been found in increasing amounts,
 
which could potentially lead to even more serious O3 problems in the region.
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Visibility deterioration 
Deterioration of visibility in the whole GPRD region is the most observable air 
pollution problem among the general public. The number of hazy days—visibility 
less than 10 km and relative humidity less than 80 percent—in Shenzhen has soared 
from 6 in the 1980s to 164 in 2006. In Hong Kong, the percentage of hours with low 
visibility—visibility less than 8 km and relative humidity less than 80 percent—has 
increased from about 4 percent in the 1990s to about 15 percent in 2006. Although the 
number of hazy days in Guangzhou decreased from 1997 to 2001, the number 
increased significantly from 65 in 2001 to 144 in 2004 (Wu et al. 2007). 
This deterioration is caused by the coexistence of multiple pollutants, which also 
makes it difficult to determine the key control elements. Extremely hazy days are 
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associated with high concentrations of aerosols, which are the solid or liquid form of 
particles suspended in the atmosphere (Wu et al. 2007). However, a multiple linear 
regression analysis, which was conducted to determine the relations between 
pollutant concentrations and monthly reduced visibility in Hong Kong, shows 
different results: monthly reduced visibility has little relation with PM10, which is 
supposed to be the main cause of visibility degradation. Meanwhile, monthly 
reduced visibility is highly correlated with SO2 and O3. Thus, the complex chemical 
composition of the atmosphere in the GPRD region requires further research to 
understand the internal mechanisms and determine a control strategy. 
emissions and air pollution: regional and global 
As the variety and emission intensity of air pollutants increase continuously, the 
impact of emissions is no longer limited to a local area. The long­distance 
transportation of pollutants and precursors has enlarged the impact radius of local 
emissions to a regional and even global scale. Consequently, in order to improve air 
quality in the GPRD effectively, it is not enough to just understand the association 
between local emissions and pollution conditions. Rather, more attention should be 
paid to the regional transportation of essential pollutants and precursors. 
The Hong Kong paradox 
The Hong Kong government has been putting a great deal of effort into controlling 
regional smog and street­level air pollution, and local emissions of sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, and PM10 have been dramatically reduced (Figure 2). In 1990, 
annual emissions of SO2, NOx, and PM10 were about 140,000 tons, 180,000 tons, and 
12,200 tons respectively. After sixteen years, the emissions have been reduced to 
70,000 tons, 100,000 tons, and 6,000 tons, respectively. 
After cutting local emissions almost in half, better air quality should be expected. 
However, the impact of these drastic reductions was rarely reflected by the local air 
pollutants concentration (Figure 1). On the contrary, the percentage of poor visibility 
days even actually increased dramatically since the 1990s (Figure 3). If not local 
emissions, what is dominating the continuous degradation of air quality in Hong Kong? 
Could it be attributed to emissions from Guangdong Province? Though many 
researchers and Hong Kong citizens complain about this, it is not necessarily true. 
The GPRD region is dominated by East Asian monsoons, and about 70 percent of the 
winds in Hong Kong are from the ocean or the northeast part of Guangdong, which 
is less industrial than the PRD. In fact, the wind blew directly from 
Guangzhou/Shenzhen—a highly developed region in Guangdong—to Hong Kong 
for less than ten days out of the year. Thus, even though the airmass from 
Guangzhou/Shenzhen is full of pollutants, the direct transportation of this dirty 
airmass to Hong Kong is infrequent. 
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Figure 2 Trends in pollutant emissions in Hong Kong (1990­2006) 
Figure 3 Trends in reduced visibility at the Hong Kong Observatory (1968­2007) 
Source: Chan and Yao 2008 
“In terms of air pollution, if you just conduct local control you will not be 
successful.” 
–John C.Y. Chan 
Even if the impact from Guangdong Province is included, the dominant factor for 
air degradation in Hong Kong is still missing. To identify it, air mass transportation 
on a continental scale should be considered. With this reasoning, the increasing ozone 
concentration along the East Asian coast indicates that the impact of emissions from 
continental scale may be a crucial factor. 
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Ozone increases along East Asian coast 
If the landmass upwind of Hong Kong is considered, all of the East Asian coast could 
be included in the source area. According to backward trajectory calculations, about 
21 percent of the airmass is from the east coast pathway. Correspondingly, obvious 
increases of ozone concentration along the East Asian coast, such as Taiwan and 
Japan, have been reported (Chou et al. 2006; Lee et al. 1998). The annual average of 
daily maximum 1h ozone concentration increased about 2.6 percent yr­1 in Taiwan for 
the period of 1994­2003 and increased 2.5±0.6 percent yr­1 at Okinawa, Japan, for the 
period of 1989­1997 (Chou et al. 2006). 
A possible hypothesis is that ozone precursors are transported and accumulate 
from north to south along the East Asian coast. Under this hypothesis, two factors 
could be explained: (1) the fastest rate of ozone increase was observed upwind of the 
GPRD region. This may be caused by the transportation of ozone precursors from the 
north. (2) when the airmass is transported from north to south, the higher ozone 
concentration tends to be formed in Hong Kong than that in Taiwan and Japan 
because of the higher temperature and radiation in Hong Kong. 
Biomass burning in Southeast Asia 
In Hong Kong, most ozone enhancement cases occur from February to early May, 
which corresponds to the period when biomass burning is most intensive in 
Southeast Asia. Biomass burning includes forest fires, grassland fires, agricultural 
waste burning in the field, and domestic biofuel use for cooking and heating. These 
fires are often initiated by humans, such as burning vegetation for land clearing, but 
biomass burning may also start naturally, such as the case of fires induced by 
lightning.7 
The amount of burning is highly related to the location, season, and human 
activities. The severity of forest and grassland fires initiated by natural causes is 
determined by lightning, precipitation, and temperature. Crop residue burning, on 
the other hand, is determined by agricultural practices (Streets et al. 2003). India, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are the major contributors of biomass 
burning in Southeast Asia, and these burning activities show obvious seasonal 
patterns. For example, in 1998 and 1999, the number of fires gradually increased 
starting in January, reached a peak in March, and then dropped dramatically in May. 
This period accounts more than 80 percent of the total fires annually. 
During the same period, huge enhancement of ozone and aerosols could be 
observed in South China, even in the Tengchong, a remote mountain site in Yunnan. 
In addition, the enrichment of a biomass burning tracer, CH3Cl, could be observed in 
the ozone­rich airmass (Chan et al. 2003). The results from a ten­day backward 
trajectory model show that before reaching the GPRD region, the airmass traveled 
across Southeast Asia from west to east, passing through regions with intensive 
biomass burning activities, such as India, Myanmar, and southwest China (Figure 4). 
Therefore it is believed that ozone enhancement in the GPRD in spring results from 
the intensive biomass burning activities in the Southeast Asia subcontinent. 
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Forward trajectories (Figure 5) also suggest that the emission of air pollutants in 
GPRD could affect the air quality on the other side of the world in a short time. In 
fact, pollutants from biomass burning in Southeast Asia, enhanced by local emissions 
from the GPRD region, can make the journey across the Pacific Ocean and reach 
North America within ten days. Thus, the transcontinental transportation of air 
pollutants makes it possible for local emissions to have a drastic impact around the 
world. 
Figure 4 Ten­day (a) backward air trajectories reaching Hong Kong and (b) forward trajectories
departing from Hong Kong at 4 km during ozone enhancement events from October 1993 to
September 1999 
Source: Chan et al. 2003 
data availability, data quality, and interpretation 
Even though the world has been paying close attention to China’s air pollution issues, 
few people can get access to detailed air quality data. Data availability, as well as data 
quality, has become the biggest barrier for scientists and the public to understand 
China’s air pollution problems. 
The Chinese government has tried to be more open with information on the 
condition of China’s environment, especially since the “Regulation on Government 
Information Openness” was approved in 2007. Daily air quality forecast data for 
sixty­nine important cities has been available online since 2005. These forecasts 
include the maximum and minimum Air Pollution Index (API), primary pollutants, 
air quality levels according to China’s Ambient Air Quality Standards, and 
descriptions of the “Air Quality Situation.”8 In addition to the data published online, 
citizens can request more information by submitting application forms to the 
environmental protection agency within the local or central government, and the 
agency should respond within fifteen workdays.9 
Some provincial governments have also launched initiatives to establish regional 
monitoring networks and publish the results online. In the case of the GPRD, the 
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In order to improve air quality in the GPRD, emissions regulations in the
region became much tougher than in most parts of China, especially more
remote areas such as southwest China. Thus, many heavily polluting
manufacturers could not afford to survive in the GPRD and moved to
southwest China, where they have been welcomed in order to help with the
development of the local economy.
By moving some of the most heavily polluting manufacturers to southwest
China, local pollutant emissions within the GPRD could ideally be better
controlled. However, the impact of the pollution from those manufactures is
far from being eliminated. Through the same pathway demonstrated in
Figure 4(a), emissions from southwest China can still affect the air quality in
the GPRD. As a result, the situation in the GPRD may actually get worse,
since southwest China has a strong desire for a booming economy and little
incentive to control pollution, and thus emissions there tend to be much
more severe. In addition, as manufacturers are scattered in remote areas, it is
becoming more difficult to impose regulations on them.




the Environmental Protection Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKEPD) have been working together to establish a PRD Regional Air 
Quality Monitoring Network since 2003. In this network, sixteen automatic air 
quality monitoring stations, including three regional stations, measure SO2, NO2, O3, 
and PM10 continuously. The measurements are controlled by a set of quality 
assurance and quality control (QA/QC) operating procedures developed by the two 
governments. Monthly maximum and minimum hourly averages for all of the 
network’s monitored pollutants have been reported to the public since 2005.10 
Box 2: Manufacturers: Move or Stay? 
However, detailed air quality monitoring data is still difficult to access in most 
parts of China, especially less developed areas. Without the permission of the local 
and central governments, data related to air pollution cannot be accessed, used, or 
published. Most of the local governments still treat air quality data as confidential 
and regulate it strictly. Thus, although more observation sites have be established 
nationwide, data from these sites still cannot be easily accessed by citizens, scientists, 
or even the other governments in the region. These restrictions might quell public 
blame temporarily, but they have killed initiatives and regional cooperation on the air 
pollution problem. Lack of information makes it very difficult for researchers to find 
an effective air pollution control strategy, especially in the context of increasing 
impacts from regional emissions. 
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Figure 5 Spatial distribution of the PRD Regional Air Quality Monitoring Stations 
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Most data published online is rough and veils the severity of the air pollution 
situation in China. For example, API values that are reported are usually not bad at 
all. Why does China’s API provide a better image of China’s air quality than what is 
happening in reality? Two facts are usually overlooked: (1) China has a very different 
API calculation system from those used in Korea and the United States. With the 
same air pollutant concentration, the PM­API numbers from different calculation 
systems do not match (Figure 6). The results from the Chinese mainland and Hong 
Kong systems are much lower than the results from the American and Korean systems 
(Figure 6); (2) The interpretation methods of API values in the Chinese mainland are 
different from those used in Hong Kong and the United States. The interpretation of 
the API number in the Chinese mainland is called the “Air Quality Situation,” with 
categories such as Excellent, Good, Light Pollution, Low­level Pollution, Severe 
Pollution, etc. Hong Kong interprets API as “Air Pollution Level,” while the United 
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States interprets it as “Levels of Health Concern.” Hence, with an API number 
between 50­100, the interpretation in the Chinese mainland is that the Air Quality 
Situation is “good,” while the rating would be a “high air pollution level” in Hong 
Kong and “moderate health concern” in the United States. 
Table 1 Interpretations of the API in Hong Kong, the Chinese mainland, and the United States 
API system of HK API system of Chinese mainland API system of U.S 
API Air Pollution 
Level 
Air Quality Situation Levels of Health 
Concern 
0­25 Low 0­50 Excellent ˄Ӭ˅ 0­50 Good 
26­50 Medium 
51­100 High 51­100 Good ˄㡃˅ 51­100 Moderate 
101­200 Very High 101­150 Light pollution 
˄䕏 ᖂ∵ᶧ˅
101­150 Unhealthy for 
Sensitive Groups 
151­200 Low­level Pollution 
˄䕏 ᑺ∵ᶧ˅ 
151­200 Unhealthy 
201­500 Severe 201­250 Medium­level Pollution 
˄Ёᑺ∵ᶧ˅
201­300 Very Unhealthy 
251­300 Medium Level­severe 
Pollution 
˄Ёᑺ䞡∵
301­500 Severe Pollution 
˄䞡 ᑺ∵ᶧ˅ 301­500 Hazardous 
Even if all the air quality data could be accessed freely, the quality of the data is 
another crucial concern. Because air pollution has not been included in the top issues 
on most local governments’ agendas, and most of the detailed data is concealed from 
the public, there is little incentive for monitoring stations to stick to or improve 
quality assurance and quality control operating procedures. In addition to the 
absence of public oversight, financial support for more advanced equipment and 
experienced technicians is also urgently needed. In short, the Chinese government 
still has a long way to go to improve the quality and availability of data for the general 
public. 
Technicians are considered “blue collar” workers. Few well­educated people are 
willing to become a technician for their permanent job. 
–John C.Y. Chan 
In closing, though many measures have been taken to tackle air quality 
degradation, the GPRD region still faces great challenges. How can they provide 
enough energy for ongoing industrialization and urbanization while preventing the 
public from exposure to toxic air pollutants? How can they evaluate the impact of 
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local and upwind emissions? How can they collaborate with upwind provinces and 
countries to limit emissions of ozone precursors? These tough problems still remain 
in this region. 
In order to tackle these challenges, scientists must work closely with governments 
to build a high­quality, long­term monitoring network, determine the critical areas 
and pollutants for a cohesive control strategy, and evaluate the appropriateness of 
control measures proposed by the government. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs, NGOs 
(non­governmental organizations), and citizens should be encouraged to participate 
in these efforts. Increasing air quality information transparency should be the first 
step for the government to move forward. 
discussion 
In the lecture, current scientific findings on the air pollution situation in the GPRD 
were summarized, and some lessons and experiences from previous and current 
pollution control practices were discussed. The questions of how to make good use of 
current knowledge and how to move forward to improve air quality in the GPRD 
region became the key points in the discussion session. 
In order to tackle these questions, scientists and policy makers should work 
together. This cooperation requires efforts from both sides. On one hand, scientists 
should state the scientific facts clearly and comprehensively to draw the attention of 
policymakers, while applicable scientific research should be conducted to develop 
and evaluate solutions. On the other hand, policymakers should learn to live with 
both the findings and occasional uncertainties of science. Uncertainties are inherent 
to science and can make science difficult for policymakers to utilize. However, that 
should not be used as an excuse for denying suggestions for vital policymaking. 
Strategies with a long­term vision should be made based on risk analysis. Strategies 
without vision and careful analysis may lead to another situation like the LPG fuel 
dilemma in Guangzhou. One of the practical ways to encourage cooperation is to 
have more scientists involved in policymaking procedures. 
Public participation should also be encouraged to help with environmental 
protection. Environmental protection used to be the obligation of the government, 
but that is no longer the case today. Citizens and corporations have been increasingly 
affected by environmental degradation. For instance, children’s health has been 
threatened, and real estate corporations have lost customers. In other words, there are 
many stakeholders besides the government who have an incentive to support and 
work for environmental protection. They should be used more effectively. 
Government should gradually increase the transparency of air quality data and policy 
making procedures to build up public confidence and encourage public participation 
in decision making. 
Finally, regional cooperation is vital because the impact of transboundary 
transportation has become increasingly important. It is no longer possible to control 
the degradation of air quality in Hong Kong by restricting local emissions. Although 
Hong Kong and Guangdong Province have initiated cooperation on air pollution 
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monitoring, there are more challenges ahead for this process in other fields and on a 
larger scale: (1) For most governments, the priority of air pollution control is still very 
low, so the incentive for intergovernmental cooperation is not strong enough, unless 
economic benefits are provided. (2) The obligations of pollution control are difficult 
to determine. Research on transboundary transportation is still preliminary; reliable 
and quantitative analysis is expected. At this point, although people are drawing 
attention to the impact of transboundary pollution, few effective rules have been 
established. More actions should be taken to foster a more constructive conversation 
between governments, allowing them to tackle their air pollution issues together. 
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CHAPTER 12 
Human­induced Drivers of the 
Development of Lake Taihu* 
Professor Shuqing An 
Nanjing University 
Ranran Wang 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
chapter summary 
“Shocked” is the best word to describe the reaction of people who come back to
Lake Taihu today after visiting years ago.The lake’s previous reputation for glorious
beauty has been ruined by frequent algal blooms in the summer. Human activities
are widely recognized as the most important forces driving this change. 
This chapter gives an overview of the main human­induced causes of Lake Taihu’s
decline. The most radical changes in the lake have occurred during the period from
the 1950s to the present. Flood control projects, wetland reclamation and pollution
inputs are the three primary causes of the lake’s degradation, all resulting from
human development. Major management efforts to restore the lake to its pre­
1950s condition include algae cleanup, discharge regulations, Yangtze River water
transfer, wetland protection and restoration, and demonstration farming zone
construction.Thanks to these restoration efforts, recent years have seen some signs
of recovery, such as temporary water clarification and reduced risk of flooding.
However, scientific understanding of the human and biotic drivers of the lake’s
eutrophication status is far from comprehensive, and more research needs to be
done. 
introduction 
Lake Taihu receives enormous public attention in China. Located in a depression in 
the center of the Lake Taihu catchment, it is the third largest freshwater lake in China 
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1 Taihu Basin Authority, 2007. 
Taihu Basin & Southeast 
Rivers Water Resources 
Bulletin 2007, Ministry of 
Water Resources 
(Figure 1). The lake is 1.9 m deep on average and has a total surface area as large as 
2,425 km2. The lake catchment is 36,900 km2 in size, located at the middle to lower 
reaches of the Yangtze River basin. With a high drainage density (>3 km/km2), the 
lake basin produces the huge volume of 16.3 � 108 km3 water every year. At a distance 
of 60­100 km from the East China Sea, the catchment is dominated by a subtropical 
monsoon climate, resulting in a relatively high temperature (annual average 15­17°C) 
and abundant precipitation (1,180 mm/yr). The basin is made up of highlands (16 
percent) in the southwest, floodplains (68 percent) in the northeast and intermittent 
water areas (16 percent) distributed around the lake. 
Figure 1 Topography of Lake Taihu 
The Lake Taihu catchment holds a unique place in China’s political economy. The 
basin contains administrative divisions that belong to Jiangsu Province (52.6 
percent), Zhejiang Province (32.8 percent), Anhui Province (0.6 percent) and 
Shanghai City (14 percent) (Figure 2). Accounting for only 0.4 percent of China’s land 
area, the catchment contains 3.7 percent of the country’s population and 11.6 percent 
of its gross domestic product (GDP). GDP per capita in this area exceeded US$8,000 
in 2007, over three times the country’s average level. Additionally, the catchment’s 
economic yield per unit of land is 57 times the national average. 1 In 2005, the 
urbanization rate in the lake basin exceeded 70 percent. In the past, the lake has 
provided multiple services, such as municipal water supplies, fish stocks, irrigation, 
and tourism. These uses demonstrate that Lake Taihu plays a crucial role in the social 
and economic development of China. 
Recent years have seen increased stress on the quantity and quality of water in Lake 
Taihu. The notorious blue­green algal bloom in the summer of 2008 resulted in 
serious drinking water shortages in Wuxi City, the most economically developed city 
in Jiangsu Province, and sounded a loud alarm bell for the government, scientists, and 
citizens. Two principal natural factors are thought to be responsible for the problem. 
First, as a result of global warming, the winter of 2007 was unusually warm, failing to 
kill most of the residual algae left from the preceding summer. In the summer of 
2008, the extremely hot weather was ideal for algal growth and hastened the algae’s 
decomposition, the product of which was the direct source of water pollution. 
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Second, since Lake Taihu is an adlittoral lake (or a shallow water body near the shore), 
its shallow depth makes the pollution very difficult to diffuse. However, human 
development, which has resulted in a large amount of agricultural, industrial, and 
municipal waste discharge, as well as construction that disturbs biochemical cycles in 
the basin, is an equally important cause of the problem. 
Figure 2 Location of Lake Taihu in China 
Source: Wikipedia. Revised by Ranran Wang 
In this chapter, we will focus on the principal human­induced drivers of Lake 
Taihu’s development. First, in a historical overview, we will briefly discuss the 
development of human impacts and synchronous conditions at Lake Taihu. This is 
followed by an examination of the major actions designed to aid in the lake’s 
recovery. In the third part, we will discuss several new problems uncovered in the 
course of recent lake restoration efforts. Finally, we will propose some suggestions for 
future improvement. 
human­induced drivers of the development of lake taihu 
Before 1 AD 
The origin of Lake Taihu is a subject of debate. There are four main hypotheses about 
the lake’s formation and evolution. Inspired by the lake’s unique circular basin 
structure (Figure 1), one hypothesis suggests that the lake was formed by a meteor 
impact dating back to more than 70,000 years ago (Wang 2002). The second 
hypothesis holds that Lake Taihu was once a lagoon created by sea­land interactions 
6,000 to 3,500 years ago and was then desalinated by freshwater from mountain rivers 
(Wang et al. 2001). A third hypothesis, based on plate tectonics, proposes that, just 
like many other great lakes in the world, the basin of Lake Taihu was a result of land 
subsidence associated with tectonic movement (Sun and Mao 2008). The fourth 
hypothesis is that the lake was a gathering of three rivers that were blocked at the 
basin, perhaps due to sea level receding (Sun and Wu 1989). 
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During this long historical period, several remarkable ancient civilizations 
emerged in the basin: the Majiabang (偀ᆊ⌰)Culture (7000 BP), the Songzhe 
(⎲⋑)Culture (6000­5300 BP) and the Liangzhu (㡃⏮) Culture (5250­4150 BP), 
followed by an unexplained cultural gap until the Song Dynasty (ᅟᳱ)Culture (1048 
AD). Characterized by low social productivity, human disturbance in the lake area 
was negligible during this period. Rather, the lake formation and the subsequent 
expansion were mainly caused by natural forces. 
From 1 AD to the 1950s 
Development in this period can be divided into three phases: before the East Han 
(૤) Dynasty, from the East Han Dynasty to the Tang (૤)Dynasty, and from the 
Tang Dynasty to the 1950s. These three phases are distinguished by different levels of 
human development. 
Before the East Han Dynasty 
During this phase, the Lake Taihu catchment was much less developed than the 
Yellow River Valley to the north. The primary human activities included primitive 
reclamation, crude fishery and crude organic agriculture. Towns in the lake area 
developed at a slow rate. Anthropogenic impacts on Lake Taihu were insignificant. 
From the East Han to the Tang Dynasty 
The first southern migration in the history of China, caused by civil wars, happened 
at the end of the East Han Dynasty. This big population movement brought both 
labor forces and advanced technology to the Lake Taihu catchment, and stimulated 
unprecedented economic development. Numerous towns were built throughout the 
following 400 years. By the end of the Tang Dynasty, this area had become an 
important national economic region. In this period, human activities expanded to 
include extensive land reclamation, organic agriculture, crude fishing and early 
urbanization. Human influences started to play a role in the lake’s development. 
From the Tang Dynasty (618 AD) to the 1950s 
As national economic development gradually transferred to the south, development 
in the Lake Taihu catchment experienced rapid growth. Political disorder in the north 
resulted in China’s second and third southern migrations, which further enriched the 
labor resources in the catchment. Relying on natural advantages (e.g. sufficient water 
supply) and social advancement, industries like textiles and breweries began to 
flourish. This period was marked by intensified human activities. Population growth, 
agricultural reclamation and industrial construction exerted measurable pressure on 
the lake’s development. From the South Song (फᅟ)Dynasty (1127­1279 AD) onward, 
the central government prohibited all reclamation for fear of aggravated flood 
disasters brought on by river blockage, but the burden of an ever­growing population 
was hard on the land. Thanks to the lake’s great natural buffering capacity, however, 
there was still no record of major environmental havoc caused by humans. Strong 
wind­driven currents in the lake may have overcome the lake shrinkage due to human 
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reclamation by facilitating shoreline erosion and sedimentation transformation (Pu 
1987; Su and Wu 1989). The lake area kept expanding and peaked at 2,550 km2 in 1950 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Area change of Lake Taihu in the past 2,000 years 
Since the 1950s 
The abrupt decline of the lake area in the last 50 years occurred in parallel with the 
degradation of water quality. The local sayings in Table 1 present a lively description 
of water quality degradation in Lake Taihu. These profound transformations were 
driven by anthropogenic impacts from three main categories: (1) flood control 
projects; (2) wetland reclamation; and (3) pollution inputs. 
Table 1 Local sayings about water quality degradation in Lake Taihu 






Cleaning rice and vegetables 
Washing clothes 
Becoming dirty 
Losing fish and shrimp 
Causing human injury 
Flood control 
Flood threats in the Lake Taihu catchment come from two main sources: “plum” rain 
in June and July, controlled by the Pacific subtropical high pressure system, and 
hurricanes from August to October originating in the Pacific. Prolonged and intense 
precipitation can cause waterlogging in the catchment’s flat topography. The 
intrusion of sea tides makes water drainage difficult. Flooding will result in high 
social and economic costs in this wealthiest area of China. In order to control flood 
damage over the years, local people have built 20 medium to large reservoirs, 540 km 
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of sea walls and river banks, 270 km of embankment around the lake, 25 dredged 
riverways, and 28,000 km of polder dikes. Indeed, some benefits have been achieved. 
For the three largest floods since the 1950s (1954, 1991, and 1999), although the 
absolute economic cost increased with each flood, the ratio of the economic cost of 
the floods to GDP actually decreased (Mao 2000). However, these human 
interventions will eventually disturb the biochemical cycle in the aquatic ecosystem. 
For example, by blocking the transport of nutrients, dams will result in nutrient 
accumulation in the lake basin and lead to lake eutrophication, reducing dissolved 
oxygen (DO) levels and disrupting the fishery. With the waterways blocked by the 
flood­control structures, populations of migratory fish species such as Coilia ectenes 
and Anguilla japonica, as well as semi­migratory fish species such as 
Mylopharyngodon piceus and Ctenopharyngodon idellus, will inevitably be reduced. 
Wetland reclamation 
Wetland reclamation is another contributor to the degraded ecosystem health of Lake 
Taihu. Known as the kidneys of the earth, wetlands play an important part in 
ecosystem functioning. Wetlands in the Lake Taihu basin consist of lakes, reservoirs, 
ponds, rice paddies, and bogs, and account for 65.9 percent of the basin’s territory. 
They serve as habitat for a large number of animal species, including zooplankton (79 
species), zoobenthos (59), fish (106), amphibians (9), reptiles (25), mammals (36), 
birds (173), and hydrophytes (75). They also provide ecological benefits in the form of 
flood diversion and storage, water clarification, eutrophication prevention, regional 
climate adjustment, and ecotourism. Since the 1950s, the ever­increasing demand for 
land, owing to continuous population growth, has led to a large amount of wetland 
reclamation for farming and building construction. From 1950 to 1985, a total of 160 
km2 lake area was reclaimed. East of Taihu Lake, an area of 3,200 km2 was utilized for 
fish breeding even though the quota set by the central government was only 1,000 km2. 
These disturbances have resulted in a dramatic species decline. From the 1960s to the 
1990s, the number of fish species in Lake Taihu declined from 106 to 60. Additionally, 
when the wetlands suffered from human reclamation, the lake’s capacity for water 
purification and eutrophication prevention was greatly weakened. The combined 
effects of flood control projects and wetland reclamation have radically changed the 
trophic status and fish populations in Lake Taihu over the last 60 years. 
Pollution input 
Along with the booming human population, which has led to rapid industrialization 
and urbanization, pollution discharge to the lake has been increasing since the 1950s. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the pollution mainly came from farmland fertilizer use 
and household sewage, in fairly low amounts. Vigorous water circulation provided by 
strong currents in the lake helped maintain a reasonably high DO level (>7 mg O2/L) 
even at the bottom of the lake as measured in the 1970s (Chang 1996). The high DO 
was able to oxidize much of the organic matter that had entered the lake and keep the 
lake generally oligotrophic or mesotrophic. It was not until the 1980s that the rate of 
pollution discharge was considered to be detrimental. 
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Pollutants emitted by agriculture, industrial facilities, and households in the lake 
basin have increased substantially since the 1980s. In 2000, 80 percent of the water had 
been polluted by emissions containing 491,500 t (metric tons) COD (chemical 
oxidation demand), 14,400 t TP (total phosphorus) and 130,000 t TN (total nitrogen). 
These effluents are responsible for the lake’s drastic change in eutrophication status 
and the sharp decrease in water quality. Table 2 shows the changes of several 
biochemical indices for water quality (CODMn, TN, TP, Chl a, TSI), the water quality 
index, and trophic states from 1960 to 2005. 
Table 2 Water quality and trophic state changes in Lake Taihu 
Year 






States mg/L mg/L mg/L mg/L 
1960 1.90 0.05 0.020 ND 34.97 I­II Oligotrophic 
1981 2.83 0.900 0.020 0.4 43.60 II Oligotrophic 
1987 3.30 1.543 0.029 7.0 54.08 II­III Mesotrophic 
1988 4.20 2.772 0.032 12.0 63.69 II­III Mesotrophic 
1990 3.90 2.349 0.058 43.0 69.05 II­III Mesotrophic 
1992 3.70 2.870 0.080 12.0 66.50 II­III Mesotrophic 
1993 4.05 2.350 0.080 30.0 68.70 III Eutrophic 
1994 4.12 1.730 0.130 13.0 65.13 III Eutrophic 
1995 4.48 3.140 0.133 19.0 71.01 III­IV Eutrophic 
1999 4.99 2.570 0.105 ND 69.61 IV Eutrophic 
2000 5.28 2.540 0.100 23.0 70.01 IV Eutrophic 
2003 4.59 2.850 0.078 14.4 67.60 IV Eutrophic 
2005 4.99 2.950 0.074 10.2 66.92 IV Eutrophic 
1. CODMn: A measure of the oxygen demand for oxidation of all the organics in solution through the strong 
oxidizing agent potassium permanganate (KMnO4). 
2. TN: A measure of all the forms of nitrogen found in water solution. 
3. TP: A measure of all the forms of phosphorus found in water solution. 
4. Chl a: C55H72O5N4Mg, an essential molecule in algae for photosynthesis; it is a good indicator of lake 
primary productivity. 
5. TSI: Trophic state index, a measure of water trophic states. 
6. Water quality index: Based on the national standard for surface water in China, surface water quality is 
categorized into 5 classes. With the index running from Class I to V, water quality decreases. 
From 1981 to 2005, COD increased from 2.83 to 4.99 mg/L. TN and TP increased 
to more than three times the original values. Water quality deteriorated from Class II 
to IV. The trophic state transformed from oligotrophic, meaning relatively low 
concentrations of plant nutrients and high concentrations of DO, to eutrophic, 
meaning relatively high concentrations of plant nutrients and low concentrations of 
DO. All other variables in Table 2 also indicate chemical deteorioration of Lake Taihu 
in this period. 
Biological changes in terms of species composition were also alarming (Figure 4). 
In the 1980s, when the lake was still oligotrophic, bacillariophyta was the dominant 
phytoplankton species. Cyanophyta, which has an exceptional capacity for N 
assimilation, was the second largest group. From 1985 to 1995, when the 
concentrations of TN and TP greatly increased, the lake’s trophic states changed from 
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mesotrophic to eutrophic and cyanophyta replaced bacillariophyta as the principal 
species. 
Figure 4 Variations of phytoplankton species composition with TN and TP increase in the water col­
umn of Lake Taihu since the 1980s 
Source: Fan, 1996; Li et al. 2006, revised by Ranran Wang 
During this period, the population of cyanophyta was relatively stable while those 
of the other three species (bacillariophyta, pyrrophyta, and cryptophyta) fluctuated. So 
far in the 2000s, the role of cyanophyta has been so overwhelming that the other 
species have almost gone extinct. Now cyanophyta is known to be the prime culprit 
in the eutrophication in Lake Taihu. 
Fertilizer overuse in farmland is a major force driving the water quality 
degradation. In recent years, fertilizer use intensity in the Lake Taihu basin has been 
578 kg/km2, 41 percent higher than the national average. While fertilizer use continues 
to go up, crop yields only show a moderate increase that is not proportional to the 
increase in fertilizer use. The excess fertilizer will be carried by runoff into the lake, 
contributing to the lake eutrophication problem. However, given the importance of 
agriculture, the pollution impacts of fertilizer use have been ignored by the 
government. 
The water degradation in Lake Taihu also results from mounting releases of 
industrial and municipal wastes. In the mid­1990s, 0.54 billion m3 of industrial 
effluents and 0.32 billion m3 of municipal effluents were discharged to the basin every 
year. In 2000, industrial effluents rose to 5.33 billion m3 and municipal effluents to 
3.24 billion m3. While the decreasing trends of TN, TP, Chl a and TSI since 2000 are a 
positive sign from restoration efforts (Table 2), the clockwork­like boom of 
cyanophyta in recent summers reminds us that we are still a long way from fully 
restoring the health of the lake. 
restoration and management 
Since the establishment of the Taihu Lake Basin Administrative Bureau in 1984, 
multiple actions have been taken with regard to the lake’s management, restoration, 
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and protection. Some of them are more effective than others. In the following section, 
we will provide a brief summary of these actions. 
Action 1: Algae cleanup 
Algae cleanup is the most direct way to limit algae spread. In the early years, this was 
done manually by employing professional salvage crews. Because of the high algae 
propogation rate, dozens of workers were needed for continuous work every day. In 
recent years, mechanical salvage boats have replaced the traditional manual labor and 
thus have sped up the cleanup in some lake areas. Several large­scale mechanical 
removal methods are in the development stage, which will integrate physical 
separation with purification by special detergents based on biochemical technologies. 
If successfully put into use, the removal efficiency will be greatly enhanced. However, 
it is a challenge to find good places to dispose of the massive amount of algal residue 
salvaged from the water without causing more pollution in the future. Obviously, 
algae cleanup cannot cure the root of the problem. 
Action 2: Discharge regulation 
Since the mid­1990s, the State Council and local governments have launched a series 
of discharge regulations for Lake Taihu. The “Zero o’clock Pass” action called for 
chemical industries, livestock farmers, hotels, and restaurants along the lake to 
achieve the national emission standards before midnight on January 1, 1999. 
Subsequently, local governments launched movements like “Turning the Lake Clean 
in 2000” and “Shutting Pollution off before the 21st Century.” Unfortunately, despite 
these efforts, the water continues to deteriorate. In 2005, 84.4 percent of water 
resources in the basin were listed as Category III or worse, and 34 percent of drinking 
water sources were polluted to varing degrees. In January 2008, the provincial 
government of Jiangsu put a new set of sewage discharge standards into effect, the 
toughest ever in China, for sewage treatment plants in the Lake Taihu basin. For 
plants built before 2008, the regulatory release limit for COD in effluents was changed 
from 60­120 mg/L to 50­60 mg/L, NH3­N from 15 mg/L to 5­8 mg/L, and TP from 1 
mg/L to 0.5 mg/L. TN was added as a new index, with the regulatory limit of 15­20 
mg/L. Sewage treatment plants constructed after 2008 must meet the lower limits of 
these emission ranges. Once the 169 sewage treatment plants along Lake Taihu have 
achieved the upgraded standards, it is possible that the COD emission will be reduced 
by 50 percent, TN by 60 percent and TP by 50 percent. 
Action 3: Yangtze River water transfer 
This operation uses the existing river channels and flood gates to flush the lake with 
water from the Yangtze River. It is based on the idea of “conquering the unmoving 
with the moving, diluting the polluted with the clean, supplementing low flow with 
ample flow” to improve water quality. Two experimental trials were conducted. In the 
first trial in 2002, 784.38 million m3 of water was transferred through five 
experimental diversions (January 1 to April 3, August 7 to 12, September 26 to October 
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11, October 19 to 31, and December 5 to 9). In the second trial, 1.109 billion m3 of water 
was transferred between August 6 and December 17, 2003 (Hu et al. 2008; Figure 5). 
Six days after the water transfer in both experiments, notable abatement was seen in 
the density of phytoplankton and the concentrations of TN and chlorophyll a. 
However, ten days after the transfer, water conditions returned to their original state. 
No reduction was ever observed in TP, which is a key determinant of the lake’s 
eutrophication. The limited success of the water transfer operation is a result of 
sediment re­suspension by scouring and pollutant accumulation in the sediment. 
Figure 5 Main routes of water transfer 
Source: Hu et al. 2008. Revised by Ranran Wang. 
Action 4: Wetland protection and restoration 
Natural wetlands, while accounting for only 3.8 percent of land area in China, 
contribute 54 percent of the total services provided by all natural ecosystems (An et 
al. 2007). The natural wetlands lost in the past fifty years would have provided the 
capacity to purify 150 percent of the TN and 60 percent of the TP discharges in China 
in the year of 2000 (An et al. 2007). In order to improve water quality and rebuild the 
ecological functions of Lake Taihu, great efforts have been invested in wetland 
protection, restoration, and construction. According to one scenario constructed by 
the government for improving Taihu water quality, 14.79 billion RMB will be invested 
in ecological renovation by the Ministry of Water Resources, a big part of which will 
be spent directly on wetland protection. The local government also plans to provide 
funds for wetland construction. In Jiangsu Province, a wetland park in Suzhou City 
has been built, and a project to build lakefront wetlands is underway around Wuxi 
City. With a growing awareness of the importance of wetlands, restoration and 
protection are likely to receive more attention. 
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Action 5: Demonstration farming zones to control agricultural pollution 
Non­point pollution from agricultural activities is a major cause of eutrophication in 
Lake Taihu. To improve water conditions in the lake, these non­point sources must be 
carefully controlled. Demonstration farming zones are proving to be an effective way 
to control this kind of pollution (Figure 6). In these zones, any effluents flowing into 
the village must go through the “pre­dam control area” and be treated in the “pre­
dam removal” facility. Pollutants from agricultural activities, such as fertilizers and 
pesticides, are treated by the “agricultural pollutant control” facilities around the 
farmland. Household sewage is delivered into the “decentralized sewage treatment” 
facility for pre­treatment and then to the “centralized sewage treatment” facility for 
further treatment. “Garbage treatment” facilities are designed for collection of other 
domestic wastes. Riverways in the village are protected by the “water purification and 
ecological restoration” facilities. “Lakefront ecological restoration” and “estuary 
pollution control” are achieved through physical barriers that prevent pollution from 
flowing into the lake. These demonstration zones can be found in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
and Anhui Provinces. At present, they are receiving a great deal of attention and 
support from the government, the scientific community, and the public. Their fate is 
unclear in the future. 
Figure 6 An illustrative map of a demonstration farming zone for controlling non­point agricultural
pollution 
summary 
The Lake Taihu Basin is one of the most important economic and cultural centers in 
China. Formed thousands of years ago, the lake has provided for shipping, fisheries, 
irrigation, drinking water, and tourism for a long period of time (Figure 7). Since the 
1950s, human activities have placed a growing stress on the lake’s development. Flood 
control projects, wetland reclamation, and pollution input are the three major human 
drivers responsible for the lake’s degradation. Although huge restoration efforts have 
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been made toward restoring the basin, no obvious recovery has been noticed so far. 
More research is needed for a complete understanding of the biogeochemical cycles 
in the basin. Environmental regulations and engineering projects should focus more 
on the root of the problem by controlling pollution sources rather than focusing on 
cleanup operations. 
Figure 7 The traditional Chinese character “Su” appears in the name of Jiangsu Province where Lake
Taihu is located. It depicts a landscape of fish, rice paddy and natural vegetation. Professor Shuqing
An hopes that the Taihu Catchment will be restored to this harmonious coexistence of humans and 
nature. 
Calligraphy by Xin Zhang 
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CHAPTER 13 
Synthesis: Ways to Move Forward* 
Xuhui Lee 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
In this chapter, we wish to synthesize the most important aspects of the semester­long 
seminar course on China’s environment that forms the basis for this book. The 
course was offered in the fall semester of 2008 at the Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies and included public lectures by eleven invited experts as well 
as discussion sessions with the guest lecturers and Yale students and faculty. 
In the course, we discussed a set of diverse and seemingly unconnected topics. Our 
speakers were asked to deliver their perspectives on the topic of their choice, and not 
to focus too much on cross­cutting issues. Listening to their lectures, reading their 
background papers, and interacting with them during reception events, we have 
gained a tremendous appreciation for the complexity of China’s environmental 
challenges. At the same time, a number of coherent themes have emerged out of the 
complexity. The purpose of this synthesis exercise is to distill these themes into 
constructive recommendations, in the hope that they may help policymakers to move 
forward with China’s environmental reform. 
pollution dispersion: local interest versus regional coordination 
Protection of local interests occurs in response to various political and regulatory 
pressures. During the 2008 Olympics, “yellow cars” – cars that were built before 1999 
and did not meet the EU1 emissions standards – were kept outside Ring Road 6, in 
an effort to improve air quality in Beijing. In Guangdong Province, policies that 
promote the change of its industrial structure toward the service and high tech 
sectors have caused polluting textile factories to relocate to the less­developed 
neighboring provinces such as Guangxi. For some factories, relocation to regions 
with cheaper labor is also a matter of survival as the new labor contract law1 increases 
their costs of operation. In the wake of the 2008 Lake Taihu algal boom, the central 
government shut down thousands of chemical factories in the lake catchment, only 
* This chapter was written by 
Professor Lee with 
contributions from the 
student authors of chapters 
2­12. 
1 The labor contract law, which 
went into effect in January 
2008, makes it difficult for an 
employer to terminate 
employment contracts. 
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to find that many of them re­opened elsewhere. Because of the lack of national and 
regional coordination, such instances of pollution dispersion appear widespread. 
Pollution dispersion also occurs in subtle ways. The Olympics cleanup efforts 
involved importing clean natural gas from southwest China. As a result, people in that 
region were left with dirtier fuels for domestic and industrial use. Clean air in Beijing 
came at the cost of deteriorated air quality elsewhere. 
Pollution dispersion matters because a pollution footprint is not confined to any 
political boundary. In principle, the performance of government officials is evaluated 
against not only GDP growth but also emission reductions and energy savings 
targets, but attention to these environmental goals varies across the country. In the 
less­developed interior regions, GDP growth still dominates the social and economic 
agenda, so much so that some county and provincial officials would disregard 
environmental regulations in order to recruit polluting enterprises. Yet locations that 
see polluters moving away may not actually enjoy improved environmental quality. 
For example, relocating textile factories from Guangdong to Guangxi could even 
degrade the water quality of the Pearl River in Guangdong. This is because with less 
stringent regulations, these factories can discharge more waste water into the West 
River, a large tributary of the Pearl River. In the case of air quality management, 
consideration of the pollution footprint is equally important. Only by shutting down 
factory operations and tightening road traffic in its neighboring provinces did Beijing 
see improved air quality during the Olympics (Chapter 7). 
Clearly, regional coordination is necessary in order to improve environmental quality. 
One recommendation we discussed is to utilize industrial parks as an effective solution to 
the dispersion problem. In these parks, pollution regulation is more stringent, 
environmental monitoring more comprehensive, and enforcement capacity stronger than 
if pollution sources were dispersed to remote locations. By confining industries in a small 
area, recycling of solid waste, heat, and waste water becomes cost­effective (Chapter 6). 
One downside is that most of the industrial parks in China are located in population 
centers, so that special attention must be given to human exposure to air pollution. 
A second idea we discussed is ranking ecological service zones according to their 
carrying capacity. Some zones must be protected for water quality and others for 
wildlife conservation. These ecological attributes determine where pollution sources 
should be placed. Practicing ecological principles, however, requires holistic thinking 
beyond one single performance measure. The “Grain­to­Green” program is a 
successful example of national coordination to protect marginal land in China’s west 
(Chapter 4). The burden of food production is now shifted to more fertile lands in 
the east, sometimes with unintended consequences. In the Lake Taihu catchment, the 
pressure to maintain high crop yields means that curbing fertilizer use, which 
degrades the lake’s water quality, becomes difficult (Chapter 12). 
special experimental environmental zone 
Progress toward environmental objectives is hampered, in our view, by the mismatch 
between the simplicity of environmental policies and the complex reality on the 
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ground. Environmental laws in China often lack enforceable details. Policy directives, 
such as the 11th Five­Year Plan, contain goals that are more aspirational than binding. 
In the case of wildlife conservation, the blanket ban against hunting may actually hurt 
conservation objectives because it removes incentives for local people to participate 
(Chapter 9). As one student puts it, prohibition is easy to legislate, though not 
necessarily easy to enforce. 
One way to move forward is to create special environmental experimental zones 
(SEEZs). Like the special economic zones that spurred the economic reform in the 
1980s, the SEEZs are designed for experimenting with bold, forward­thinking 
environmental measures. They are test grounds for trying out concrete methods 
being used in the developed countries for regulation, monitoring, and capacity 
building. The mindset of learning from experimentation also provides real hope for 
breaking the ideological gridlock that otherwise would be insurmountable at the 
national scale. The lessons learned would then propagate from these zones to the rest 
of the country, much like the way the economic reform policy did in the 1990s. To 
paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, China would be practicing environmental regulation 
with Chinese characteristics. 
Some environmental experiments are already happening. In ecocities, new 
technology and concepts are being tested that will minimize resource consumption and 
waste output (Chapter 6). The trial SO2 emissions trading program is an attempt to 
learn from the success of acid rain abatement in the U.S. (Chapter 5). In Shanghai, a new 
land credit system allows real estate developers to gain development rights if they restore 
enough degraded wetland elsewhere (Professor Shuqing An, personal communication). 
One feature that distinguishes the SEEZ from these ongoing experiments is the necessity 
to think big geographically. Without coordination over a large enough geographic area, 
ecocities cannot improve the quality of life because they are merely green dots in a 
landscape inundated with brown smog and fouled by polluted water. 
In the spirit of experimentation, we should challenge the widely­held view that it 
is publicizing the damage of pollution, not the pollution problem itself, that may 
trigger social unrest. In the SEEZ, efforts should be made to ensure that not only data 
on environmental quality, but also data on human health, are easily accessible to the 
general public. Even simple maps of morbidity and mortality, when analyzed together 
with air and water pollution maps (Chapter 5), can send powerful messages to 
policymakers and entrepreneurs about the real cost of economic development. 
Another experiment for consideration in the SEEZ is to privatize the work related 
to environmental monitoring. An obstacle in China’s environmental reform is the 
lack of manpower in the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA; now 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, or MEP). As noted by Prof Jianguo Liu2, SEPA 
employed only one­eighth the number of workers of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency even though China’s population was three times that of the U.S. 
The elevation of SEPA to a full ministry has changed the power dynamics, as MEP 
leaders can now participate in cabinet­level meetings. However, the size of the MEP 
workforce remains essentially unchanged. Because the government uses a rigid quota 
system for hiring public servants, a drastic increase in the MEP size is not going to 
2 Jianquo Liu and Jared 
Diamond (2008). 
Revolutionizing China’s envi­
ronmental protection. Science 
319:37­38. 
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happen anytime soon. In recognition of this reality, private firms should be allowed 
to shoulder some of the workload. Environmental monitoring is a technical field, 
with well­defined parameters and technology. It is a good candidate for the 
privatization experiment. 
Forward­thinking should be an important hallmark of the SEEZ. So far, air quality 
management has focused on sulfur compounds and particulate matter. Ozone and 
mercury, two other pollutants at the center of regulatory activity in the developed 
countries, have received little attention. Rather than handling one set of pollutants at a 
time, policymakers should be encouraged to think beyond the present time frame and 
anticipate the harm ozone and mercury will continue to cause in the future. Similarly, 
the SEEZ should lead the way in experimenting with effective strategies for reducing the 
carbon footprint of economic development (Chapter 8). Experiments of this type could 
be an impetus for transforming China into a society in true harmony with nature. 
environmental education and human resource development 
The need to build environmental capacity, especially human resource development, 
was an issue repeatedly brought up by our guest speakers. Professor Richard Harris 
offered a sobering example: only one wildlife biologist was engaged in the 
management of a wildlife reserve in China that is twice the size of Montana (Chapter 
9). The reasons for the low capacity are manifold. Wildlife education and research in 
China are very theoretical and are not well connected to managing wild species in 
open habitats. More generally, environmental monitoring is a blue­collar, technician’s 
job with low social status and little prospect for career advancement (Chapter 11). In 
universities and government laboratories, SCI publication3 counts are an overriding 
factor in job performance evaluation. People are not rewarded for painstaking work 
on data collection and on the solution of practical problems. 
New incentives generated by the privatization experiment discussed above can 
operate in parallel to the academic performance matrix. They allow market 
mechanisms to value the service technical people provide to the society. 
University education plays a vital role in capacity building. Environmental degree 
programs in Chinese universities have a relatively short history of ten years or less. 
They place a strong emphasis on technical training related to some focused aspects of 
the environment. In comparison, the U.S. environmental programs emphasize 
rounded education, with a mode of training akin to that of the MBA degree. Students 
study not only technical skills, but also environmental law and policy, environmental 
economics, and statistical analysis of environmental data. At graduation, they are 
knowledgeable about the critical issues concerning pollution, resources, conservation, 
and environmental regulation, the four pillars of effective environmental manage­
ment. Such a model of environmental training could be of value for China. 
A related, but broader question is whether people with more advanced education 
will have a smaller environmental footprint. Professor Jianguo Liu made a convincing 
case that investment in education is a viable solution to making the Wolong Panda 
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Reserve a better system. This is because with good education, young people in the 
reserve can find employment elsewhere, thus reducing the pressure on local 
ecosystems. On larger scales, how education shapes personal consumption habits is 
poorly known. Quantitative studies are needed to establish evidence that links better 
education to greener consumption choices. 
Several speakers emphasized the increasing role of executive training in capacity 
building. Tsinghua University, Professor Jimin Hao’s home institute, has been 
collaborating with the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies on an 
environmental education program targeted at city mayors. Professor Zunyu Chen’s 
university has launched a training program for the municipal government of 
Shenzhen, to which mandatory attendance is required of its top officials. These 
speakers believe that executive training is much more effective if social, economic and 
technical lessons are brought to bear on the analysis of specific cases rather than 
theoretical lectures on environment 101. 
Lake Taihu, the third largest freshwater lake in China, is an excellent candidate for 
such a case analysis. According to Professor Shuqing An, there are 103 lakes with a size 
greater than 1 km2 in the Yangtze River Basin. All but three are now isolated from the 
Yangtze for flood control, land reclamation, and fish horticulture. By the end of 2009, 
Lake Puoyang, China’s biggest freshwater lake, will likely be blocked by dams. (Lake 
Dongting, the second largest lake, seems safe at the moment because the nature of the 
surrounding geography requires that the river water runs though it.) There is an 
urgent need for local officials and business leaders to learn lessons from Lake Taihu’s 
management so that the ecological problems that have occurred in its catchment are 
not repeated elsewhere. 
international collaboration 
China’s environmental woes are also those of the world. The developed countries are 
partially responsible for environmental degradation in China: They import factory 
products from China but leave behind hazardous wastes (Chapter 4). It is also important 
to note that some of the pollutants are dispersed globally so that their damages are not 
confined to China’s national boundaries. It is imperative that the international 
community play an active role in helping China meet its environmental challenges. 
Mr. Ma Jun’s lecture emphasized the unique role of business leaders of 
multinational companies (Chapter 5). By forming partnership with domestic NGOs, 
these companies can influence business practice in China. Some of them mandate 
that their suppliers adhere to stringent international pollution standards. Domestic 
companies on their own pay less attention to being black­listed on Ma Jun’s pollution 
map, but are more likely to clean up if their polluting behavior is hurting the brand 
name of the multinational that purchases their products. Over time, this bottom­up 
pressure should lead to positive changes in Chinese corporate culture. 
In our discussion with the speakers, we have identified several barriers to 
international collaboration that deserve further attention. The first one concerns 
intellectual property rights. Technology transfer, especially the transfer of green 
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technology, has the potential to produce tempting low­hanging fruit. Although 
Chinese laws on intellectual property have been streamlined since China joined the 
WTO, enforcement of these laws is still weak. Strengthened protection will remove 
the fear of some entrepreneurs that their intellectual property rights may be infringed 
upon should they use their latest invention in China. It will also stimulate the 
emergence of new technology that can cope with China’s unique situations. For 
example, there is an urgent need to find ways to dispose of the massive amounts of 
manure waste being produced by livestock farming. Scientists are challenged to 
convert the manure to either chemically balanced fertilizer or a new generation of 
biofuel (Chapter 10). Foreign talents are likely to take on these challenges if they are 
assured that their research results will be strictly protected. 
A second barrier is the lack of transparency in bilateral collaborations. Many 
government agencies and universities have environmental programs that engage 
partners in China, but they are not fully informed of what others are doing. The lack 
of multi­lateral dialogues may stem from the desire to protect trade secrets, or more 
likely from different incentive structures for their work with China (Chapter 2). We 
believe that programs that target a specific problem can induce nations to work 
together. For example, South Korea, Japan and the U.S. all feel the impact of mercury 
emissions in China. Having this problem orientation should help streamline the 
incentive structure toward a common goal for these countries. 
A shortage of bilingual professionals is identified as the third barrier that hinders 
international collaboration. In Dr. Gary Waxmonsky’s division at the U.S. EPA, fewer 
than a handful of people are proficient in Chinese. According to Professor Alice 
Newton, language difficulty is a big obstacle that plagues the direct dialog between 
small businesses in the EU countries and their Chinese counterparts. She also notes 
that EU’s capacity building efforts bear the legacy of its colonial past: Spanish 
researchers prefer to work in Mexico and Portuguese scientists in Brazil, in large part 
because of convenience of communication. Language immersion programs, such as 
the two­way Erasmus­Mundus where western students receive intensive language 
training in China, could facilitate better collaboration in the future (Chapter 3). 
checks and balances 
The power balance in China’s environmental regulation is played out vertically 
between the central government and those at the provincial and county levels. In 
western democracies, environmental regulations are negotiated among elected 
government officials (who represent citizens’ concerns), industrial groups, and 
environmental NGOs4. In China, the interests of various actors are intertwined. For 
example, enterprises in the energy, auto and construction sectors are the backbone of 
the booming economy and also the main culprit in the smog problem. A majority of 
these enterprises are state­owned. Some government entities serve the dual role of 
polluter and pollution regulator. There is little oversight from NGOs and private 
citizens of how these regulators regulate themselves. Only their superiors in the 
vertical chain of command have the real power to hold them accountable. 
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synthesis: ways to move forward 
The central government, with good intentions and policies, often relies on 
environmental incidents as leverage for action. Immediately after the chemical spill 
in the Songhua River in 2005, the Minister of Environmental Protection was removed 
from power. The Lake Taihu algal boom cut off water supply to millions of residents 
in the Wuxi municipality, and more than 3000 chemical plants were shut down. In 
response to the severe water shortage in the lower reach of the Yellow River, a strict 
water quota system was enforced in provinces in the upper reach of the river basin5 . 
The governmental response is decisive when people’s lives are threatened or 
conditions are causing social unrest. 
Environmental degradation differs by degree. If the situation does not reach the 
point of crisis, it usually does not get attention at the top. Even if it does, the shortage 
of enforcement manpower does not guarantee prompt action. This is a gap that non­
governmental actors can fill. Through streamlining the accessibility of environmental 
pollution data, NGOs can generate pressure on polluting enterprises and even on 
local governments (Chapter 5). With the backing of the central government, 
professional societies, such as the Ecological Society of China, are now taking on the 
added responsibility of environmental monitoring, auditing and eco­labeling. 
Scientists, especially prominent ones such as members of the People’s Congress and 
the Science Academy, are playing an important role in the power balance. We have 
seen good examples: Professor Xu Zhao is a consultant to the government of 
Shanghai; Professor Jiming Hao played a critical role in shaping the air quality 
regulations for the Olympics; Professor Zunyu Chen has been organizing 
environmental training for the government of Shenzhen. 
The relationship between NGOs and the government is unique in China. In the 
opinion of some guest speakers, for these actors to be effective, it is essential that they 
do not have a hidden agenda, that their motives are in line with the social and 
economic goals of the central government, and that their actions support rather than 
undermine the socialist state of governance. 
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5 The quota system, together 
with the “Grain­to­Green” pro­
gram, produced a successful 
solution to the trans­bound­
ary water problem. The river 
stopped running dry about 5 
years ago. Jinan, the capital of 
Shangdong Province located 
at the end of the river, no 
longer needs groundwater to 
meet its water needs. Natural 
spring fountains – the “spirit 
of the city” – have returned to 
numerous tourist attractions 
in the city.
































2 劳动合同法，2008年 1月生效，使得雇主很难终止雇佣合同。 
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3 Jianguo Liu and Jared Diamond (2008) Revolutionizing China’s environmental protection. Science 
319: 37-38. 
4  ISI Web of Knowledge 科学索引系统收录期刊的论文。 
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水的问题，黄河流域上游的省市被强制执行一套严格的水配额制度。 6 当人民的生 
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